Hobbes, in his Leviathan, denied the existence of witches, demons, and immaterial human soul, and an incorporeal God. He also denies that humans were naturally social or oriented to the good, and insisted that the were basically motivated by a desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain, virtue and vice being merely names. These "materialistic" theses underwrote Hobbes' novel approach to the problems of political authority and obedience involving a monarch-by-convention, installed through the operations of fear, desire, and rationality.

All this looked cynical and dangerous to many of Hobbes' readers. Nevertheless, some philosophers, including Locke, were cautiously receptive to Hobbes' attempt to place experimental, rather than supernatural foundations under morals and politics. Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding soon attracted considerable negative publicity in its own right. It was said that Locke, in his attack on innate ideas, "struck at Fundamentals, threw all Order and Virtue out of the World..." Newton said that Locke has "struck at ye roots of morality in a principle you laid down in your book of Ideas." Locke's mere suggestion that matter might think put Bishop Stillingfleet into a rage.

This seminar will first examine Hobbes' construction of a severely anti-spiritual ontology in his Elements of Body and a naturalistic politics in his Leviathan. We will then uncover the subtly modified versions of materialism, hedonism, and conventionalism extant in Locke's Essay. Finally, we will consider the attacks of critics and their rival schemes. The aims of the course are to: a) provide a general perspective on early modern empiricism; b) gain experience with the interpretation of both canonical and noncannonical texts in the history of philosophy; and c) cultivate an appreciation of the historicity of current debates between deontologicsts vs. consequentialists, and moral realists v. contractualists.

1. Reading list (to be purchased):
   • Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge, CUP, 1996.
   • John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975.
2. To be purchased as a packet at cost:
   • Short excerpts from: Hobbes, Elements of Body: John Smith, The Immortality of the Soul; Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheism; Cicero, De Finibus; John Edwards, The Eternal and Intrinsick Reasons of Good and Evil; Richard Bentley, Boyle Lectures; Thomas Tension, The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examined; Thomas Stillingfleet, Correspondence.

A bibliography of recommended secondary literature will be provided at the beginning of the term.

Coursework:

A 500-600 word summary (exactly 1 page, typed, single-spaced) of the week's reading should be prepared, brought to class, and handed in. These summaries will serve as the basis of class discussion; they also will be commented upon and reutrned for revision. A final paper (5,000-6,000 words) employing secondary sources will be due at the end of the term, along with a complete set of at least 10 (ideally revised and improved) summaries.

A graduate-level introduction to problems and ideas in the philosophy of language. The major topic concerned are meaning, reference, logical form, the analytic-synthetic distinction, propositional attitudes,names, and indexicals. The empahsis will be on current discussions of these topics and their relation to basic issues in the history of philosophy. The text is A. Martinich Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 4th ed., Oxford University Press. Further information and syllabus will be posted at comet.lehman.cuny.edu/mendel.

OPEN ONLY TO PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS

This course will take up certain central conceptions of moral judgment and moral life in both their classical and contemporary expressions. The emphasis will be on the relative, and distinctive, strengths and weaknesses of such theories.

Students may well already own most of the readings for this course. I will either order an anthology or assemble a packet of the readings as well. But in any event, students taking this course should have read G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, chapter 1, for the first class. The selection of Moore that appears in the Cahn/Markie anthology, Ethics, History, Theory, Contemporary Issues, will do as well.

A survey of philosophical texts and thinkers from the Fourth through the Fourteenth Centuries. Authors to be studied will include Augustine, Boethius, John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm, Abelard, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham and John Buridan. Major issues will include the relation of philosophy to theology in the Christian, Islamic and Jewish traditions and the role philosophy would play in the history of science.

"Whether the modal notion 'there could have been', as contrasted with 'there is', is genuinely intelligible and scientifically respectable, has of course been a contentious issue in philosophy." (J. Burgess)

"Necessity abounds. ... But how much diversity is there to this abundance? ... I shall argue that there are three main forms of necessity — the metaphysical, the natural, and the normative." (K. Fine)

Various kinds of possibility (and their associated necessities) do indeed abound in so many areas of philosophy. We will begin on a quasi-historical note, with the appeal to possibility via the notion of conceivability in Hume and Descartes (Here Yablo's "Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?" is a good place to start). We then turn to Kripke's Naming and Necessity, for his conception of possible worlds and the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility. There are all sorts of relative necessities that seem to fall into systematic place, and we intend to stay with some basic kinds modality that are of transparent interest. What is modal possibility? What are real, physical possibilities, and how do they figure in laws of nature or in accounts of laws of nature? We will address the modal issues of 'can' in the free will debate, as well as the role of possibility in the analysis of indicative and counterfactual conditionals. In the philosophy of mind as well as in an account of (conceptual) analysis, a two-dimensional approach has become prominent in the work of Davies, Stalnaker, Chalmers, Jackson and others. We will delve into it a bit (probably using Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics). Epistemic possibility is crucial to understanding skepticism, the (disputable) closure of knowledge under implication, and whether 'know' is contextually sensitive, a topic we will treat.

