This is the CUNY/Mt. Sinai Medical School preclinical elective seminar in medical ethics for M.D. and Ph.D. candidates. Extended discussions of the theoretical issues involved in the human genome project, issues in genetics, birth defect policy, humane care, life termination policies,transplants, controlled clinical trials, epidemics, incompetence, and justice in health care distribution. Several critical topics in the philosophy of science (scientific explanation, prediction, proof, and scientific revolutions) and ethical theory will be discussed as they relate toindividual cases. Ph.D. students will also have the opportunity to attend Medical Center case conferences. The works to be read are:

1. Contempory Issues in Bio-Ethics, 4th Ed., Beauchamp Waiters, Wadsworth
2. Philosophy of Natural Science. Hempel, Prentice-Hall

Plus handouts.

Prerequisite to consideration for medical ethics fellowship.

Instructors:

• Bernard Baumrin, Ph.D., J.D., Professor of Philosophy (CUNY), (212) 787-5638
• Daniel Moros, M.D., Associate Professor of Neurology (MSMC), (212) 241-8134

The course will focus on philosophical theories of diachronic personal identity (what makes a person at a later date identical to a person at an earlier date?) and synchronic personal identity (what makes an individual a singular person at any point in time?). After exploring some general issues about identity and personhood, and briefly surveying some classical theories of personal identity, we will consider contemporary "psychological" and "physicalist" theories of personal identity. We will discuss the role played by memory, spatiotemporal continuity of body and brain, "core" psychology, "personal" psychology, and "unity of consciousness" in the determination of personal identity. We will consider the philosophical status as well as the purported implications of thought experiments involving reincarnation, brain division and transplantation, fission and fusion, teletransportation, molecular decomposition and recomposition, and the relevance of psychological studies of split-brain patients and multiple personalities. We will also consider the implications of different theories of personal identity for questions of personal responsibility and desert, and the role (if any) our individual concepts of our identity play in determining our personal identity. If time permits, we will look at the bearing of current psychiatric and social-psychological theories of personal identity on philosophical criteria of personal identity. Regular attendance is required. Duplicates will not be accepted, and fission products will be independently assessed. Multiples will be assessed once only.

Readings for the course will be primarily drawn from the following texts (which intending students are advised to purchase), supplemented by xeroxed materials:

• Kolak, D, & Martin, R. (1997). Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
• Perry, J. (ed)(1975). Personal Identity. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

We will examine current research on the semantics and pragmatics of fiction and metaphor. The course will be organized about four questions. What is fiction? How are our imaginings about a work of fiction generated? What is the ontological status of fictional objects such as Emma Bovary and Lilliput? What are the issues in formulating a correct theory of metaphor?

1.) The nature of fiction. Walton characterizes fiction in terms of a propositional attitude involved in its uptake. Currie, in opposition to writers such as Walton and Searle, relies heavily on a Gricean model of communication according to which fiction emerges as a speech act.

2.) How can something be "true in the story" when it is not explicitly stated in the text? Thus, nowhere in the text of Madame Bovary is it actually stated either that her husband had two legs or that he ate pizza, yet the first is sanctioned by the text and the second isn't. We will consider David Lewis's classic "Truth in Fiction" in which he develops two principles for settling such questions. Kendall Walton disagrees and argues that there can be no satisfactory principles for generating such "fictional truths", while Currie making use of Gricean intentions and themes from the logic of belief sentences to provide some of more refined versions of such principles.

3.) What is the correct semantics for fictional names e.g., "Emma Bovary"? Are there fictional objects as the semantic values of such names, and if so, are they best thought of in terms of possible world semantics [Kripke maintains that fictional objects don't merely happen not to exist, but that they could not possibly exist], Meinongian semantics, or in some other way?

4.) Which semantic framework is right for figurative language, such as irony and metaphor? We will discuss the views of Aristotle, Searle, Davidson, Fogelin, and Lakoff among others.

Readings:

K. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe Harvard Univ. Press, G. Currie, The Nature of Fiction Cambridge Univ. Press, R. Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking Yale Univ. Press, and papers by J. Searle, P. Strawson, D. Lewis, D. Davidson. Notes from Kripke's John Locke lectures on fiction.

The course will focus on a close reading and analysis of Descartes' principal philosophical works, including Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Discourse on Method, Meditations on First Philosophy and The Passions of the Soul, with selections from the objections and replies to the Meditations and his correspondence. Particular attention will be paid to Descartes' connections with earlier authors and his influence on Continental Rationalism.

