

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat

Randy Rydell¹

Inis Claude once wrote that the secretariat is “the most valuable product to date of the historical process of international organization.”² At the UN, Claude added, the secretary-general has the role of “international statesman” or, as Trygve Lie once put it, “the spokesman for the world interest.”³

Claude identified three basic problems facing any such secretariat. It must perform its mandates in an objective and cost-effective manner, maintain its international status, and, if possible, demonstrate some political leadership. For Dag Hammarskjöld, the fundamental choice facing the UN organization was whether it should function as “static conference machinery” or serve as a “dynamic instrument” to achieve specific political objectives.⁴

All of these observations very much apply to the work of the UN and its secretaries-general in dealing with nuclear weapons challenges. While member states make the most fundamental decisions, the secretary-general and secretariat have all made their own unique contributions in addressing such challenges. These contributions merit close attention by all who are concerned about the process of international organization, in particular as it applies to multilateral efforts to address challenges relating to nuclear weapons, the most dangerous of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Since there is little scholarly literature on the role of the secretary-general and secretariat in this field, this chapter seeks to fill that gap. In light of growing concerns in the world over the magnitude of the threats posed by such weapons, this chapter will address four questions: What have the eight secretaries-general and secretariat sought to achieve in this field? How has this work changed? Why? And to what effect? It begins by briefly outlining the origin and evolution of the secretariat's and secretary-general's disarmament mandate, followed by a look at the UN machinery designed to fulfill this charge. Next, the chapter turns its attention to various structural changes within the secretariat for addressing nuclear weapons issues that reflect the different priorities of successive secretaries-general. Following this examination secretariat's institutional change, the chapter focuses on some specific approaches to disarmament offered by each of the secretaries-general. Finally, the chapter closes with some preliminary conclusions and offers a look ahead at three possible futures for the secretariat in the field of disarmament.

Origin and Evolution of the Disarmament Mandate

The mandates of the secretary-general and the secretariat derive first of all from the UN Charter. The Charter was adopted just weeks before the world's first nuclear test. Not surprisingly, the Charter does not contain the term "nuclear weapon" nor does it assign any specific mandate to the secretary-general or the

secretariat for either “disarmament” or the “regulation of armaments”—both goals that are found in the Charter, but which specifically apply to other UN organs.⁵

The five articles of Chapter XV relate to the work of the secretariat. Under Article 97, the secretary-general serves as the “chief administrative officer” of the UN organization. Article 98 acknowledges the need for a more flexible mandate by providing that he or she “shall perform such other functions” as the other UN organs may entrust to that office. Article 99 also authorizes the secretary-general “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Article 100 establishes the institutional independence of the secretary-general and secretariat and obliges each member state to respect their “exclusively international character.” Article 101 pertains to the recruitment of staff, including the criteria of “efficiency, competence, and integrity” and geographic diversity.

Although the Charter does not define the terms “disarmament” and “regulation of armaments,” their meanings have evolved through practice and customary use in the UN system. Disarmament refers to the elimination of an agreed class of weapon—a goal that the UN has specifically applied to all WMDs—while “regulation of armaments” has evolved to encompass limits on the production, trade, or use of other types of weaponry.

Virtually throughout its existence, the UN has sought to eliminate nuclear weapons, not just to regulate them. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946 established a commission to “deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and related matters,” which would be accountable to the Security Council. The resolution identified the goal of eliminating all “weapons adaptable to mass destruction,” a term covering nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The council later adopted resolution 18 (13 February 1947), which established a UN Commission for Conventional Armaments, with a regulatory focus.

After neither commission, working in the early years of the Cold War, was able to arrive at a consensus, the General Assembly combined them (by adopting resolution 502(VI) on 11 January 1952) into the UN Disarmament Commission, also under the Security Council. This commission had the mandate to prepare a draft treaty to eliminate WMDs, to regulate and reduce other armaments, and to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy. Following extensive but unsuccessful diplomatic efforts throughout the 1950s to achieve these goals—both within the commission and separately among the great powers—the assembly adopted a Soviet proposal (in resolution 1378, 20 November 1959) to combine the WMD disarmament and conventional arms regulation goals into a joint term—“general and complete disarmament under effective international control”—which has remained ever since the ultimate goal of the UN in this field.

