City University of New York

2008 Graduate Student Philosophy Conference

The students of the Ph.D./M.A. Program in Philosophy at the CUNY Graduate Center
present our Eleventh Annual Graduate Student Philosophy Conference on March 28 & 29, 2008.

All events will be held at the CUNY Graduate Center at 365 Fifth Avenue.

Friday, March 28, 2008

1:00–2:15 Room 9204 "Rigidity, Theoretical Identification and Essentialism"
Nigel Leary, University of Birmingham
Commentator: Mark Alfano
Chair: Monique Whitaker
Download this paper
In this paper I will reinterpret the claim that Kripke's theoretical identification sentences express, when true, a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds. I will argue that there is a clear disanalogy between proper names and natural kind terms, locating this difference both in the motivation behind the individual projects, and at the semantics of theoretical identification sentences. I will then argue that any necessity concerning natural kinds within the Kripkean semantic program turns on a version of non-trivial essentialism, built on a questionable view of scientific investigation, both of which I argue are debatable. Finally I will argue that Kripke's suspicious metaphysics is vital to the rigid designation relation, and that the conclusion, that there a (metaphysically) necessary truths, knowable a posteriori, turns out, in light of Kripkean essentialism, to be both unsurprising and dubious.

Room 9205 "Varieties of Moral Equivalence in Just War Theory"
Saba Bazargan, Rutgers University
Commentator: Graham Parsons
Chair: Sophia Bishop
Download this paper
I argue that the doctrine of the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC), a corner-stone of the just war convention, has been mistakenly thought to be a single claim, when in fact there are multiple, incompatible versions. These various versions impose different adequacy-conditions on candidate in bello rules, and delimit to different extents the in bello rules to which those conditions apply. Each version can be assessed by determining the extent to which it coheres with the just war convention. Specifically, I invoke two necessary criteria. The first is: for any in bello rule, if it imposes a restriction on a class of acts for combatants on one side of a war, it must do the same for combatants on all sides. The second criterion is: no in bello rule can entail the claim that combatants who fight in unjust wars eo ipso do so wrongfully. I show that orthodox versions satisfy either the first or second criterion, but not both. Ultimately, I argue for a version of MEC which satisfies both criteria. This is the version of MEC, rather than others prominent in the literature, that those in favor of the just war convention ought to adopt.

2:45–4:00 Room 9204 "Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem"
Angela Mendelovici, Princeton University
Commentator: Mike Collins
Chair: Kyle Ferguson
Download this paper
There is a very popular approach to mental representation that identifies representation with a species of causal relation holding between mental states and things in the world. This view identifies a representation's content with whatever it tracks, where tracking is causal co-variation in optimal, normal, or adaptive conditions, or conditions of asymmetric dependence, depending on the theory. I argue that there are representations that represent one thing but track another. This is the mismatch problem for causal theories of mental representation. I discuss three examples of mismatch cases: hot- and cold-representations, heaviness-representations and color-representations. I suggest that contrast effects might point to another source of mismatch cases and sketch an argument against causal theories from contrast effects relating to attractiveness. I conclude that representations bear interesting and important causal relations to things in their environments, but that none of these relations constitute representation. Tracking and representation are two distinct phenomena.

Room 9205 "A Religious Challenge to Justificatory Liberalism"
Kevin Vallier, University of Arizona
Commentator: Joshua Livingston
Chair: Jessica Jeavons
Download this paper

Justificatory liberalism holds that imposing upon another for religious reasons is unacceptable because the reason the imposition is based upon cannot be accessed by others. Thus, the imposition cannot be justified. To the justificatory liberal, religious reasons are the paradigmatic 'private reasons' which necessarily cannot be shared. Thus, imposing coercion based on religious commitment is unacceptable. In arguing for this, the justificatory liberal relies on a distinction between religious reasons and secular reasons. Secular reasons, while not necessarily public, stand a much better chance of counting as public reasons, or reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share.

This paper challenges the strong distinction between religious and secular reasons that justificatory liberalism often assumes. My goal is to show that there is no non-arbitrary distinction between what counts as religious reasons and secular reasons. Religious reasons can be distinguished from secular reasons in virtue of their content, but there is no formal description of religious reasons that distinguishes them from secular reasons.

If my arguments are successful, I do not think justificatory liberalism is defeated. To the contrary, if justificatory liberalism can be reoriented away from the religious-secular divide that has prevented it from gaining broader acceptance. I suggest that justificatory liberalism can abandon its reliance on the religious-secular reason distinction in a few ways, arguing for one option over the others.