A number of very good articles on the relation of conceivability and possibility, not to mention an excellent Introduction can be found in Gendler and Hawthorne's collection: Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford Pb, 2002), which we shall use.

Finally, if time, interest, and competence permit, we will ponder the puzzle of "imaginative resistance" in ethics, as discussed recently by Gendler and Weatherson.

Requirements: Term paper. 'Possibly' either a short, critical paper or [inclusive] a presentation in class. Not necessarily both.

A critical examination of the role of education within a democratic society. Among the readings are Plato's Republic, John Dewey's Democracy and Education, and Amy Gutman's Democratic Education.

Two short papers are required.

THIS COURSE WILL RUN FROM SEPTEMBER 13 TO OCTOBER 27, 2005.

Philosophy of Mind in Aristotle and his ancient interpreters

This is the first time it will have been possible to teach this course because a Sourcebook is available for the first time giving translations and explanations of the ancient interpreters of Aristotle. Vol 1 deals with Philosophy of Mind, including ideas from Aristotle's Ethics, and the contrast with Plato's views. The only book everyone will need to buy is Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200 - 600 AD, vol. 1, Psychology, which should be available from Cornell University Press. If not, it came out from Duckworth in England in December 2004, and can be ordered e.g. from Amazon.co.uk At least one copy of vol 2 will be in the classroom and any remaining passages needed will be on a handout.

The course will be different from the Sourcebook, however, in the following way. It will start from the views of Aristotle in his Philosophy of Mind and Ethics and the contrast with Plato. Only when Aristotle (and his difference from Plato) has been explained, will we turn to the Sourcebook to see how Aristotle's views were reinterpreted before being passed on to the Middle Ages, to Thomas Aquinas and Descartes.

The course will proceed by philosophical topics. Ten examples follow.

1 Freedom, When first mentioned and when connected with (a) will, (b) indeterminism? Responsibility, Same questions (different answers).
Sourcebook vol 1, Ch. 14
Optional reading:
Richard Sorabji 'The Will', Ch. 14 in his Emotion and Peace of Mind, Oxford University Press, 2000, paperback Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Duckworth, London 1980 paperback, Chs 14-15.

2 Concept formation
Sourcebook vol.1, Ch 1a, 3g, 3i, 3j, 5b, 5c
Optional reading: Richard Sorabji 'The ancient commentators on concept formation', in Frans de Haas, ed., Interpretations of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, forthcoming, Brill, Leiden.

3 Relation of bodily to mental states
Sourcebook, vol.1, Ch. 6a
Optional reading: Richard Sorabji Emotion and Peace of Mind, as above, Ch. 17. Victor Caston, 'Epiphenomenalisms ancient and modern' Philosophical Review 106, 1997, 309-361.

4 Does Aristotle accept immortality that is both human and individual?
Sourcebook vol. 1, Chs. 3g, 12b
Optional reading: Richard Sorabji, 'Is the true self an individual in the Platonist tradition?' in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, ed., Le commentaire entre tradition et innovation, Vrin, Paris 2000, 293-9.

5 Does perception involve the use of reason?
Sourcebook vol. 1, Chs 1a-b, 2a, 4c
Optional reading: Richard Sorabji 'Aristotle's perceptual functions permeated by reason', in Gerd van Riel, Caroline Macé, eds, Platonic Ideas and Concept Formation in Ancient and Medieval Thought, Leuven University Press 2004, 99-117.