The UN Disarmament Machinery and its Mandates

The institutional structures of the UN have varied widely over the years. The current arrangement was largely a product of the General Assembly's first Special Session on disarmament (SSOD-I) in 1978. Its final document (in General Assembly resolution S-10/2, 30 June 1978, referenced below by paragraph number) set forth a declaration of principles, a "programme of action," and a description of the relevant institutional machinery. While the "ultimate objective" was "general and complete disarmament under effective international control," (19) the document identified nuclear weapons as the first priority in disarmament negotiations. (45)

A key paragraph declared that the UN has "a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament" and that it "should play a more active role in this field." (114) The final document reasoned that since "little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War," especially in nuclear disarmament, the solution lay in the following:

In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament. ... There is ... an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums

appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. (113)

The new disarmament machinery would have its own division of labor, with the UN Disarmament Commission performing a purely deliberative role, the First Committee being responsible for preparing resolutions for adoption by the General Assembly, and the Committee [later “Conference”] on Disarmament serving as the world’s “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum.” (120)

While the final document never referred explicitly to the “secretariat” per se, it did identify many roles for the secretary-general and the “centre for disarmament.” It stated that the secretary-general “shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission’s functions.” (118d) It requested the secretary-general “to appoint the Secretary of the Committee [on Disarmament], who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee.” (120c) It also requested the secretary-general “to set up an advisory board of eminent persons” to advise that office on UN studies on disarmament and arms regulation.⁶ (124)

The Programme of Action also addressed the role of the secretary-general in generating studies and reports, and in preparing guidelines for the UN’s programme of fellowships on disarmament, which was created to train government officials, especially from developing countries. The final document

stressed the roles of the centre for disarmament in gathering information and performing research, and in coordinating with other offices in the UN system, as well as with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Also considered at SSOD-I was a French proposal to establish an international institute for research on disarmament, which later evolved into the autonomous UN Institute for Disarmament Research based in Geneva.

The secretariat has acquired many additional mandates pursuant to General Assembly resolutions and requests by states parties to multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties. Each year, the secretary-general presents numerous reports to the assembly on various disarmament issues, including reports of groups of governmental experts, statistical information, and most commonly, reports conveying the views of member states, as requested by the General Assembly. In recent years, the secretariat has launched a program on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which addresses a wide variety of issues relating to nuclear weapons (disarmament, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism). It has for over three decades served as the de facto secretariat for the states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has for over a decade promoted the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

In summary, the secretariat handles all *administrative* issues relating to disarmament in the UN organization. It serves an *advisory* function—primarily

through the provision of information and advice to the secretary-general and by assisting missions of the member states. It undertakes *research* and performs substantive analyses of policy issues, publishes reports and papers, and monitors worldwide developments. It also performs *advocacy* and *educational* functions.

Organizational Change within the Secretariat

Just as the UN's mandates have varied over the years, so too have the structures of the secretariat for addressing nuclear-weapons issues. As the "chief administrative officer" of the UN under the Charter, the secretary-general has some flexibility in organizing the secretariat, and in fact, the organization of the secretariat in disarmament often has reflected the personal priorities of the secretary-general. Yet other organizational changes have been affected by the general climate of international relations outside the UN, including the status of relations between the great powers, especially the United States and Russian Federation, which have the largest nuclear arsenals. There have also been organizational changes due more to purely internal administrative factors. In short, organizational change in the UN is multi-causal—and determining the source of a specific institutional change often involves some educated guesses, as the full circumstances behind such changes are not always well documented.

The pattern of organizational change in the secretariat in the field of disarmament does not fully conform to either of Hammarskjöld's classic models

of “static conference machinery” or “dynamic instrument” of political initiative. One could say it has even merged these categories, reflecting at times a kind of “dynamic conference machinery” or a “static instrument.” Beyond question, both the structures and mandates have undergone some significant changes over the years and will likely continue to do so.

