

Folk Intuitions Matter: On Virtue and Human Well-Being

I. Introduction

In Reasons and Persons (1984), Derek Parfit divided up prominent theories of well-being¹ into three camps: hedonist, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories,² with perfectionist accounts³ lumped in the objective list category.⁴ Though not exhaustive of all possible positions, his taxonomy presented the live options on the analytic market at that time and has since served as a useful map of the well-being debate. Philosophical criticism by way of counterexamples, however, continually harasses the standard options, and their defenders continually adapt to new counterexamples by making new modifications. This philosophical arms race and the counterexample-modification mechanism (call it “intuitive selection”) that drives it has brought about much of the diversity we see in the philosophy of well-being today. Looking at the literature, we find that informed desire satisfaction theorists have sought to severely circumscribe the set of desires the satisfaction of which constitutes well-being in an effort to accommodate counterexamples motivated by pro-objectivist⁵ intuitions.⁶ Objective list theorists and objectivistic Aristotelian accounts, for their part, have made sure to incorporate subjective components (e.g. pleasure, desire-satisfaction) of well-being as a nod to the strong pro-subjectivist intuitions that many of us share.⁷ L. W. Sumner, in his (1996) sophisticated account of well-being as “authentic happiness,” similarly adopts a best-of-both-worlds strategy in trying to make peace with both sets of intuitions by making subjective satisfaction constitutively central to well-being, but restricting the relevant satisfaction to that which is experienced by subjects who are objectively informed and autonomous.

In the longer (full version) paper, I take a critical look at Sumner’s sophisticated account⁸ and evaluate a strand of cases that, according to ordinary or folk⁹ intuitions, seem to be genuine counterexamples to that account: cases of individuals who live uncontroversially immoral forms of life. With limited space in this shortened paper, I will set aside the reconstruction and (negative) evaluation of Sumner’s account and focus on my other main (positive) argument that such cases of uncontroversially immoral forms of life motivate a necessary condition for well-being that, interestingly, would be rejected

by the vast majority of moral philosophers today (Sumner included). Call it the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AVC):

AVC: An agent *S* is well off only if she is morally virtuous.

Another way to put it: moral virtue is a necessary non-instrumental component or constituent of well-being. Importantly, as I stress in the next section on methodology, I present AVC as a (yet-to-be-formally-confirmed) characterization of the folk conception of well-being, not necessarily as the most philosophically plausible conception, full stop.

I motivate AVC by careful consideration of folk prudential intuitions about cases of uncontroversially immoral lives. I argue that such intuitions concerning well-being are hard to access: simplistic psychological surveys will not work, and, regardless of the preferred method of data collection, there always seem to be a number of plausible but inconsistent interpretations of the intuitions elicited. I characterize these methodological difficulties that hinder access and suggest that they may be overcome by having people reflect on cases through the analytic device that Fred Feldman has dubbed the “Crib Test,”¹⁰ a realistic thought experiment that, more than any other device I can think of, gives us a window into our deepest convictions about well-being. Moreover, I argue that the intuitions thus generated cannot be easily accommodated or explained away by opponents of AVC. Such intuitions probably also tell against various other subjectivist accounts of well-being, since to my knowledge they do not incorporate anything like AVC, but I do not take up the task of demonstrating this. I suggest that AVC is compatible with most perfectionist and objective list theoretical frameworks.

II. Methodology

First, I want to discuss some crucially important though often neglected methodological concerns. Why should we care about the folk conception of well-being? Should not our target be the most philosophically plausible conception, full stop? Recent reflection and a review of the literature on well-being suggest to me that the aim of the debate should be to arrive at an account that best captures the

ordinary conception, if it does not presuppose any fundamental error and does not conflict with any established philosophical or scientific “background theories.” If we discovered that it was shot through with error, then we would do well to seek a revisionary account that best captures the ordinary conception while avoiding its errors. What philosophers of well-being should sensibly aim at, then, is an account that is consistent with and supported by unimpeached¹¹ ordinary intuitions about well-being. I say “sensibly” because people across class and culture seem to be substantively familiar with well-being as a category, we care a lot about the application of the concept,¹² and besides, it does not look like there is any better way to determine the best account. We cannot test for prudential value empirically, nor to my mind can we reasonably infer an account of well-being from uncontroversial philosophical or scientific theories. We can surely rule out some theories of well-being that presuppose known error or conflict with relevant background theories,¹³ for we want the most rational conception of well-being we can get, but the main competitors within Parfit’s taxonomy seem to pass these epistemic tests. So how can we decide between them?

