| Fall 2010 |
| Sept. 1 |
Joseph Levine, University of Mass., Amherst
|
| "On the Phenomenology of Thought" |
| Sept. 8 |
Graham Priest, CUNY Graduate Center |
| "Contradiction and Unity" |
| Sept. 15 |
Douglas Lackey & Peter Simpson, CUNY Graduate Center |
 "Is Elective Abortion Immoral"
|
| Sept. 22 |
Jesse Prinz, CUNY Graduate Center |
| "The AIR Theory of Consciousness" |
| Sept. 29 |
Dale Jamieson, New York University |
| "The View From Somewhere Else" |
| Oct. 6 |
Josh Knobe, Yale University |
| “Intuitions about Consciousness: Experimental Studies” |
| Oct. 13 |
Rohit Parikh, CUNY Graduate Center |
| "Measuring Belief" |
| Oct. 20 |
Thomas Pogge, Yale University |
| "Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights with Human Rights: the Health Impact Fund" |
| Oct. 27 |
Ernie Lepore, Rutgers University |
| "In Search of Meaning in Another's Words" |
| Nov. 3 |
NO CLASSES SCHEDULED BEFORE 4:00 P.M. |
| NO COLLOQUIUM |
| Nov. 10 |
Stephen Darwall, Yale University |
| "Bipolar Obligation" |
| Nov. 17 |
Georges Rey, University of Maryland |
| "Phenomenology Without Phenomenality: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism and Other `Intuitions'"
|
| Nov. 24 |
THANKSGIVING - NO COLLOQUIUM |
|
|
| Dec. 1 |
Mircea Dumitru, University of Bucharest |
| "Opacity" |
| Dec. 8 |
Greg Lavers, Concordia University, Montreal |
| "On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions"
This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this sub ject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine’s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.
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