4:30–6:00 Room
9206/9207 Keynote Speech: Professor Stephen Neale, CUNY Graduate Center
"Heavy Hands and Scene-Reading Traps"

6:30 Dinner near the Graduate Center

Friday, March 28, 2008
1:00–2:15	Room 9204	"Rigidity, Theoretical Identification and Essentialism" Nigel Leary, University of Birmingham Commentator: Mark Alfano Chair: Monique Whitaker Download this paper In this paper I will reinterpret the claim that Kripke's theoretical identification sentences express, when true, a posteriori necessities concerning natural kinds. I will argue that there is a clear disanalogy between proper names and natural kind terms, locating this difference both in the motivation behind the individual projects, and at the semantics of theoretical identification sentences. I will then argue that any necessity concerning natural kinds within the Kripkean semantic program turns on a version of non-trivial essentialism, built on a questionable view of scientific investigation, both of which I argue are debatable. Finally I will argue that Kripke's suspicious metaphysics is vital to the rigid designation relation, and that the conclusion, that there a (metaphysically) necessary truths, knowable a posteriori, turns out, in light of Kripkean essentialism, to be both unsurprising and dubious.
Room 9205	"Varieties of Moral Equivalence in Just War Theory" Saba Bazargan, Rutgers University Commentator: Graham Parsons Chair: Sophia Bishop Download this paper I argue that the doctrine of the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC), a corner-stone of the just war convention, has been mistakenly thought to be a single claim, when in fact there are multiple, incompatible versions. These various versions impose different adequacy-conditions on candidate in bello rules, and delimit to different extents the in bello rules to which those conditions apply. Each version can be assessed by determining the extent to which it coheres with the just war convention. Specifically, I invoke two necessary criteria. The first is: for any in bello rule, if it imposes a restriction on a class of acts for combatants on one side of a war, it must do the same for combatants on all sides. The second criterion is: no in bello rule can entail the claim that combatants who fight in unjust wars eo ipso do so wrongfully. I show that orthodox versions satisfy either the first or second criterion, but not both. Ultimately, I argue for a version of MEC which satisfies both criteria. This is the version of MEC, rather than others prominent in the literature, that those in favor of the just war convention ought to adopt.
2:45–4:00	Room 9204	"Causal Theories of Mental Representation and the Mismatch Problem" Angela Mendelovici, Princeton University Commentator: Mike Collins Chair: Kyle Ferguson Download this paper There is a very popular approach to mental representation that identifies representation with a species of causal relation holding between mental states and things in the world. This view identifies a representation's content with whatever it tracks, where tracking is causal co-variation in optimal, normal, or adaptive conditions, or conditions of asymmetric dependence, depending on the theory. I argue that there are representations that represent one thing but track another. This is the mismatch problem for causal theories of mental representation. I discuss three examples of mismatch cases: hot- and cold-representations, heaviness-representations and color-representations. I suggest that contrast effects might point to another source of mismatch cases and sketch an argument against causal theories from contrast effects relating to attractiveness. I conclude that representations bear interesting and important causal relations to things in their environments, but that none of these relations constitute representation. Tracking and representation are two distinct phenomena.
Room 9205	"A Religious Challenge to Justificatory Liberalism" Kevin Vallier, University of Arizona Commentator: Joshua Livingston Chair: Jessica Jeavons Download this paper Justificatory liberalism holds that imposing upon another for religious reasons is unacceptable because the reason the imposition is based upon cannot be accessed by others. Thus, the imposition cannot be justified. To the justificatory liberal, religious reasons are the paradigmatic 'private reasons' which necessarily cannot be shared. Thus, imposing coercion based on religious commitment is unacceptable. In arguing for this, the justificatory liberal relies on a distinction between religious reasons and secular reasons. Secular reasons, while not necessarily public, stand a much better chance of counting as public reasons, or reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share. This paper challenges the strong distinction between religious and secular reasons that justificatory liberalism often assumes. My goal is to show that there is no non-arbitrary distinction between what counts as religious reasons and secular reasons. Religious reasons can be distinguished from secular reasons in virtue of their content, but there is no formal description of religious reasons that distinguishes them from secular reasons. If my arguments are successful, I do not think justificatory liberalism is defeated. To the contrary, if justificatory liberalism can be reoriented away from the religious-secular divide that has prevented it from gaining broader acceptance. I suggest that justificatory liberalism can abandon its reliance on the religious-secular reason distinction in a few ways, arguing for one option over the others.
4:30–6:00	Room 9206/9207	Keynote Speech: Professor Stephen Neale, CUNY Graduate Center "Heavy Hands and Scene-Reading Traps"
6:30	Dinner near the Graduate Center