The only reasonable response, apart from refusing to talk and think about well-being anymore (eliminativism), seems to be the view that unimpeached intuitions should hold some methodologically normative weight, i.e. that the fact that a strong unimpeached intuition supports a view is a pro tanto reason to accept that view. This is so because of our goals in the debate. As I see it, most moral philosophers have given up the lofty goal of obtaining a “true” account of well-being, where “true well-being” is determined by some criterion independent of human practices, conceptions, or ways of life. This sort of prudential realism faces many of the nasty metaphysical and epistemological difficulties that harass robust accounts of moral realism. A more modest and currently popular goal is to arrive at the most rational account of “our” shared thinking or conception of well-being—where “rational” describes the account that essentially meets the following three criteria: it is internally consistent, consistent with established background theories, and best supported by “our” unimpeached intuitive judgments (in a moment, I will get to the question of whose intuitions should count). We could of course eliminate well-

being from our conceptual toolkit, but given how much we apparently care about the part of our experience that it answers to and given its central place in practical reasoning, eliminativism appears unattractive and perhaps futile given the apparent inevitability of caring about what is in our interest. If we care so deeply about well-being, it is eminently reasonable to seek to obtain most rational account of it we can.

To that end, I contend that AVC captures an important part (let me stress part) of the ordinary conception of well-being. Undoubtedly, as my colleagues and the literature on well-being assure me, many if not most moral philosophers will not be sympathetic to this condition: surely, the wicked not only can be well off, but sometimes are well off. To my knowledge, welfare hedonists, informed desire-satisfaction theorists, (most) objective list theorists, and Sumner, among many others, would reject AVC and concur with Bernard Williams that evil people can be, “by any ethological standard of the bright eye and the gleaming coat, dangerously flourishing.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, I think such a condition has something significant and interesting to be said for it: namely, it appears to be supported by folk intuitions though admittedly not by the (often theoretically informed) intuitions of professional philosophers. And let me note: I am not just sitting by, content with my speculation about folk intuitions; I am currently hammering out the experimental design of a Crib Test survey (with help from Josh Knobe at UNC) that I hope will properly test my characterization of the folk conception of well-being.

III. Pro-AVC Cases That Cannot Easily Be Explained Away

I offer cases in this section that motivate AVC. Further, I argue that they cannot be easily dismissed or accommodated by opponents of AVC. The strand of cases I consider, uncontroversially immoral lives, are not unfamiliar: neo-Aristotelians have offered similar kinds of cases as data that their opponents cannot accommodate.¹⁵ But it is not clear that such cases clarify our prudential intuitions. And the intuitions that such cases elicit seem to be easily dismissed or accommodated. To my knowledge, nobody has attempted to defend the methodological normativity of such intuitions in light of the various

deflationary responses that have been and might be offered against them. But somebody should, because they can be reasonably defended and thus should be taken seriously. I will take up that task in what follows.

Consider a serial child molestor who is informed, rational (i.e. a child molestor who meets the standard idealized conditions of subjectivist accounts), and satisfied with his abusive way of life. Indubitably and sadly, there exist many such individuals and groups who practice such a form of life. Call this the case of CHILD ABUSER. Also consider an informed, rational, child porn viewer (i.e. a child porn viewer who meets the standard idealized conditions of subjectivist accounts) who finds his regular engagement in such private sexual fantasies quite satisfying. Call this case CHILD PORN VIEWER. These two cases plausibly meet the standard idealized conditions of most subjectivist accounts (e.g. hedonist, rational desire-satisfaction accounts) I am aware of.¹⁶

