PHILOSOPHY
The City University of New York Graduate Center
Philosophy of Mind Comprehensive Exam Reading List
(An asterisk* indicates that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal (OUP 1991.) Two asterisks** indicate that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, eds. Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere (The MIT Press, 1997.) Three asterisks*** indicate that the work is available, in whole or suitable abridgment, in Mind and Cognition, ed. Lycan (Blackwell, 2nd ed. 1999.) A hash mark # indicates that the work is available in Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. Chalmers (OUP 2002.))
[return to Comprehensive Exam list]
- THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM AND MATERIALISM
- Descartes, Meditations II and VI, selections, *, #
- J. J. C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," *, #
- Jerome Shaeffer, "Mental Events and the Brain," *
- Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (excerpts), *, # Or: "The Identity Theory," **)
- Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, ch. 2, in *
- Paul M. Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," *, #, ***
- FUNCTIONALISM
- Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," *, #, ***
- David Lewis, "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications," *, #
- David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain," *
- Ned Block, "Troubles with Functionalism" (abridged), *, #
- Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," *
- John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," with comments by Jerry Fodor and replies by Searle, *
- INTENTIONALITY AND INTENTIONAL CONTENT
- Jerry A. Fodor, "Propositional Attitudes," *, #
- Jerry A. Fodor, "Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought" Psychosemantics, Appendix; in ***
- Daniel C. Dennett "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works," *, #, ***
- W. V. Quine, "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," *
- Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," §§VII, XI-XV in Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality also available at http://www.ditext.com/sellars/epm.html
- Fred Dretske, "A Recipe for Thought," #
- Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," *
- Norman Malcolm, "Thoughtless Brutes," *
- INDIVIDUALISM AND EXTERNALISM
- Hilary Putnam, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (excerpt), #
- Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, ch. 2, in ***
- Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," *
- Brian Loar, "Social Content and Psychological Content," *
- Martin Davies, "Externalism and Experience," **
- MENTAL QUALITIES
- Joseph Levine, "On Leaving Out What It's Like," **
- Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," *
- Paul M. Churchland, "Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson," **
- David Lewis, "What Experience Teaches," **, #, ***
- Gilbert Harman "The Intrinsic Quality of Experiencee, ***
- Ned Block, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness," **
- Daniel C. Dennett, "Quining Qualia," **
- David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind, ch. 5 available at http://web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/CM/csq.pdf
- Sydney Shoemaker, "The Inverted Spectrum," **
- Ned Block, "Inverted Earth," **, ***
- CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF
- Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat," *, **, #
- Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, ch. 5
- David M. Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness," *
- Fred Dretske, "Conscious Experience," **, #
- Galen Strawson, "The Self and the SESMET" at http://www.reading.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/gjs/sesmet.pdf
- Donald Davidson, "Knowing One's Own Mind," *** also in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam, OUP, 1994
- Tyler Burge, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge" in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam
- G. E. M. Anscombe, "The First Person," * also in Self-Knowledge, ed. Quassim Cassam
- MENTAL CAUSATION AND EPIPHENOMENALISM
- Donald Davidson, "Mental Events," *, #, ***
- Jaegwon Kim, "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation," *
- Donald Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele, OUP, 1995
- Jaegwon Kim, "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele
- Fred Dretske, "Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behaviour" in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele
