This is a seminar on selected dialogues by Plato. It will aim at several targets of which the most prominent are Plato's conception of mimesis and the attempts that Plato makes to find positive uses for non-philosophical language.

Plato's readers all see the depth of his antipathy toward mimetic poetry. At least since Plotinus they have tried to imagine alternatives to mimesis (or to bad species of mimesis) that Platonic philosophy would permit and that might even use language to lead up toward being instead of perversely into non-being and ignorance.

To imagine an alternative to mimesis however one must first form a clear, non-caricatured conception of what Plato means by mimesis. Second, one should specifically consider the possibilities inherent in rhetoric that could make it an antidote to mimetic poetry.

Accordingly the seminar will begin with a review of the passages that define mimesis in the Platonic dialogues, namely Republic Books 3 and 10 and selections from Sophist and Timaeus. We may also consider passages from Aristophanes (Frogs, Thesmophoriazusae) that shed light on the meaning of mimesis before Plato.

We then read Plato's Menexenus for a remarkable and obscure example of Platonic mimesis that also works as a fine example of Platonic rhetoric. We will situate the Menexenus's funeral speech on one hand in the context of Athenian funeral speeches (Pericles' of course, but perhaps also those of Lysias and ps.-Demosthenes), on the other hand in the context of Thucydidean historiography; we will also consider the fragments attributed to Aspasia. Secondary sources may include Nicole Loraux (from The Invention of Athens) and Madeleine Henry (Prisoner of History).

The double consideration of rhetoric and history opens up two avenues to explore in the Platonic dialogues. The main road the one most connected to the theme "alternatives to mimesis" leads to Platonic rhetoric. We will read Plato's Phaedrus to press the question that the Menexenus had hinted at, whether philosophical rhetoric could turn the human mind in the direction of greater being. Special attention will go to the role of praise in Platonic metaphysics; and we will read from Peter Struck (Birth of the Symbol) on "allegorical" interpretation in antiquity.

Time permitting we will explore the second road that leads from the Menexenus. As a unique case of Platonic historiography, the funeral speech in that dialogue raises questions about how Plato understands the nature of history. In this setting the Theaetetus helps illuminate the question of philosophy's relationship to its own history.

[Counts for course satisfaction of History of Philosophy (Ancient) Comprehensive Exam requirement]

No period in the history of western intellectual life is closer to the present in its contributions to the study of language than the later middle ages. The aim of this class is to introduce students to discussions of central topics (by figures such as Ockham and Buridan) and their relation to current views. Both periods take a compositional approach wherein more complex language/sentences are treated in terms of their simpler component parts. This is an indispensable theme of authors such as Chomsky and Davidson. These sentences were considered in works on philosophical logic and also in works called Sophismata (The study of sophisms/puzzles/paradoxes.). The method of the latter was to examine opposing sides of a question. Hamlet fresh from a medieval university was using this method when he posed and examined answers to the question: 'To be or not to be?'.

Compositionality requires that one starts with simple singular sentences such 'Socrates is human' and proceeds to more complex ones constructed from them. These are treated in terms of a semantical version of Aristotle's correspondence theory of truth. A current version is found in Alfred Tarski's famous paper and is the basis for model theoretic semantical approaches to language (found in texts such as Cherchia and Ginet's Meaning and Grammar—An Introduction to Semantics). One takes up problematic negative sentences such as 'That chimera does not exist'. This is the topic of negative existentials. It is also dealt with in works by many current authors, e.g., Meinong, Bertrand Russell, Quine, etc. From there one goes on to general sentences and the treatment of quantifiers, such as 'All' and 'some'. This material is dealt with in current writers such as Quine, Barcan Marcus and Kripke. After that modal sentences and what Bertrand Russell called propositional attitudes. Here is a variation of a sophism: You believe the object coming to you covered in a donkey's skin is a donkey. The object coming to you is your father. So you believe your father is a donkey. This sophism and others deal with the same question posed by Frege's morning star-evening star case. Last but not least are discussions of the Liar's Paradox: [This sentence is false]. Which paradoxically if true, is false and if false, is true. One treatment is known today as 'The Buridan Peirce solution' crediting Charles Saunders Peirce for reviving a theme from John Buridan.

[Counts for course satisfaction of Philosophy of Language Comprehensive Examination requirement]

This course constitutes an introduction to the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), in particular as expressed in his Phenomenology of Spirit, (Encyclopedia) Logic, & Philosophy of Right. In the 1970s, Richard Rorty stated that, in places where Hegel is studied seriously, philosophy continues to be the paramount intellectual discipline, transcending the specialist orientation that it has elsewhere. Around the same time, the publication of Charles Taylor's book on Hegel made this a real possibility (again) in the English-speaking world. This course will explore what effect taking Hegel seriously has on our view of the nature of philosophy. It will also examine interpretations of Hegel's philosophy from the last twenty years or so. In particular, despite some recent interest in Hegel's ontology and epistemology, most Hegel scholars from the last generation have regarded his importance primarily in terms of his ideas in practical, and especially political, philosophy. Accordingly, the first part of the course will emphasize Hegel's major theoretical concepts, including his distinctive notions of phenomenology, consciousness, freedom, logic, dialectics, and contradiction, and in particular their use in developing an alternative to Kantianism. The second part of the course will emphasize his practical philosophy, including the concept of abstract right, the differentiation of ethics from morality, and the notion of ethical life as such, including his views on civil society, the state, war, and world history. In addition, we will briefly consider Marx's influential critique of Hegel. Students will be expected to read and respond to some of the increasingly voluminous literature that is now appearing (in English) on Hegel.

The following books are required reading and should be procured prior to the first class (these editions/translations are strongly recommended):

• A.V. Miller (ed.), Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford)
• W. Wallace (ed.), Hegel's Logic (Oxford)
• G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. Wood (Cambridge)

[Counts for course satisfaction of History of Philosophy (Modern) Comprehensive Examination requirement]

Empiricism is the doctrine that experience is the test and the only test of theory. It is a sword that destroys speculation, fantasy, and error, but it is also a means of construction that can show that what was never imagined is true—or at least empirically adequate.

This course will cover the period of English philosophy from the early 17th to the mid-18th century. Topics to be addressed include Bacon's theory of the interpretation of nature, Hobbes's rejection of incorporeal substances, Boyle and Locke on the experimental philosophy and the corpuscularian hypothesis; qualities, substances, species, and identity; Berkeley's attempt to demonstrate that the existence of a material world outside all minds is an incoherent speculative hypothesis unsupported by experience, and Hume on impressions, ideas, and moral sentiments.

[Counts for course satisfaction of History of Philosophy (Modern) Comprehensive Examination requirement]

John Dewey, the preeminent American philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century, made contributions to virtually every area of philosophical inquiry. This course will offer a critical examination of his epistemology, moral and political theory, and philosophy of education. We shall read in their entirety Democracy and Education, The Quest for Certainty, Experience and Education, Freedom and Culture, and Theory of Valuation. Grades will be based on mid-term and final examinations.

Dewey's complete works are available in paperback in a 37-volume edition from Southern Illinois University Press. The volumes we shall read are The Middle Works, Vol. 9, The Later Works, Vol. 4, and The Later Works, Vol. 13.

This course can be used to satisfy the comprehensive requirement for an advanced course in ethics or social and political philosophy. [Counts for course satisfaction of Ethics or Social and Political Philosophy Comprehensive Exam Requirements]

What are the semantic tasks? Why are they worthwhile? How should we accomplish them? The seminar will examine these methodological questions and propose a naturalistic answer. It will then examine some influential semantic theories from the perspective of that answer, in particular, direct-reference theories (Soames), use theories (Horwich), and two-dimensional semantics (Jackson, Chalmers). Other issues that may be taken up are holism, verificationism (Dummett), eliminativism and revisionism, including the idea that we should ascribe narrow meanings (contents) to explain behavior. The seminar will draw on ideas in my Coming To Our Senses.

The course is not an introduction to the philosophy of language.

Requirements

1. A brief weekly email raising questions about, making criticisms of, or developing points concerning, matters discussed in the class and reading for that week. 50% of grade.
2. A class presentation based on a draft for a paper (topic chosen in consultation with me). The draft to be submitted before Tuesday of the week of presentation. 20% of grade.
3. A 2,500 word paper probably arising from the draft in (ii). 30% of grade.