Given our familiarity with folk intuitions, would the lifestyles of CHILD ABUSER and CHILD PORN VIEWER strike the folk as “in the interest of” or “good for” the individuals who adopt the lifestyle? Could such individuals, living such lives, be faring well? Such cases seem to naturally elicit a negative response to these two questions from many of my students. And many who respond positively to one or both of the questions are often reluctant to do so. However, subjectivists could contend that ordinary intuitions concerning CHILD ABUSER and CHILD PORN VIEWER are consistent with subjectivist theories of well-being and thus do not privilege alternative accounts over theirs. That is, subjectivists could argue that the reason why many intuit that CHILD ABUSER would not be not well off is because, behind that intuition, lies the belief that such a form of life would likely lead to his dissatisfaction (owing to a “guilty conscience,” a lack of loving relationships, and so forth).¹⁷ So it would not be the case that our intuitions uniquely support the claim that such immoral forms of life lack (non-instrumental) prudential value simply because they are immoral, because our intuitions are also consistent with the claim these immoral forms of life lack instrumental prudential value in that they typically do not contribute to their subjects’ informed, rational satisfaction. But the cases that I have presented are that of

the satisfied, informed, and rational CHILD ABUSER and CHILD PORN VIEWER. Would the folk judge that these particular individuals are well off? Many would be reluctant to do so and this reluctance, I suggest, amounts to an unwillingness to accept Sumner's account. Prior to a proper experimental study, I suspect that for the most part ordinary intuitions would not side with subjectivists who reject AVC.

Many other pro-AVC cases could be formulated along the lines of CHILD ABUSER and CHILD PORN VIEWER.

IV. The Crib Test

Rather than appeal directly to ordinary intuitions and then shift the burden of proof, which, though perhaps a sensible burden-of-justification argument, could very well be countered by some debunking explanation of folk intuitions (e.g. the folk are confusing concepts)—I want to suggest a thought experiment that, more than anything else I can think of, would best clarify core intuitions about well-being. Fred Feldman has dubbed the thought experiment the “Crib Test.”

But first, why exactly should we consider a further thought experiment? Why are not direct appeals—e.g. “is the CHILD ABUSER well off?”—sufficient to properly elicit our intuitions? One quick reason is that the intuitions generated by direct appeal to CHILD ABUSER and other cases may not be universally shared among the folk: the Crib Test may facilitate a deeper understanding of the ordinary conception of well-being, with the result being the elucidation of a conception that is more extensively shared than we may have thought. But my main reason for appealing to the Crib Test is that it seems very difficult to properly elicit people's intuitions about well-being simply by asking them a question of the form: “Is so-and-so _____ [insert your preferred prudential adjective]?” For instance, if a professor were to ask her students whether CHILD ABUSER could be “happy,” she would probably receive a majority of affirmative responses. But does employing the term “happy,” as many philosophers and psychologists do, draw out our intuitions about well-being? Such a question seems to skew the survey in favor of a subjectivist or mental state conception of well-being, for though “happiness” has referred to

well-being at times in past centuries, in the vernacular today it has incurably psychological associations, whereas adjectives like “flourishing” tend to be more neutral terms. But even the latter term is not completely free from association, for its use seems to incline one to an objectivist (e.g. Aristotelian) account of well-being where one is well off insofar as one is physically and mentally functioning like a normal human being, much like a plant is “flourishing” insofar as it is growing and thriving like a plant of its kind. And some objectivists have made use of such inclinations.¹⁸ So when a professor presents her students with particular cases like that of CHILD ABUSER and asks whether such individuals can be “happy” or “flourishing,” I am skeptical that she is drawing out their intuitions about well-being. Such terms probably refer to concepts related but not identical to well-being. Thus I doubt that there is a single concept answering to “well-being,” “flourishing,” and “happiness.”

Such methodological difficulties concerning word choice suggest that it is not obvious how, exactly, to test for prudential intuitions. These initial difficulties in determining folk intuitions about well-being may be overcome to some extent, in my view, through something like the following thought experiment. I suggest that the thought experiment, more so than any other device I can think of, would reliably generate intuitions that track the ordinary conception of well-being.

Imagine that you are a proud and loving parent of a newborn baby. Imagine that as you look into the crib where the baby is peacefully sleeping, your heart is filled with parental affection and concern. You hope that things will turn out well for your baby.¹⁹

Now, given this natural concern for your child's well-being, as you look at your baby, respond to this question: Would your hope that things turn out well for your baby be unfulfilled if your baby grew up to live a life of happy/satisfied Xing [X being a placeholder for a particular vice or virtue]?

The Crib Test is not my invention,²⁰ but I think the implications of the thought experiment are significant and have not been drawn out or have been too quickly dismissed. In what follows, I draw out the implications of the thought experiment and respond to actual and potential objections.