The secretariat has undergone at least nine reorganizations in disarmament, under each secretary-general with the exception of Hammarskjöld.

The first office in the secretariat to handle nuclear weapons issues was the “Atomic Energy Commission group,” located in the Department for Security Council Affairs, which was established in 1946. This group became the “disarmament affairs group” in 1952 after the commission was abolished, and remained in the newly named Department for Political and Security Council Affairs (DPSCA). The group’s small staff of about 10 was organized into an “atomic energy section” and a conventional arms office.

Though this section was eliminated in 1964, the disarmament affairs group remained responsible for handling nuclear weapons issues. This group became the “disarmament affairs division” in 1966, though its staff remained quite small. From 1946 to 1976, the disarmament office staffed between ten and fifteen people, typically about a third of which were clerical.

In his report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization in 1975, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim stressed the importance that the UN organization attaches to progress in disarmament:

The long-term reason for the necessity of disarmament ... is that without it our Organization will not be able effectively to play its primary role—a role which in the present circumstances is vital to the survival of organized life on our planet.⁷

In that report, Waldheim concluded “the role which the United Nations is playing in disarmament is far from adequate” and called upon the assembly to “consider a basic review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament.”⁸ On 12 December 1975, the General Assembly established an “Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament,” with a focus on organizational issues, improvements in “the collection, the compilation and dissemination of information,” and assistance to states in ensuring the effective functioning of relevant multilateral agreements.⁹ In June 1976, Waldheim issued a report elaborating on the need for reform, stressing the UN’s need to improve its collection and use of information.¹⁰

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by Inga Thorsson of Sweden, identified many proposed reforms, including several applying to the secretariat.¹¹ It urged states participating in disarmament negotiations to “give serious consideration” to seeking assistance from the United Nations. It urged the

General Assembly to call upon the secretary-general to undertake “in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters,” with the assistance of governmental experts and other sources. It called for the publication of a “United Nations Disarmament Yearbook” and a “disarmament periodical” reporting “current facts and developments” in the field, as well as “annotated bibliographies” and brief summaries of relevant books and articles.¹²

The report also recommended transforming the disarmament affairs division into a “centre” for disarmament, endowed with these new or strengthened mandates. On 14 December 1976, the General Assembly adopted Sweden’s resolution 31/90, which endorsed these proposals. For the first time, the secretariat’s top official handling disarmament held the rank of assistant secretary-general.¹³

The process of organizational reform continued over the years to follow, further raising the profile and status of disarmament in the secretariat. As noted earlier, the SSOD-I assigned in 1978 a wide variety of responsibilities to the centre, especially in terms of the public advocacy of disarmament. In 1979, the General Assembly adopted another Swedish resolution, this time requesting the secretary-general to carry out a “comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs.”¹⁴ The preamble provided the rationale for the new resolution, noting “the growing disarmament agenda,” the “complexity of

the issues involved,” and the greater participation of states, which was creating “increasing demands” on the UN “for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament.”

The study was prepared with the assistance of a group of experts chaired by Argentine Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (who presided over SSOD-I).¹⁵ Among other proposals, it supported a stronger role for the assistant secretary-general in coordinating disarmament activities in the UN system. It called upon the secretary-general to consider “possibilities to strengthen” the centre by giving it additional staff (“within the existing over-all resources” of the UN). It also cautiously proposed a possible UN role in verifying disarmament agreements. The group discussed restructuring proposals—including the options of creating a “department for disarmament affairs” or a “world disarmament agency”—but “did not take a position of its own” on these proposals.¹⁶

The study cautioned, “whatever the adequacy of the means provided by the United Nations in the service of the task of disarmament, it was ultimately the will of States to make the best use of them and their political readiness to negotiate which would determine how much progress was made in that regard.”¹⁷

In 1982, the year Javier Pérez de Cuéllar became secretary-general, the General Assembly made a new effort to advance organizational reforms in disarmament and raise its priority. The first event was the convening of the second General Assembly Special Session on disarmament (SSOD-II), which was

held from 7 June to 10 July. The session opened with several speeches about the dismal global situation for disarmament following SSOD-I, with many references to the nuclear arms race, rising military expenditures, and the failure to have achieved much progress on the goals of the earlier special session.