6 Physiological processes and intentional objects: development of the idea
Sourcebook vol. 1: Chs 1d, 1e, 3n
Optional reading: The rival interpretations of Aristotle by Myles Burnyeat and Richard Sorabji in M. Nussbaum, A.Rorty, eds, Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, 2nd edition, paperback, Oxford University 1995, are adjudicated by:
Victor Caston, 'The spirit and the letter', in Ricardo Salles, ed., Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, Oxford University Press, 2005, 245-320.
The development of the idea of intentional object is discussed in
Richard Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: the Development of the idea of intentionality' in H.Blumenthal, H. Robinson, eds, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol. 1991, Aristotle and the Later Tradition, 227-259.
Victor Caston, 'Aristotle and the problem of intentionality' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 1998, 249-98.
Victor Caston, 'Why Aristotle needs imagination', Phronesis 41, 1996, 20-55.

7 Animal minds
Sourcebook vol. 1, Chs 6d, 11b, 17g, 17h, 18a
Optional reading; Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals, Duckworth and Cornell 1993.
Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame, Duckworth, London, 1980 paperback, Ch 11.

8 Soul self-moving or unmoved?
Sourcebook vol. 1, Chs 6a, 6b, 7
Optional reading: M.L. Gill, G.J.Lennox,eds, Self-Movers, Princeton University Press, 1994.
Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, Duckworth, London, paperback, Ch. 13, 'Nature and God: two explanations of motion in Aristotle'.

9 Aristotle's moderation of emotion versus freedom from emotion
Sourcebook vol. 1: Ch 13 c,d,f,g,h,i,j
Optional reading: Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, as above, Chs 13, 14, 25.

10 A life of contemplation or social utility: which is the ideal?
Sourcebook vol. 1: Ch. 17a
Optional reading: John Dillon 'An ethic for the late antique sage', in Lloyd Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge University Press 1996, 315-335.
Richard Sorabji as under 4 above.

The course will be over 7 weeks twice a week, starting Sep 13th. A short paper will be due on Oct 7th. A term paper, which can be on a new topic or substantially expanding the old one, will be due on Oct 21st, with a few days extension, for those writing on the last two topics.

Godel's own proof of the collapse of Hilbert's program is indirect in the sense that he produces an auxiliary statement (first incompleteness theorem) that leads to the collapse (second incompleteness theorem). I will show by a syntactic argument (infinite descent of actual numbers) that Hilbert's original program directly implies its own collapse. Another unusual feature of Godel's independence proofs is, unlike other such proofs, they do not proceed by producing a model where the statement is false. I will show that this can be done, using a modified ultrapower construction or arbitrary initial segments of nonstandard models, that this can be done. Some of the material in my "mood to Godel" lecturem and the self-defense lemma, and the recursion theorem (another approach) will be included as time permits.

Prerequisites: Familiarity with the mathematical techniques mentioned in the description, though maybe some "review" explanations will be given.

We'll focus on four problems about the nature of mind: (1) How we know about minds, both our own and those of others; (2) whether mental phenomena are physical; (3) how to characterize the various types of mental phenomena, such as thinking and sensing; and (4) the nature of psychological explanation and its significance for (3).

Because knowing requires mental functioning, nineteenth-century discussions typically followed Kant and Descartes in explaining mind in terms of their role in knowing. But knowing not only involves a highly specialized aspect of mental functioning, but goes beyond the strictly mental. So that strategy ignores mental phenomena that play little or no role in knowing and emphasizes epistemic concerns irrelevant to the nature of mind. Contemporary discussion, by contrast, takes language and action as basic, rather than knowing. And, since many mental phenomena express speech or action, this has led to a theoretical focus on the mental as such.

Still, because of a residual concern with knowing, the new focus on mind originated with the concern about how we know about mental states. Our knowledge about our own mental states often seems unmediated by inference and independent of evidence, whereas we seem not to know about the mental states of others in that way. How, then, do we know about others' mental states? How do we know what others are thinking and feeling, and even that they think or feel anything at all? And, because this concern arises from the way knowing one's own mental states differs from knowing others', how do we know even about our own mental states?

These questions leads to another. We must somehow know about the minds of others by way of connections mental states have to bodily states or to behavior. So we can answer that question only if we can first determine in general terms how mind and body are related. Are mental states a special type of bodily states? Or are they nonphysical states causally related to bodily states?

But we cannot effectively invesigate whether mental phenomena are physical without determining what it is for a phenomenon to be mental in the first place. We'll approach this problem of characterizing mental phenomena by focusing on three groups: intentional states such as thinking, doubting, and desiring; sensory states—both bodily sensations such as pains and tickles and the sensations that figure in perceiving; and what it is to be a self or a person and what it is for a mental state to be conscious.