Rather than asking the folk if they think CHILD ABUSER's life could be characterized as "happy" or "flourishing," we should ask them to reflect upon their situation as a parent who, quite naturally, is fundamentally concerned for his or her child's well-being. The test can be put in personal terms: would we as loving parents, wanting our child to be well off, want our children to end up adopting the lifestyle of CHILD ABUSER or CHILD PORN VIEWER? Or more specifically, would our hope for our child's well-being be unfulfilled if he grew up to live the life of CHILD ABUSER or CHILD PORN VIEWER? I contend that the folk's response to this question would shed light on their understanding of well-being, more so than experimental surveys that ask questions of the form "Is so-and-so _____ [insert your favorite prudential adjective]?"²¹

It is undeniable that the vast majority of us who have children love our children. By "love" I mean roughly what Harry Frankfurt means in his plausible enough analysis of the concept: love is a "disinterested concern for the existence of what is loved, and for what is good for it."²² That is, love is an unconditional concern for another's well-being. Frankfurt observes that "among relationships between humans, the love of parents for their infants or small children is the species of caring that comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love."²³ Frankfurt's analysis is on target: parents strongly love their children in the well-being promoting sense. And the love of a parent for her child is probably the purest instance of this unconditional concern for another's well-being, a concern that tends to be not as "polluted" by other concerns such as self-interest; that is, our children's well-being is typically and primarily a non-instrumental end for us as parents, not an instrumental end for our own benefit. This statistically normal psychological fact about human beings gives some sense to the idea that the Crib Test could be a reasonable way of eliciting our intuitions about well-being.

If we were to prompt parents with the Crib Test and thereby get them to focus with increased clarity on what is in the best interest of their children, would they desire that their child live a satisfying life, regardless of whether she is morally virtuous, or would they desire that their child live a satisfying

and morally virtuous life? I suspect that the vast majority of parents, in concern for the well-being of their children, would hope them to adopt the latter form of life.

Of course critics could insist that the intuitions of these parents are confused, that they cannot avoid conflating the tight connection between moral virtue and well-being with the contingent causal connection between moral virtue and satisfaction. That is, the reason why they think virtue is necessary for well-being is because virtue is strongly causally correlated with subjective satisfaction: it is really subjective satisfaction that is at the heart of well-being. But such a move would be suspiciously ad hoc and, in my view, unpalatably condescending to parents with these intuitions. Are they so hopelessly confused that they cannot look at their baby (imagined baby) in the crib, reflect on its future, and authentically report their judgment that a life of satisfaction and moral virtue is constitutively more beneficial for or more in the interest of their child than a life that consists merely in satisfaction? To preclude any confusion, we could stipulate and stress that the alternative lifestyles would add up to the same amount of satisfaction. Still, I suspect that the folk would not be indifferent about which life would make their child better off—as loving parents they would strongly that their children be satisfied *and* morally virtuous. If critics insist that the folk are still confused, then it seems to me that he would be forced to significantly reassess the strength of people’s familiarity with well-being. If the folk are so confused about well-being that they cannot accurately report their experience of it in the face of reflection on the future life of their child, then either it is doubtful whether they have a relatively clear and determinate conception of well-being that can be accounted for by a particular theory or the folk are just dull and cannot hold before their minds the case as described. Both diagnoses are implausible.

In a recent book, Fred Feldman presents an objection to the Crib Test thought experiment:

It is not entirely clear that this thought experiment will always work. Suppose a religious fanatic looks into his child’s crib. Suppose he wants the child to have a wonderful life. Suppose he thinks that the best imaginable life for the child is one in which the child becomes a martyr for God. This religious fanatic might be filled with love, and he might

be thinking about the Good Life for his child. But it is not clear that he is expressing a hope about what we would normally think of as the child's *welfare*. Perhaps he is thinking about what he takes to be a moral or religious virtue. Perhaps he is thinking about the most beneficial life the child could live. So the mere fact that he is a parent filled with love, and is looking into his child's crib, and is saying something about 'the Good Life,' does not absolutely guarantee that he is thinking about [welfare].²⁴

In response, I grant that the Crib Test will not "always" work and that a loving parent's response to the Crib Test will not "absolutely guarantee" that the parent is thinking about his child's welfare. But the Crib Test seems by and large fairly reliable and more reliable than any other available thought experiment. The mere possibility that, as Feldman suggests, a loving parent could respond to the Crib Test by putting his conception of welfare aside and instead responding only to moral considerations, should not threaten the reliability of the thought experiment. Feldman needs to offer us a principled reason to think that parental intuitions generated by the Crib Test would frequently be based on moral or religious considerations, *as opposed to* welfare-based considerations. The suggestion that they *might* be so based in extreme instances (e.g. the case of the religious fanatic²⁵) does not undermine the usefulness of the Crib Test with respect to getting at the prudential intuitions of statistically normal people.

