Representative Publications

• “Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?” Inquiry
  (forthcoming).
• What is the Physical?” in McLaughlin B. and A. Beckermann (eds.),
  Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press)
  (2009), pp. 173-188.
• Philosophy of Mind, Wadsworth Press (2009), 141 pages.
• “Affective Proprioception” co-written with Jonathan Cole,” Janus Head:
  Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental
  Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts, Special Issue
  Edited by Shaun Gallagher, 9.2 ( 2007), pp. 299-317.
• "Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New,”
  Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007) pp. 176-189.
• “What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?”
  Dialectica 60:4 (2006), pp. 383–396.
• “Proprioceiving Someone Else’s Movement,” Philosophical Explorations,
  9:2 June (2006) pp. 149-161.
• “Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense,” Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
  64: 2 (2006) pp. 231-242.
• “Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World” Erkentnis, 64: 2
  (2006) pp. 177-191.
• “The Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism,” co-written with David
  Papineau, Analysis, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2005) pp. 233-237.
• “Consciousness is Puzzling, but Not Paradoxical,” Philosophy and
  Phenomenological Research, 69: 1 (2004) pp. 213-226.
• “The Epistemic/Ontic Divide,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
  66: 2 (2003) pp. 404-418.
• “New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utility: Is Every World Good, Bad or
  Neutral?” co-written with D. Fishkind and J. Hamkins, Australasian
  Journal of Philosophy, 80: 2 (2002) pp. 178-190.
• “Post-Physicalism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8: 2 (2001) pp. 61-80.
• “With Infinite Utility, More Needn’t be Better,” co-written with J.
  Hamkins, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 2 (2000) pp. 231-240.
• "The Body Problem," Noûs, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1999) p. 183-20