An investigation of the mathematics behind the logic. Intended for students who have had a previous logic course, but little mathematical background. After considering propositional logic in some detail, we will examine the Tarski definition of model and satisfaction. Soundness and completeness will be proved, and some of the fundamental consequences of model theory arising from these results will be examined. We will look at both axiom systems and tableau systems, but familiarity with these proof methods is not presupposed.

This class will be given from 1/29 to 3/21.

The course will begin with some of the classical authors, Frege, Russell, perhaps Mill, which formed the background for Naming and Necessity. It will then discuss various problems and objections that have arisen out of the book: the contingent a priori; the nature of rigid designation; the transmission of the reference of names; and others. Some knowledge of the book and its background is highly desirable in those taking the course.

Text:

Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press (ISBN 0674598466)

The regular classroom for this will be C198 (Concourse Level). However, the first two meetings, Jan 31 and Feb 4, will be in the Proshansky Auditorium (just in case there is a big crowd to start with).

All lectures will be taped and copies can be borrowed by those who miss a class.

The course will be divided into 5 topics:

1. Explanation and Confirmation
2. Realism, Reductionism, and the Nature of Theories
3. Scientific Change: Rationality and Objectivity.
4. A Brief, Closer Look at a Scientific Concept: Causality and Determinism.
5. A Brief, Closer Look at a Particular Science: Philosophy of Biology (or Psychology)

Text: R. Boyd, P.Gasper, and J.D. Trout, eds. The Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: The MIT Press)

Requirements: 1 short, critical/analytical, paper, and either a term paper or a final exam.

This course addresses central issues in the theory of knowledge, focusing on questions falling under four broad headings.

1) The skeptical challenge and the analysis of knowledge. Can we hope to know anything beyond the contents of our immediate experience? What conditions would have to be met in order for us to have such knowledge?

2) The nature of justification. Can a belief be justified if the person whose belief it is cannot provide grounds for it? Do beliefs always depend for their justification on other beliefs, or do some beliefs provide the "foundation" on which others are justified? Are standards for justification absolute, or do they vary from context to context?

3) The sources of knowledge. In what ways, exactly, is empirical knowledge dependent on experience? Is all knowledge dependent on experience in these ways, or can there be a priori knowledge, knowledge dependent only on reason and understanding?

4) The aim and status of philosophical theories of knowledge. What is the relation between scientific pursuit of knowledge and philosophical accounts of knowledge? What, if anything, is the philosopher looking for that the scientist is not providing?

Text: Epistemology. An Anthology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim (Blackwell, 2000).

Students will be assumed to have access to Descartes's Meditations, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Descartes's First Mediation will be discussed in the first meeting.

This class will be given from 4/1 to 5/23.

The course focuses on the foundations and limits of toleration and individual liberty in plural societies. The importance of toleration was first acknowledged in the area of religion, and the course will begin with a discussion of one of the liberal classics, John Locke's A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689). The case for toleration and individual liberty will then be considered in a broader context, with some attention being paid to another liberal classic, John Stuart Mill's essay ON LIBERTY (1859), and the character of its defense of liberty. The arguments and principles invoked will then be applied to some contemporary issues relating to the legal enforcement of society's shared morality, the position of the state with respect to different conceptions of the good life, and the significance of cultural diversity within a society.

Readings:

• John Locke, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (any edition).
• J.S. Mill, ON LIBERTY (any edition).
• R. Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Duckworth, 1977).
• S. Mendus, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM (Macmillan,1989).
• Michael J. Sandel, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT (Harvard University Press, 1996).
• J. Waldron, LIBERAL RIGHTS (Cambridge University Press, 1993).
• C.L. Ten, MILL ON LIBERTY (Oxford University Press, 1980).
• C.L. Ten, ed. MILL's MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Ashgate, 1999).
• P. Devlin, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (Oxford University Press, 1965).
• H.L.A. Hart, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY ( Oxford University Press, 1963).
• Robert P. George, MAKING MEN MORAL (Oxford University Press, 1995).
• J, Gray and G.W. Smith, ed. J.S. MILL ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS (Routledge, 1991).
• W. Kymlicka, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE (Oxford University Press, 1989).
• W. Kymlicka and I. Shapiro, ed. ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (New York University, 1997).
• B. Barry, CULTURE AND EQUALITY (Harvard University Press, 2001).

A critical examination of the philosophical argumentation in Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Ion, Lesser Hippias, Laches, Lysis, Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Protagoras. Three short papers are required, each an analysis of a section of argument in one of the dialogues. No knowledge of Greek is presumed.