While the session did not achieve its primary purpose—to elaborate a “comprehensive programme for disarmament” for implementing the recommendations of SSOD-I—it did launch a “World Disarmament Campaign” to “inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support” for the goals agreed at SSOD-I.¹⁸ While the session’s concluding document requested the secretary-general “to make every effort” to promote these goals, it provided no funds and instead urged the secretary-general “to explore the possibilities of redeploying existing resources.”¹⁹

With respect to the secretariat, the annex of the concluding document contained several relevant—though not agreed upon—paragraphs that Working Group I had proposed for inclusion in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. These included proposals for: a “department for disarmament Affairs”; an “international disarmament organization” under UN auspices with responsibilities that include verification of arms control and disarmament agreements; and a “United Nations disarmament agency.”

On 13 December 1982, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 K, which requested the secretary-general to transform the centre for disarmament

into a “department for disarmament affairs” that would be “appropriately strengthened with the existing overall resources of the United Nations” and headed by an under-secretary-general.²⁰ This was the highest level that disarmament had ever been handled within the secretariat. The resolution was introduced by Norway on behalf of forty-two delegations and was adopted without a vote, with the Soviet Union cautioning “against losing sight of the fact that the real reasons for the lack of progress in disarmament lay not in the organization of the work of the United Nations bodies, but in the willingness of certain major States to stop the arms race.”²¹ The department for disarmament affairs (DDA) was officially established on 1 January 1983.²²

The *Secretary-General's Bulletin* of 1 June 1983 spelled out the specific functions and structure of the new department.²³ Its functions were to assist and advise the secretary-general on disarmament issues; provide administrative and substantive services to the various parts of the UN disarmament machinery and to facilitate coordination of activities therein; maintain liaison with other international organizations; coordinate the World Disarmament Campaign; administer the UN's program of fellowships on disarmament; and carry out any other tasks that may be assigned by the secretary-general. Structurally, the department had an office of the under-secretary-general—with formal management, policy advice, coordinating, liaison, and analytic responsibilities—

as well as three branches: the committee and conference services branch; information and studies branch; and the Geneva branch.

This structure would soon expand, especially to focus on regional issues. In 1984, the General Assembly asked the secretary-general to assist member states in the various regions to participate in the World Disarmament Campaign (resolution 39/63 J, 12 December 1984). A year later, the assembly established the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (resolution 40/151 G, 16 December 1985), and in 1986, created the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America, later expanded to include the Caribbean.²⁴ The following year, the General Assembly established the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, later expanded to include the Pacific.²⁵

All these resolutions provided, however, that their funds would have to come from “existing resources” and “voluntary contributions.” In practical terms, this required DDA and the centres to devote considerable effort to fund-raising activities. Although none of these resolutions specifically put these centres in DDA, they provided the secretary-general flexibility to do so and this is where they were placed.

By 1988, DDA had four branches—the committee and conference services branch; the publications and World Disarmament Campaign branch; the monitoring, analysis and studies branch; and the Geneva branch, in addition to the

three regional centres.²⁶ It was still, however, the smallest department in the secretariat.

Coinciding with these developments were growing concerns of member states with the growth and effectiveness of the UN bureaucracy in general. In 1986, a high-level group of governmental experts issued a report that included recommendations for a “substantial reduction in the number of staff members” as well as for the merger of “departments, offices and other units” when consolidation would improve the efficiency of the organization.²⁷

There was little apparent desire among member states, however, to reduce or eliminate DDA on grounds of inefficiency or over-growth. In June 1990, the Disarmament Commission completed a review of the role of the UN in disarmament and concluded that the secretary-general “should be assisted by an adequately staffed and funded” DDA.²⁸ The report said that DDA’s resources should be “commensurate with” its mandated tasks “in so far as” UN budget restraints would permit. It also called for the coordinating role of DDA vis-à-vis other UN activities and relevant specialized agencies to “be strengthened.”