TEXTS

• Devitt, Coming to Our Senses. Cambridge [0-521-49887-2]
• Soames, Beyond Rigidity, Oxford [0-19-514528-3]
• Horwich, Meaning. Clarendon Press. [1-19-823824-X]
• Horwich, Reflections on Meaning. [0-19-925124-X]

RECOMMENDED

• Devitt and Sterelny, eds., Language and Reality. MIT [0-631-19689-7]
• Fodor, Psychosemantics. MIT
• Loewer and Rey, eds, Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Blackwell [0-631-187014]
• Fodor and Lepore, Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Blackwell [0-631-18193-8]
• Devitt and Hanley, eds., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell [978-0-631-23142-4]

[Counts for course satisfaction of Philosophy of Language Comprehensive Exam requirement]

This course addresses a number of issues prominent in recent philosophy of mathematics, as well as the classic foundationalist accounts.

The main traditional questions of philosophy of mathematics have been how proof creates knowledge, and what (if anything) this knowledge is of, issues tied to the analysis of mathematical statements. But perhaps proof is not sufficient or necessary for knowing mathematical P. A trustworthy authority might undermine a valid proof of P by assuring you of ~P. You might need a computer for lengthy calculations. As for ontology, there has been an almost obsessive level of discussion of the "indispensability argument" for mathematical objects. We will want to know how, if at all, these issues relate to the three great foundational traditions developed over the last century.

One is logicism, the thesis that mathematics is reducible to logic. It seems clear that "logic" here must include set theory, but lately "neo-logicists" have sought to circumvent or minimize the need for sets. We will look at work by Burgess, Hale, Boolos and others. Set theory is fascinating in its own right, and we will spend time on its foundations. We will also look at category theory as an alternative foundation for set theory and mathematics generally.

The second major tradition, or tendency, has been constructivism, beginning with Kant and culminating in intuitionism. Here we encounter issues about the mind-dependence of mathematical entities. Can intuitionistic logic be reconstrued so as to be classical acceptable? Among the authors we will look at are Detlefsen, Dummett and Feferman.

The third major tradition holds that mathematics consists in the deduction of theorems from postulates, neither of which make definite statements or are truth evaluable. Structuralism, which takes mathematics to describe multiply instantiated structures, is an offshoot of this approach. One quickly becomes involved in questions of consistency, models and the existence of large cardinals. Another is the idea that mathematics, as being neither true or false of physical reality (or of any other reality), is simply a tool, or a language, or a vocabulary, for describing the physical world. A natural corollary of such a view is that all of empirical science can in principle be restated without loss of cognitive content without mathematics. This is a claim the positivists took as self-evident and that Field has worked hard to substantiate (although the positivists, unlike Field, do not think that e.g. number theory or analysis is thereby shown to be false).

Talk of structure also leads to questions of mathematical ontology. Are there structures, stable and eternal as Plato (and famously Goedel) conceived them? If there are, how do we get to know about them? Does recent research by Dehaene on the development of mathematical thought in infants offer empirical evidence that there is something substantive yet a priori about mathematical thinking? One suspects that what is or isn't in the minds of infants, including an inborn omega-sequence, is not knowledge in any interesting sense. And in this connection we must consider the significance of incompleteness: Goedel's famous results and equally famous results in set theory.

There certainly are structures in the world, or, better, some arrays (sets, sums) of objects are structured. Baseball teams are cyclic groups of order 9. Does that mean there are mathematical as well as non-mathematical properties instanced in nature? What if any difference is there? (Did God really make the integers and leave everything else to us?) Do we know anything a priori about these naturally instantiated structures, in a way that we do not know anything about color or density or magnetic coupling?

In recent years there has been increasing attention to the issue of the applicability of mathematics to physical reality. One problem is, is there a problem here? Is mathematics more applicable than one would expect a priori, or that one would expect on various fictionalist and if-then-ist views? How applicable should mathematics be? Can physical phenomena be explained mathematically? What is one to make of the apparent fact that sometimes our equations do our thinking for us (that symmetries predict unobserved physical phenomena, for instance)?

