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Philosophy of Mind Comprehensive Exam Reading List

(An asterisk* indicates that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal (OUP 1991.) Two asterisks** indicate that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, eds. Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere (The MIT Press, 1997.) Three asterisks*** indicate that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in Mind and Cognition, ed. Lycan (Blackwell, 2nd ed. 1999.) A hash mark # indicates that the work is available in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Chalmers (OUP 2002.))

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  1. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND MATERIALISM
    1. Descartes, Meditations II and VI, selections, *, #
    2. J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," *, #
    3. Jerome Shaeffer, "Mental Events and the Brain," *
    4. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (excerpts), *, # Or: "The Identity Theory," **)
    5. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, ch. 2, in *
    6. Paul M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *, #, ***
  2. FUNCTIONALISM
    1. Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," *, #, ***
    2. David Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications," *, #
    3. David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," *
    4. Ned Block, "Troubles with Functionalism" (abridged), *, #
    5. Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," *
    6. John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," with comments by Jerry Fodor and replies by Searle, *
  3. INTENTIONALITY AND INTENTIONAL CONTENT
    1. Jerry A. Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes," *, #
    2. Jerry A. Fodor, "Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought" Psychosemantics, Appendix; in ***
    3. Daniel C. Dennett "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works," *, #, ***
    4. W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *
    5. Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," §§VII, XI-XV in Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality also available at http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html
    6. Fred Dretske, "A Recipe for Thought," #
    7. Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," *
    8. Norman Malcolm, "Thoughtless Brutes," *
  4. INDIVIDUALISM AND EXTERNALISM
    1. Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (excerpt), #
    2. Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, ch. 2, in ***
    3. Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," *
    4. Brian Loar, "Social Content and Psychological Content," *
    5. Martin Davies, "Externalism and Experience," **
  5. MENTAL QUALITIES
    1. Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It's Like," **
    2. Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," *
    3. Paul M. Churchland, "Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson," **
    4. David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches," **, #, ***
    5. Gilbert Harman "The Intrinsic Quality of Experiencee, ***
    6. Ned Block, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness," **
    7. Daniel C. Dennett, "Quining Qualia," **
    8. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 5 available at http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/CM/csq.pdf
    9. Sydney Shoemaker, "The Inverted Spectrum," **
    10. Ned Block, "Inverted Earth," **, ***
  6. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF
    1. Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat," *, **, #
    2. Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, ch. 5
    3. David M. Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness," *
    4. Fred Dretske, "Conscious Experience," **, #
    5. Galen Strawson, "The Self and the SESMET" at http://www.reading.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/gjs/sesmet.pdf
    6. Donald Davidson, "Knowing One's Own Mind," *** also in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam, OUP, 1994
    7. Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam
    8. G. E. M. Anscombe, "The First Person," * also in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam
  7. MENTAL CAUSATION AND EPIPHENOMENALISM
    1. Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," *, #, ***
    2. Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," *
    3. Donald Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele, OUP, 1995
    4. Jaegwon Kim, "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele
    5. Fred Dretske, "Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour" in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele

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