We often determine the nature of something by its role in explaining things. So we may be able to resolve disagreements about how to characterize mental phenomena by appeal to their role in psychological explanation. Psychological explanations are sometimes cast in commonsense terms and sometimes in scientific terms. We'll consider both, asking how psychological states explain behavior, what constraints such explanations impose on the nature of mental states, and whether the explanations of scientific psychology cast doubt on the applicability of our commonsense psychologycal concepts.

We'll use The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal (available through the Graduate Center bookstore arrangement) and a very few xeroxes on library electronic reserve.

The subject of experience

I propose to consider the views of, among others, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, a German Idealist or two, William James, and van Fraassen—perhaps also the Buddhist Nagarjuna. Jointly they raise all the fundamental metaphysical issues. I hope also to present some of my own views and consider the case for saying that the self is an entity that is a subject of experience that is as such not to be identified (to take the human case) with the human being considered as a whole. This raises—among other things—the question of the 'size' of the self. (One finds all views, XXL, L, M, S, XXS: eternity, lifetime, part of lifetime, day, second or so, 1/16,000000ths of a second, timeless.) Also the question of the self's claim to be a substance; the question whether the self's claim to be a substance is not only as good as, but in fact better than, anything else's claim to be a substance; the question whether selves are perhaps the only substances there are, or at least the only substances we can know to exist, once we get metaphysically rigorous in our account of substances (if, that is, there is or can be more than one of them). I assume that physicalism is true for purposes of discussion but have a non-standard view of physicalism that involves outright realism about consciousness.

Descartes

I consider Descartes briefly in order to set the scene. I think that he is usually misunderstood (for example: his claim that 'the mind' is 'indivisible' is perfectly plausible, properly understood). I will address some of the details of his (not entirely stable) conception of the metaphysical nature of thinking substance, which invites a radical interpretation in addition to the conventional interpretation. (It is helpful to know that many thought Descartes was secretly a materialist; many of his works were banned for their materialist implications.)

Locke

I believe almost everyone (except Udo Thiel) is wrong about Locke on personal identity. His theory is not vulnerable to Berkeley's and Reid's famous charge of inconsistency, nor to Butler's (and Sergeant's) famous charge of circularity, nor, I think to the charge that paragraph 2.27.13 of the Essay, on the 'fatal error', is itself a fatal error. The so-called 'neo-Lockeans' (e.g. Parfit) are not really Lockeans. Although Locke identifies 'self' and 'person', discussion of his view is not really central to the topic of the metaphysics of the self, because 'person' is, for him, as he says, a 'forensic' term. (Locke is probably a materialist at heart.)

Hume

I believe almost everyone is wrong about Hume on personal identity. Hume did not deny the existence of subjects of experience, for example, contrary to what many have supposed. One of the main tasks of Hume interpretation is to work out why he famously announced, in the Appendix to his Treatise, that his theory of personal identity was indefensible. (Hume is pretty plainly a materialist.)

Kant

Kant's Paralogisms are the most successful part of his Critique of Pure Reason and make a number of crucial points about the phenomenology of self-experience and the metaphysics of the self. The basic form of argument is: This is how the self or subject seems to us in experience; this, indeed, is how it must seem to us, in experience; it does not, however, follow that this is how it is, metaphysically speaking, or that we can know how it is, metaphysically speaking. (Kant's Paralogisms are not fundamentally original in their basic content, but the points take on a new force when translated into his special framework.)

German Idealists

eg Fichte: 'What was I before I came to self-consciousness? The natural answer to this question is: I did not exist at all, for I was not an I. The I exists only in so far as it is conscious of itself...The self posits itself, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it exists; and conversely, the self exists and posits its own existence by virtue of merely existing. It is at once the agent and the product of action....' (1795/1982: 98, 97). One aspect of Fichte's view is developed by Nozick when he writes that 'there is no preexisting I; rather the I is delineated, is synthesized around the reflexive act. An entity is synthesized around the reflexive act and it is the 'I' of that act...the self which is reflexively referred to is synthesized in that very act of reflexive self-reference...an entity coagulates' (1981: 87, 91, 88)

William James

William James is the greatest philosopher of mind. The Principles of Psychology is compulsory reading for any serious student of the subject. I will focus on his discussion of 'The Self' in the long ch. 10 (also ch. 9, 'The Stream of Thought', and ch. 6 'The Mind-Stuff Theory'). There are shorter versions of chs. 9 and 10 in his Psychology; Briefer Course.

selected texts

Nagarjuna

(c150/1995) The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, translated with a commentary by Jay Garfield (Albany, NY: SUNY Press).