Inference from axioms was implicitly taken as unproblematic in much axiomatist and logicist literature. There was some discussion of the strength of the logical rules by which to conduct inference, and model-theoretic versus proof-theoretic conceptions of implication. Only recently has there been thought to be something mysterious about "rational insight" into deductive connections. Only recently has "following by definition" seemed mysterious. Wittgenstein's ruminations on "following a rule" and "the hardness of the logical must" raise these issues, in a way greatly clarified by Kripke's discussion of Wittgenstein.

[Counts for course satisfaction of Philosophy of Science Comprehensive Exam requirement]

"Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see".

The excitement of the philosophical theories of natural or scientific laws lies in the various connections of those theories to the promise they held for the analyses of explanation, confirmation, physical necessity (and perhaps modality in general), confirmation, and the understanding of counterfactual conditionals, properties, universals), and dispositions. We shall begin with a brief but thorough review of this classical literature.

This initial excitement and promise of the subject gave way under powerful critical studies that soon followed the classical period. Within the last two decades, a series of seminal papers initiated an anti-Humeanism about laws that transformed the subject radically. With it came several ways in which laws were viewed as involving a special necessitation, as relations between universals , special natural predicates, essences, and natural kinds (take your pick). The subject became divided into fundamental laws, and Ceteris Paribus laws of the special sciences. Then it became divided still further into those for whom all laws are CP laws, and no true fundamental laws. Or else there were fundamentals laws, but no CP laws. Finally it was even suggested that there are no laws at all. It is this recent somewhat chaotic situation that will be the target of our seminar, in which mainly contemporary views will be examined. In the end we will consider the reconstruction of key characteristics of laws in a new way using material from a manuscript on laws (The Robustness of Laws), and return to a view which we hope will explain the modality function laws, their difference from accidental generalizations, their role in explanatons in which they occur, and their identity despite changes in theoretical settings.

The main source for contemporary readings will the recent anthology Readings on Laws of Nature, J.W. Carroll ed., Pittsburgh University Press (Paperback) 2004. This will be available from Barnes and Noble main store at 5th ave. and 18th street. All other material will be available electronically either on electronic reserve from CUNY, or e-mailed to the members of the seminar.

[Counts for course satisfaction of Philosophy of Science Comprehenseive Exam requirement]

This course will introduce students to some of the main problems concerning the nature of Reality.

Among the topics to be discussed are:

1. Necessity, Possibility, and Existence: How are we to understand claims about what might or might not have been? How are we to understand the claim that counterfactual situations exist, or, alternatively, that possible worlds exist? Are there things that might have existed but do not?
2. Nominalism, Conceptualism and Realism: Are only particulars real? Or do properties exist as well? What is the status of abstract entitities like numbers?
3. Identity: A discussion of the two important principles, the Identity of Indiscernibles and the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Can two distinct objects share all their properties in common?
4. Space and Time: How do space and time enter into the problem of the identity of objects? Could space and time exist without matter, or are statements about space and time reducible to statements about spatial and temporal relations between particulars?
5. Cause and Effect: An examination of the Humean view that causation is just constant conjunction.
6. Freedom of the Will: Does every event have a cause, and if so, how does this square with our notion of an individual's acting freely, and of our notion of an individual's being responsible for his or her actions?
7. The Mind/Body Problem: The complex of problems concerning the identification of mental things with bodily things. A discussion of issues about mental content, individualism, and folk psychology.
8. Naturalism and Transcendentalism: Is Reality exhausted by what is revealed to us by our senses (Naturalism), or is there a Reality beyond that which our senses can reach (transcendentalism)?

Readings from classical and contemporary sources.

Email: jadler@brookyln.cuny.edu

An investigation of reason's activity in reasoning and in controlling desire, action, and itself. Examination of comparisons between practical reasoning (or reasoning to action) and theoretical reasoning (or reasoning to belief). In particular: Is there an analogue for theoretical reasoning of the problem posed for practical reasoning by weakness of will? Similarly, does self-control of desire by reason, though the imposition of rules, principles, or binding mechanisms, have analogues for belief? Is the role of self-knowledge parallel for the two kinds of reasoning? Readings drawn from epistemology and practical reasoning, as well as cognitive science studies of self-knowledge and reasoning including writings by Nozick, Davidson, Elster, Harman, Johnson-Laird, Velleman, Pollock, Frankfurt, Kahneman and Tversky, and Nisbett.

[Counts for course satisfaction of Epistemology or Philosophy of Mind Comprehensive Examination requirements]

What is the relationship between the mind and the body? Is the mind physical? What is consciousness? How does the mind represent things in the world? How are we to understand the apparent gap between the third person point of view and the first person point of view? In this course we will investigate these, as well as other, central questions in philosophy of mind.

Readings will be taken from David Chalmers' Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.

Though the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds is strongly associated with Leibniz, it has a long history, going back at least as far as Plato's Timaeus. And though the claim is best known through Volatire's satire of Leibnizian views in Candide, it is neither as fatuous nor as offensive as it is there made out to be. Nor is it much more fatuous or offensive than other interesting philosophical claims.

This course will track the history of the claim that the world is maximal with respect to perfection, however that is understood. In the Timaeus, the demiurge fashions a world that is as good as it can be, given the constraints imposed by the materials out of which it is fashioned, and the receptacle into which it is placed. This theme the constraints that necessity impose upon perfection is a recurring one. The Platonic account filtered down through various neoPlatonists into theistic accounts of creation (Augustine thought Plato must have plagiarized his account from Moses), and persisted even when theology was Aristotelianized. Aquinas handles the relation between God's unsurpassable goodness and the perfection of the creation with considerable sophistication.

Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz are, in their different ways, major contributors to the long history. Malebranche's views clearly influenced Leibniz positively, Spinoza's negatively. I will devote considerable time to these influences and to Leibniz himself. After Leibniz, the discussion becomes heated and confused, with scientific versions of optimism in mechanics differentiating from moral versions of optimism in history and politics. Voltaire is a pivotal figure, both for his own vituperative contributions and for his contacts, or conflicts, with other figures, including Maupertuis, Mme du Chatelet, and Rousseau.

In contemporary philosophical theology, the topic of the best possible worlds has been discussed by a number of writers, and most of the literature of the last thirty years will be looked at. Though the issue may seem arcane, it has interesting ramifications in moral philosophy via the notion of maximization, and also in philosophy of science. It also gives rise to some neat and intriguing puzzles.

I will run the course as seminar in which, after a couple of weeks of introductory lectures, most of the work is done by the students.

Readings will include: Plato, Timaeus; Leibniz, Theodicy; Voltaire, Candide.

For more information contact me: sgrover@qc.cuny.edu

[Counts for course satisfaction of Metaphysics or History of Philosophy (Modern) Comprehensive Exam requirement]

A review of the principal issues and authors in moral philosophy from its Athenian roots to contemporary thought. The purpose of the course is to gain familiarity with the key concepts, distinctions, issues, and stances that form the present context of discussion in ethical theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and metaethics. The topics considered will include:

• Classical Content (Plato, Aristotle, Hellenic and Roman Ethics);
• Ethics within the bounds of Christianity (Augustine, Aquinas);
• The English Enlightenment (Hobbes, Butler, Hume, Bentham, Mill);
• Continental Moralists (Rousseau, Kant, Nietzsche);
• The Autonomy of Ethics (Sidgwick, Moore, Prichard, Ross);
• Contemporary intuitionism non-cognitivism, relativism, and antirealism.

Required texts include the main ethical works of the moralists as listed below, and William Frankena's Ethics, 2nd Edition.

• Plato includes the Euthyphro, Crito, and the Republic;
• Aristole — Nicomachean Ethics;
• Hobbes — Leviathan, Parts I and II;
• Butler — 15 Sermons — Esp. 1–3, 11, 12;
• Hume — Treatise Bk III;
• Bentham — Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation — Chs. 1–7;
• Mill, J.S. — Utilitarianism, On Liberty;
• Rousseau — Discourse on Inequality and The Social Contract;
• Kant — Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals;
• Nietzsche — Beyond Good and Evil or The Genealogy of Morals;
• Sidgwick — Methods of Ethics, Ch. 1;
• Moore — Principia Ethica;
• Prichard — Moral Obligation;
• Ross — The Right and The Good;
• Rawls — Essays

One should, if possible, obtain individual editions of these texts. A useful alternative is Ethics, ed. by Steven Cahn and Peter Markie, Oxford 1998. This volume also contains other essays which will be assigned periodically. Please use the 3rd edition of this book.