Upon consideration of CHILD ABUSER and CHILD PORN VIEWER, I suspect that ordinary intuitions motivate AVC. Such cases, especially as considered through the elucidating device of the "Crib Test," would carefully elicit ordinary intuitions that the prudentially valuable life is something more, or something different. We need additional conditions or different conditions of well-being in order to avoid such counterexamples. Wayne Sumner discusses certain "hybrid theorists"²⁶ who add a "value requirement" to standard subjectivist conditions.²⁷ Such a requirement would be that a form of life can contribute to an individual's well being insofar as it possesses some sort of objective value, value that is not realized by the subject's pro-attitudes. Hence, on such a view, the reason why CHILD ABUSER and

CHILD PORN VIEWER are not well off is because their forms of life rank low on the scale of some kind objective value.

The discussion thus far suggests that such objective value is moral in nature and hence that AVC has something interesting and significant to be said for it: namely, it appears it is supported by folk intuitions. Yet it should be noted that AVC does not entail just one theoretical framework. It is compatible with either a perfectionist or objective list framework. A perfectionist theory may incorporate AVC by making the realization of perfectionist value—being a “good specimen of your kind”—necessary for well-being and by contending that the practice of moral virtue is essential to realizing one’s perfectionist value. An objective list theory may incorporate AVC by putting moral virtue on its list of (non-instrumental) necessary prudential goods.

V. Concluding Remarks

I submit that an adoption of AVC is a plausible way of making sense of ordinary intuitions concerning the cases above, at least at this moment in the contemporary debate on well-being. Perhaps some new theory that rejects AVC will be developed that accommodates ordinary intuitions or perhaps the latter will be given an independent debunking explanation. Or perhaps experimental philosophers will demonstrate that ordinary intuitions are not at all as I have supposed. But prior to formal experimental investigation (which I am currently carrying out), at this point in the conversation AVC seems to be an accurate (partial) characterization of the ordinary conception of well-being. And the ordinary conception matters—even more, in my view, than the intuitions of professional philosophers who spend a lot of time thinking about well-being. Folk intuitions about physics should be reasonably dismissed in favor of the far superior epistemic source of science, but folk intuitions about well-being should not be ignored by philosophers without a demonstration that they are shot through with error. Whatever the experimental outcome, I am convinced that the best account of well-being should not be determined primarily by the

often theoretically informed intuitions of a tiny population of philosophers, and yet in practice, it appears that is how a substantive portion of the philosophy of well-being is currently being carried out.²⁸

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¹ "Well-being" and its cognates—welfare, benefit, flourishing, prudential value, eudaimonia—appear to concern similar subject matter: what is good for an individual. Theories of well-being attempt to answer the question: what does well-being consist in? Or alternatively, what are the "components" of well-being? An important distinction to be made in this debate is that between the components or nature of well-being and the means to or sources of well-being. The debate concerns the former.

² For a sophisticated objective list theory, see Arneson (1999).

³ For a representative perfectionist account, see Kraut (2002, esp. chs. 2 and 3). Though some of the neo-Aristotelian literature seems relevant to the literature on well-being, the two literatures do not merge (as Daniel Haybron also notes (2007, p. 1, n. 2), and as a result it is difficult to locate where many neo-Aristotelians (e.g. Hursthouse (1999), Nussbaum (2000), Foot (2001)) stand in the debate on well-being.

⁴ Parfit (1984), p. 493.

⁵ There are many proposed distinctions between subjectivist and objectivist accounts in the literature, and some purportedly do important philosophical work for their proponents, but for this paper I simply need a distinction that conveniently carves up contemporary debate. The following distinction will do: subjectivist theories contend the components of well-being consist centrally (though not necessarily exhaustively) in some actual or ideal pro-attitude(s) of the agent whose well-being is in question. Objectivist theories, though they might plausibly contend that the components of well-being consist in part in actual or ideal pro-attitudes, do not make pro-attitudes central to well-being: for instance, an Aristotelian perfectionist account may hold that moral virtue and the exercise of our rational capacities is more central or important for well-being than the mere achievement of a certain kind of satisfaction or pleasure. In what follows, I will thus call hedonist, desire-satisfaction, and Sumner's theory "subjectivist" views, while lumping Aristotelian perfectionist and objective list accounts in the "objectivist" category.

⁶ For instance, consider the set of fully informed desires that Peter Railton (2003) and David Lewis (2000) identify as grounding well-being, respectively, in their "ideal advisor" and "dispositional" accounts of well-being. For criticism of the move to ground well-being in "fully informed" desires, see Carson (2000).

⁷ See Arneson's (1999) accommodation of desire-satisfaction in his objective list account and Toner's (2006) incorporation of subjective satisfaction in the Aristotelian perfectionist account he develops.

⁸ Though it has been more than a decade since he published his account in (1996), the critical response to Sumner is just starting to taking shape. See Sobel (1997) and recent discussion by LeBar (2004), Toner (2006), and Kraut (2007).

⁹ Let "the folk" refer roughly to those who are not steeped in philosophical theorizing, namely non-philosophers.

¹⁰ Feldman (2006), p. 585.

¹¹ "Unimpeached" intuitions are roughly those that are not filtered out as a result of presupposing error, conflicting with established background theories, or being subject to deeply distorting influences like self-interested bias and indoctrination.

¹² We typically take something's status as prudentially valuable, *ceteris paribus*, as a reason to promote it.

¹³ Consider various religious theories of well-being that depend on scientifically suspect metaphysical claims.

¹⁴ Williams (1985), p. 46.

¹⁵ See e.g. Philippa Foot's (2000) case of the wicked Wests, which is discussed in the longer version of my paper.

¹⁶ Further, these cases are not bizarre thought experiments like (say) Nozick's experience machine and thus our intuitions about them cannot be immediately discounted as unreliable guides. If they are to be discounted, a different undercutting defeater will have to do the work.

¹⁷ Sumner's (1998) article suggests he would make this response. There he makes a case for the contingent positive correlation between an individual's moral virtue and her satisfaction. He argues that virtue is just one substantive good among others.

¹⁸ See Richard Kraut's (2007) appeal to intuitions about "flourishing" and his case for the conceptual link between flourishing and well-being.

¹⁹ These three lines are from Fred Feldman (2006), p. 585. Here and in his recent book (2004) dubs this thought experiment the "Crib Test."

²⁰ For an early appeal to something like it, see Kraut (1979), pp. 187-189.

²¹ Valerie Tiberius has put the formidable question to me: how do we know that the intuitions generated by the Crib Test are intuitions about well-being, instead of (say) flourishing? My response: if Crib Test intuitions were about flourishing, then they would endorse lives that involve the full exercise of our natural capacities, lives like that of Ghengis Khan who, by any reasonable standard, was "dangerously flourishing" in his health, wealth, and relationships. Yet I suspect Crib Test intuitions do not endorse such wicked lives and thus that they more likely track well-being, not related concepts like flourishing or happiness. If still pressed on why I am confident that Crib Test intuitions target well-being, I would say that given the difficulties involved with surveys and word choice, and given the centrality of our conception of well-being in relation to the care for our children, the Crib Test is the best way I know of elucidating it. If there is a better way, I want to hear about it. We could throw in the towel and conclude there is no univocal concept of well-being that can be characterized, but that would be a last resort given how much we care about well-being. Also see my response to Feldman's objection on p. ##

²² Frankfurt (2004), p. 42.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 43.

²⁴ Feldman (2004), p.10

²⁵ Even in the case of the religious fanatic, as Feldman describes it, it is not obvious that the religious fanatic is or is likely basing his judgment on moral or religious considerations, as opposed to welfare-based considerations. His response, if elicited by reflection through the medium of the Crib Test, might very well reveal that he has an (odd) conception of well-being that ties well-being and religious virtue (as he conceives of it) together.

²⁶ These philosophers are called “hybrid theorists” because they combine a subjective component (e.g. authentic satisfaction) with an objective component (e.g. perfectionist value) in their account of well-being. For recent hybrid accounts, see e.g. Adams (1999, ch. 3) and Toner (2006).

²⁷ Sumner (1996), p. 164.

²⁸ Let me express my gratitude for helpful comments on ancestors of this paper from...