Descartes

Descartes, R. (1641-1644/1985) Principles of Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume 1, translated by J. Cottingham et al. (CUP).

Descartes, R. (1641/1985) Meditations, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume 2, translated J. Cottingham et al. (CUP), especially II and V I.

Strawson, G. (1994) Mental Reality pp 123-7 (Cambridge, MA: MIT)

Clarke, D. (2003) Descartes's Theory of Mind (OUP).

Clarke, D. (2006) Descartes: a Biography (CUP).

Locke

Locke, J. (1690-4/1975) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by P. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Garrett, D. (2003), 'Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and "Fatal Errors"', Philosophical Topics 31: 95-125

Strawson, G. (typescript) 'Locke on personal identity'

Thiel, U. (1998) 'Personal identity' in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by M. R. Ayers and D. Garber (CUP).

Winkler, K. (1991) 'Locke on Personal Identity' Journal of the History of Philosophy 29: 201-226 [reprinted in Locke, ed. V. Chappell (OUP, 1998).

Hume

Hume, D. (1739-40/2000) A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton (OUP) 1.4.6 and Appendix (pp 164-71, 398-400).

Hume, D. (1748/2000) An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by T. Beauchamp (OUP)

Craig, E. J. (1987) The Mind of God and the Works of Man (OUP), chapter 2

Garrett, D. (1997) Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy (OUP) ch 5.

Pears, D. (1990) Hume's System: An Examination of the First Book of His Treatise (OUP), chs on personal identity.

Strawson, G. (typescript) 'Hume on personal identity'

Stroud, B. (1977) Hume (London: Routledge) ch 8.

Kant

Kant, I. (1781-7/1933) Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan) or by W. S. Pluhar (Indianopolis: Hackett).

Kant, I. (1783/1953) Prolegomena, translated by P. G. Lucas, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Strawson, P. F (1966) The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen).

Fichte

Neuhouser, F. (1990) Fichte's Theory of Subjectivity (CUP) ch. 3.

Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Pippin, R. (1988) 'Fichte's Contribution' in Philosophical Forum 19.

Wood, A. (1991) 'Fichte's Philosophical Revolution', Philosophical Topics 19.

James

James, W. (1890/1950) The Principles of Psychology, volume 1 (New York: Dover), chs 6, 9, 10.

James, W. (1892/1984/2001) Psychology; Briefer Course [chs. 9 and 10 of The Principles of Psychology = chs. 2 and 3 in abridged Dover edition (2001) and = chs. 11 and 12 in Harvard edition (1984).

van Fraassen

(2005) 'Transcendence of the Ego: the Non-Existent Knight' in The Self?, edited by G. Strawson (Oxford: Blackwell).

The span of a thinking being is the span of a single thought.

Moral Philosophy in Britain has had a great history from Hobbes to Ross, particulary in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries from the English Revolution to the French Revolution.

In this seminar we will focus on the moral theories of Hobbes, Clarke, Butler, HUtcheson, HUme, and Bentham, but with attention paid also to Cudworth, Cumberland, Locke, Shaftesbury, Wollaston, Price, and Smith.

We will examine the utilitarianisms of J. S. Mill and G. E. Moore, and the deontology of H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross.

We will examine the original texts and some of the important recent literature about them and their applications in contemporary ethical theory.

Text: British Moral Theorists, 1650-1800, ed. D. D. Raphael, 2 vols, Oxford.
[The Hackett Reprint will be ordered by the bookstore.] or British Moralists, ed. Selby-Brigge (Oxford, 1899) or the Bobbs-Merrill reprint, ed. by B. Baumrin (1964)

One should also obtain facsimile copies of Hobbes's Leviathan and Hume's Treatise.

To borrow Wilfrid Sellars' description of philosophy, we can say that metaphysics is the study of "how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term." The aim of this course is to introduce you to some important questions in contemporary metaphysics, topics that are not only interesting in and of themselves but are also important for understanding a wide rage of philosophical issues.

The course will be structured around the following four topics. 1) Existence: What is it for something to exist? Are there things that do not exist? When does a theory imply the existence of something? 2) Identity and Persistence: How are we to understand the relation of identity? Does an object remain the same object despite gradual changes? What about a person? 3) Reduction: How are we to understand the relation between the buzzing atoms that make up a desk, for example, and the solid desk? Does physics in some way tell us what there really is? And 4) Realism: In what sense, if any, does the world exist independently of our beliefs about it?