Wittgenstein's philosophy developed in two stages. The first stage, 1912 - 1918, ended with the publication of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: the second stage began in 1929 and ended with his death in 1951. The seminar will cover both stages and it will analyze the way in which the second stage developed out of the first. It will also deal with the place of Wittgenstein's work in the history of 20th century philosophy. The following topics will be among those that are discussed: Logical Atomism, the Picture Theory of Sentences, Solipsism, Linguistic Regularity, the Private Language Argument, Necessity, and Philosophical Method. The course will end with an examination of Wittgenstein's strange view that the pronoun "I" is not a referential expression.

Preparatory classes will be Mondays 5:00-6:00 PM in the NYU Philosophy Conference Room.

See the NYU Philosophy Department's site for the course description.

An exploration of some of the central issues in philosophical aesthetics, largely through modern and contemporary writers. Topics to be taken up include: What is the right account of the concept of intention in art and art criticism? May art be seen, as Goodman and Langer have held, as a "language" and if so, what advantages follow from this picture? How are aesthetic descriptions to be understood - if such descriptions do not appear to follow from naturalistic descriptions, are they then inchoate or mysterious? How are critical justifications to be understood - if, as it certainly seems, there are no laws of aesthetic success, is it the case then that there really are no justifications either? How we are to understand the institutional theory of art and the more subtle historical version of that theory recently developed by Danto?

Philosophical aesthetics faces in two directions. Where relevant, the connections between these theories to more general arguments or positions in philosophy will be taken up. How positions in aesthetics follow from or fit in with various arguments made in philosophy generally will be one of the main concerns of this course. But we will also be concerned with the degree to which these positions do justice to or illuminate our considered experience of art and art criticism.

I have been asked to give this course to the graduate students of Hunter College's studio art and art history program. Hence the location and the two and half hour time slot (do not be alarmed - I am sure we will take a break). The presence of actual artists, a group not known for excessive deference to authority, and art historians, who I assume, will have a wealth of examples to draw upon, should make things very interesting; at the same time, a certain amount of patience with the philosophically young will be expected. Course requirements: a final exam or 15 page course paper.

From Pragmatism to Professionalism: Means, Ends, and the Development of a Professional Ethic for Criminal Justice Practitioners

Those who work in criminal justice (e.g. police, corrections officers) tend to be pragmatically oriented. Their vision is shaped by certain social ends (e.g. lower crime; apprehension of criminals; secure incapacitation), and this can easily lead to the use of controversial means. Such pragmatism might seem to be problematic for the development of a professional ethic. This course will offer an extended exploration of the complicated ethical dialectic of ends and means, drawing broadly on work in ethics and political philosophy (e.g. the dirty hands problem) as well as considering its relevance for the more specific project of constructing a professional ethic for criminal justice practitioners.

Weekly readings will be provided. Participants will be expected to make a class presentation as well as write an extended research paper on some aspect of the topic.

Texts:

• Paul Rynard & David P. Shugarman (eds), Cruelty and Deception: The Controversy over Dirty Hands in Politics (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000).
• John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing (Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. Ch 2.

General Reading:

• Niccolo Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings (ed. & trans. Ian Wooten, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).
• Leon Trotsky, John Dewey, & George Novack, Their Morals and Ours: Marxist versus Liberal Views on Morality. Four Essays (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973).

This course deals with the way contemporary scientific findings and theories can be relevant to philosophy. No special scientific knowledge is presupposed, only elementary (undergraduate) logic and philosophy. We will approach the subject by way of a flourishing area of intellectual controversy: contemporary cosmology as a testing-ground for both the physicist's theories of matter and the philosopher's theories of science. After an overview of the relevant theories our discussions and readings will center on such topics as:

-The nature and limits of scientific observation. For example, physicists regard the early universe as a useful physical laboratory; but we can see into this laboratory only indirectly, and in a way that demands much philosophical sophistication.

-The scientific credibility of cosmological claims. For example, how can one make assertions about the so called "Big Bang", or the existence of largely separate and markedly different cosmic regions?

-Cosmology and metascientific attempts to fix the limits of scientific explanation, in relation to, for example, recent physical theorizing about why the "fundamental constants of nature" (say, the proton's mass and charge) are what they are, or why there is something rather than nothing.

-Cosmology and metascientific attempts to fix the limits of what is meaningful or true. Consider, for example, the doctrine that the true is what could be warrantedly be asserted in the "long run" vis-a-vis so much in contemporary cosmology.

-Conceptual issues about origins and causality. For example, is there anything that is philosophically puzzling in the notion that matter has a temporal origin?

-Cosmology and some presumed revivals of natural theology. Consider, for example, all the recent self-indulgemt excitement and all the fuss generated by various versions of the so-called "Anthropic Principle".

-The expanded scope of neo-Darwinian naturalism as a contemporary perspective, particularly with regard to our understanding of what we are and where we fit into the "scheme of things".