2008 CUNY Graduate Student Philosophy Conference Schedule (continued)

Saturday, March 29, 2008
9:30–10:15	Breakfast in the Philosophy Program lounge (Room 7113)
10:15–11:30	Room 9204	"Psychological Explanation and the Broadness of Content" Neil Mehta, University of Michigan Commentator: Jared Blank Chair: Kyle Ferguson Download this paper Fodor argues that (1) there are intentional psychological laws, (2) these laws are implemented by computational processes, (3) all content is broad (so it doesn't supervene on what's in the head), and (4) content is atomistic. Given the picture of implementation that Fodor endorses, however, these four theses look incompatible. We need sufficient conditions linking intentional properties to computational-mechanism properties and sufficient conditions linking computational-mechanism properties to intentional properties. But, in Frege cases, the intentional properties of a mental term apparently do not determine an implementing computational mechanism. Fodor attempts to explain away this incompatibility by arguing that, in the nomically relevant worlds, Frege cases don't occur systematically; I give counterexamples that show that, in the actual world, Frege cases do occur systematically. I conclude that, since (1) and (2) are non-negotiable theses, there must either be some narrow content or some non-atomistic concepts.
10:15–11:30	Room 9205	"Endurantism, Timelessness and Time Travel" Ben Phillips, University of Sydney Commentator: Jean-David Lafrance Chair: Sophia Bishop Download this paper In Four-Dimensionalism, Ted Sider presents three 'arguments from exotica' as he calls them, which are offered up as objections to the view, favoured by endurantists, that temporary intrinsics are relations to times. The first of these is an argument from the possibility of timeless worlds, while the second and third are arguments from the possibility of time travel. I start by defending Sider's arguments against several replies given in the literature, before going on to argue that there are time-traveling scenarios analogous to the ones canvassed by Sider which can be used to force the endurantist to admit a brute impossibility, where this same impossibility can be perspicuously explained by the proponent of temporal parts.
12:00–1:15	Room 9204	"Intuitions and Expertise" Kaija Mortensen, University of California, Santa Cruz Commentator: Alex Kiefer Chair: Laura Di Summa Download this paper Michael Devitt (2006) claims that intuitions function in philosophical theory-building analogously to the way they function in linguistic theory-building. According to Devitt, intuitions are truth-tracking judgments made spontaneously and unreflectively by experts. While I agree that articulating the relationship between expertise and intuition is key to better understanding the standard philosophical practice of constructing thought experiments, I argue that 1) philosophy cannot appeal to intuitions in the same way that linguistics does and 2) Devitt's account of expertise is too thin to explain the real philosophical work an intuition does. Drawing on the work of Hubert Dreyfus, I propose that the judgments philosophers like Devitt call intuitions are judgments based on the non-propositional knowledge that one acquires via the situational training required to gain expertise. This insight illuminates the role intuitions should play in philosophical theorizing as well as helping us better understand the ways our intuitions can be misguided.
12:00–1:15	Room 9205	"Kaplan on Quine's Theorem" Paolo Bonardi, University of Geneva and New York University Commentator: Daniel Leafe Chair: Monique Whitaker Download this paper The so-called Quine's Theorem states that in a sentence, if a given position, occupied by a singular term, is not open to substitution, then that position cannot be occupied by a variable bound to an initially placed quantifier. A presumed counter-instance to this theorem has been put forward by David Kaplan in his article "Opacity". The purpose of my paper is to illustrate Kaplan's counter-instance to the theorem and to prove that it fails.
1:15–2:30	Lunch in the Philosophy Program lounge (Room 7113)
2:45–4:00	Room 9204	"A New Inductive Argument for the Existence of Other Minds...?" Josh Sheptow, UC Berkeley Commentator: David Pereplyotchik Chair: Jake Berger Download this paper I consider an argument advanced by Everett (2000) that we can learn about other peoples' minds from testimony. More specifically, we can infer from the fact that (1) other people are generally reliable; and (2) other people say things like "I am in pain", and "I believe that P" that (3) other people have pains and beliefs and, hence, minds. I then raise six different objections to this argument. The last objection, I claim, is decisive.
2:45–4:00	Room 9205	"Epistemological Emergence in Solid State Physics" Johannes Knolle, Boston University Commentator: Patrick Martin-Breen Chair: Jessica Jeavons Download this paper This paper discusses aspects of emergence in the physical sciences, especially, with respect to the relation between Solid State and Particle Physics. Starting with some results and definitions from the recent debate on reduction, supervenience and emergence the paper introduces the concept of epistemological emergence. This idea is used to clarify differences between Solid State and Particle Physics. The paper discusses emergence in Quan- tum Mechanics and goes on to the interlevel relationship between the two physical sciences. Superconductivity is shown to be one example for an epistemological emergent phenomenon. Through the study of the praxis of problem solving inside the two different fields, epistemological emergence becomes apparent.
4:30–6:00	Segal Theater	Keynote Speech: Professor Achille Varzi, Columbia University "Boundaries, Conventions, and Reality"
6:30	Dinner near the Graduate Center

Return to the 2008 Conference Web Site