The first three classes will be devoted to Plato and Aristotle.

This material should be given a fresh reading before the first class on August 28, 2007.

[Philosophy students only]

Most discussions of ethics and International relations proceed from what Michael Walzer has called "the legal paradigm," that is, they develop a system of international moral rights based on a putative system of international legal rights. This course takes an entirely different approach, using contemporary work in basic moral philosophy as a springboard for the analysis of key problems of international relations.

Here are some examples.

1. Beginning with Bernard Williams' "The Truth in Relativism" and Gilbert Harman's The Nature of Morality, the case for moral relativism has been revived and the discussion of the pros and cons of relativism has reached new levels of sophistication. What does contemporary work on relativism tell us about the widely circulated argument that rights to free expression represent "Western Values" and that demands for respecting such rights are improperly imposed on non-Western states?
2. The development of the "trolley problem" through Foot and Thompson to Kamm and McMahan has raised levels of sophistication about the appropriate circumstances in which some innocents can be sacrificed to benefit others. What does work on the Trolley Problem teach us about the proper rules for the initiation and pursuit of just war?
3. Work on the "doing versus allowing" distinction from Bennett to Rachels and Unger (on the one side) and Anscombe to Quinn and Kamm (on the other) has improved out understanding of the relation between action theory and the deontological/consequentialist divide. What can work on doing versus allowing, and killing versus letting die, teach us about obligations of developed nations towards less developed nations, as regards food, medical supplies, and other forms of aid?
4. Work on the "Prisoners' Dilemma" over the last four decades has shed new light on problems of trust and suspicion in international relations. What does contemporary work on the Prisoners' Dilemma teach us about the difficulties of international co-operation and the evolution of larger structures of world order?

[Counts for course satisfaction of Ethics Comprehensive Exam requirement]

Begins September 11, 2007
Ends October 25, 2007
Registration limited to 12
Cross-listed with Classics

A set of translations in the region of 100 pages will be prepared as required reading for the course and handed out at the beginning. The reading below, ordered for library reserve and partly available on-line, follows the descriptions of the topics, and is to help with the two papers due, a short paper on Oct 1st on the first topic, Conscience and a term paper on Oct 21st on any of the topics. The term paper may be on a new topic or a substantial development of the short paper. The first half of the course will be on topic 1: Conscience. The second half will be on Will, which is the seat of conscience according to Bonaventure, while the misnamed weakness of will in Aristotle is treated by Aquinas as a model of how conscience can go wrong. The topic of Will brings in the Struggle against Temptation and Freedom from emotion, and so I have broken up the description of topic 2 into four inter-related topics.

[Counts for course satisfaction of History of Philosophy (Ancient) or Ethics Comprehensive Examination requirements]

A more detailed description of the course is also available.

Developments in digital technology — in electronic surveillance, data mining and data base integration, and profiling — are raising significant ethical challenges in relation to identity, security, and privacy. The course will explore the key ethically relevant concepts and track the challenges and responses that identity, security, and privacy are currently encountering. Some consideration will be given to the different ways in which the ethical challenges are being addressed in Europe and the United States.

There is no set text for the course. Notes will, however, be distributed at classes.

[Counts for course satisfaction of Ethics; Social and Political Philosophy Comprehensive Examination requirement]

Class begins on September 10, 2007

Seminar participants will include CUNY students and MSSM medical students, genetics counseling students, MPH students, and clinical researchers.

This seminar will explore the complex issues raised by human subject research. The seminar will begin with a review of some of the landmark cases of unethical use of human subjects in research, the policies that shape our current understanding of the ethical conduct of research, and the mechanisms for research oversight that have been instituted. Then, through reading a broad select of seminal articles and papers from the recent literature, seminar presentations, and discussion, we shall engage in a conceptual analysis of a number of controversial and pressing issues. We shall be discussing the moral and public policy aspects of topics such as research design, risk-benefit assessment, informed consent, the use of vulnerable subjects, research without consent, confidentiality, inducements, conflicts of interests, disclosure of research findings, tissue use, vaccine development, international research. In addition to exploring the moral landscape of this rich and provocative domain, the seminar should clarify and inform participants understanding of basic moral concepts such as autonomy and justice. It should also serve as a model for approaching other issues in applied ethics.