By 1991, DDA had 30 staff members at the professional level or higher and an annual regular budget of just over \$5 million.²⁹ It continued to acquire new missions and mandates, without additional funding. Following the war in 1991 to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq, pursuant to resolution 687.³⁰ This

resolution required the secretary-general to develop and submit to the council a plan to accomplish several tasks, including: the creation of the special commission to carry out on-site inspection of prohibited weapon capabilities in Iraq; the development of measures by which Iraq would turn over to the commission prohibited items “for destruction, removal or rendering harmless”; and assistance and cooperation between the commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accomplishing the nuclear disarmament of Iraq.³¹

The secretariat played a significant role in the planning and setting up of UNSCOM—and while UNSCOM (and its successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC) were almost entirely staffed by personnel recruited by the respective commissions from outside the secretariat, the latter did provide the commissions with several professional and general service staff members to assist their work.³² A member of the secretariat also served as a member of UNMOVIC’s “college of commissioners,” which was appointed by the secretary-general after consultations with the Security Council.³³ Both commissions were funded by Iraq, not the regular UN budget.

The arrival of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as secretary-general in January 1992 began a period of decline for disarmament in the secretariat. His new spokesman announced on 7 February that the new secretary-general would soon be

implementing a major organizational reform of the secretariat, one that would abolish several high-level posts and eliminate several departments, including DDA, whose staff and mandates would merge into a new Department for Political Affairs (DPA).³⁴ The spokesman said the intent was to “streamline” the secretariat and make it “more efficient and more economical.” Yet on the cost issue, he also said “I don’t know about savings,” adding that the purpose of the reform was not to save money but to “improve the bureaucracy.”³⁵

The announcement came on 21 February, when Boutros-Ghali issued a *Note* expressing his intention “to consolidate and streamline” the UN in an effort that would include moving DDA into the new DPA.³⁶ He pointed to the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, where the members at the level of heads of state and government issued a presidential statement stressing the importance of enhancing the UN’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Implicitly, the *Note* viewed the function of disarmament as belonging in a department with a mandate in such fields as conflict resolution and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The first phase of the reform would be effective from 1 March 1992.³⁷ On 2 March, the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving the secretary-general’s proposal, which it called “a vital part of the reform and revitalization” of the United Nations.”³⁸

NGOs appeared to be somewhat surprised by the reform, but initially at least did not vigorously oppose it. In May, the newspaper *Disarmament Times*—

issued by the NGO Committee on Disarmament—published an interview with former veteran Soviet diplomat Vladimir Petrovsky, DPA’s new under-secretary-general with the dossier for disarmament. He said the new “Disarmament Office” occupied a “prominent place” in DPA and that it “has become a part of the political work of the UN Secretariat,” adding that the reform “helps to make the work of the Office much more action-oriented and synchronized with the activities of the UN in other areas, especially preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.”³⁹

In June 1992, Boutros-Ghali issued a report requested that January just after he assumed his position by the Security Council—*An Agenda for Peace*—which focused at length on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping, but which made only a brief passing reference to disarmament.⁴⁰ In July, the secretary-general issued his programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993, which indicated a budget reduction of over \$600,000 for disarmament and a reduction of two high-level posts in this area.⁴¹

Disarmament Times later asked Petrovsky to comment on the treatment of disarmament in *An Agenda for Peace*. His response was that disarmament was outside the mandate of the report, and that it was an issue that “should be treated as a kind of associated measure with preventive diplomacy, peace-making, and peace-keeping.”⁴² The newspaper also noted that the secretary-general’s 1992

report on the work of the organization, departing from tradition, failed to make any reference to disarmament.⁴³

In October 1992, Boutros-Ghali issued *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*, which addressed disarmament issues.⁴⁴ The report's preface called disarmament "an inherent part of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building." It added that the end of strategic bipolarity "has not diminished the need for disarmament; if anything, it has increased it."