Text: Kim and Sosa (eds), Metaphysics: An Anthology, Blackwell 2002

Compatibilism says you can have it all: free will and determinism. This course will examine the intuitive motivation for compatibilism, challenges to compatibilism both obvious and recondite, and compatibilist treatment of a variety of puzzles. Among the topics we will discuss: conditional analyses of power; problems posed by the relativity of simultaneity; Newcomb choices and self-prediction; whether the self is pushed around by its desires; Libet's work on brain events preceding conscious choice; whether a good man freely does the good if "he would never do" evil acts; the direction of explanation among freedom, responsibility and punishment; Frankfurt intervenors; Clockwork Orange scenarios; hierarchical analyses of autonomy.

We will read some classic compatibilist pieces by Aristotle, Hume, Hobart, Schlick, P. Strawson, Frankfurt. We will also look at work by Berofsky, Lehrer, Kane, van Inwagen and others, including published and in-progress work by the instructor.

Meglev@nyc.rr.com

This course will concentrate on some major issues in Aquinas' philosophy of mind and metaphysics. A central topic will be the intriguing theoretical alternative that Aquinas, adapting the psychological thought of Aristotle, offers between dualism and materialism, based on hi hylomorphist metaphysics. In fact, partly because of theological considerations, Aquinas had to be more thoroughgoing than Aristotle in developing ideas of the will, free choice, mental self-reflection, and moral consciousness (where Aquinas turned more to the thought of the Platonizing Augustine than to that of Aristotle). A good guide to Aquinas' originiality as well as contemporary topicality can be found in Anthony Kenny's Aquinas on Mind (Routledge, London and New York, 1993). The course itself will use, in particular, Aquinas' Quaestiones de Anima, selections from his commentaries on Aristotle, and selections from the Summa Theologica.

As introductory readings for the "completely uninitiated", Brian Davies's The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992) of Aquinas: An Introduction (Continuum, London and New York, 2003), are recommended.

This course attempts to examine philosophically how current concerns about terrorism have impinged on the discourse of freedom and security and the relations between them. In addition to reviewing some of the conceptual issues involved, it will develop ethical tools for reviewing recent policies and practices surveillance, extraordinary rendition, torture, profiling, etc.

A useful compendium, to which considerable reference will be made, is Igor Primoratz (ed), Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, NY: Palgrave/Macmillan, though reference to other works will be offered throughout the course.

Philosophical logic intersects with and touches on issues central to Metaphysicsm, Philosophy of Language/Linguistics, and Epistemology. The material will be covered at a level so as to assess its philosophical and linguistic significance. The course will be organized for covering the central issues in two ways.

1. A Practical consideration. We will cover the classic material by Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, etc. which appear on our reading lists. In this sense the class will serve as preparation for comprehensives. But there is a difference. We will also cover recent developments.

2. The jumping off point for discussing issues will be Russell's theory of descriptions. It has been called a "paradigm of analytic philosophy" and this is the one hundreth anniversary of the publication of "On Denoting." I will make available papers scheduled to appear in the special anniversary issue of Mind (Neale, Schiffer etc.) and elswhere.

The view is connected with views concerning

1. Existence, empty names (free logics), ontological arguments
2. Ontological commitment, substitutional quantification
3. Belief ascriptions and modal contexts.

Related topics to be dealt with concern the nature of logic, its scope, the aprior and analyticity.

Some readings (italicized for those on the reading lists)

• Russell, "On Denoting," Material from
  Principia Mathematica
  , Parts of the Logical Atomism Lectures, Description chapter in
  Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
  . Material from Neale
  Descriptions
  , and Ostertag
  Descriptions
• Frege, "Sense and Reference"
• Carnap, sections from
  Meaning and Necessity
• Quine, "On What There Is," sections from Word and Object, sections from Orenstein,
  Willard van Orman Quine
  , "Two Dogmas," "Carnap of Logical Truth," selections from recent Gibson
  Companion to Quine
  .
• Strawson, "On Referrring" and Oxford object dependent views.
• Davidson, "Logical Form," "The Logical Form of Action Sentences," "On Saying That," Schiffer, belief attribution and material from his recent "The Things We Mean"
• Kripke, from
  Naming and Necessity
  , "Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference," "Belief Sentences," Hawthorne ed.
  Conceivability and Possibility
  .