At the General Assembly's First Committee's special meeting on the secretary-general's new report on 11 November, under-secretary-general Petrovsky stated that to achieve "genuine disarmament," it must be integrated into the "broader structure of an international system of peace and security, along with economic and social concerns."⁴⁵ He admitted "quite frankly" that "we do not have any ready-made recipes for the reorganization of the multilateral machinery for disarmament" and that our "only strong intention ... is to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs [ODA]... as a focal point of the Secretariat in this field."

On 9 December, the General Assembly decided to convene a special meeting of the First Committee from 8-12 March 1993 to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery.⁴⁶ The secretary-general addressed the First Committee at its meeting on 9 March 1993 and drew upon the themes of his *New Dimensions* report, stressing that the "Secretariat's capabilities are being

strengthened,” adding that he was also “considering a proposal to relocate units of the Office of Disarmament Affairs to Geneva.”⁴⁷ On 8 April, the assembly adopted a resolution urging the secretary-general “to take concrete steps to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs in order to ensure that it has the necessary means to carry out its mandated tasks.”⁴⁸ During the debate, the NGO Committee on Disarmament sent a letter to the secretary-general opposing any move of ODA to Geneva, calling for greater NGO participation in the UN disarmament machinery, and supporting “an over all strengthening of the UN secretariat resources devoted to disarmament.”⁴⁹ Many member states also opposed this restructuring.

On 20 September 1993, the secretary-general informed the General Assembly that ODA would remain in New York and the office would be renamed the “centre for disarmament affairs” headed by a director at an upgraded D-2 level.⁵⁰ He also indicated that he would be adding to his budget proposal for the biennium 1994-1995 additions to cover two new posts in the conventional arms area, and one additional general service staff for the new centre.

The secretary-general issued a formal amendment to the UN’s *Organization Manual* on 15 February 1996 to describe the new centre’s functions and structure.⁵¹ In this scheme, “the Centre, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, is responsible for the provision of advice

to the Secretary-General” on disarmament issues. The centre’s key functions largely reflected those of the department that preceded it.

Less than a year later, in January 1997, Kofi Annan became secretary-general and soon indicated his intention to re-organize the Secretariat once again in the field of disarmament. His initial proposal appeared in a lengthy report—*Renewing the United Nations*—which identified broader reforms in the organization of the secretariat.⁵² He indicated his intention to create a “Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation, headed by an under-secretary-general.” He reasoned that disarmament “is a central issue on the global agenda” and that, in the post-Cold War era, the UN “has taken centre stage in the worldwide effort to limit both weapons and conflict.” He underlined some new or growing threats, including the proliferation of “nuclear weapons technology and material” and the interest of “criminal syndicates and various terrorist groups” in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. On 11 September, he submitted a budget report on his reforms, which included the creation of a new disarmament department with forty-one employees and a proposed 1998-1999 biennium budget of just over \$12 million, an increase over the \$10.8 million spent in the 1996-1997 biennium.⁵³

Later that month, the NGO Committee on Disarmament—then representing some 250 NGOs worldwide—circulated their own resolution that welcomed the creation of the new department and strongly urged all member

states to support it.⁵⁴ The US ambassador to the UN at the time, Bill Richardson, had circulated a memo on 25 August stating the following about re-establishing DDA: “While our opposition to this step was conveyed to the secretary-general, we recognize the decision was within his prerogatives and will work with him to ensure the Department will function effectively and efficiently.”⁵⁵

In October, Annan issued an “addendum” to *Renewing the United Nations*, focusing specifically on disarmament.⁵⁶ He said that nuclear disarmament must “be pursued more vigorously” and that WMD issues “continue to be of primary importance.” In November, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that welcomed and commended the secretary-general’s reform initiative (resolution 52/12, 12 November 1997).

At a press briefing on 14 January 1998, the secretary-general announced the appointment of Jayantha Dhanapala, the Sri Lankan diplomat who had served as president of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference as the new under-secretary-general for disarmament affairs. In May, Annan issued the formal description of the functions and structure of DDA, having dropped “and Arms Regulation” from its original title.⁵⁷ The new department would have seventeen enumerated functions, which resembled many of those performed by the previous department and centre. The functions included promoting “the goal of nuclear disarmament with a view to progressive reductions in nuclear weapons and their complete elimination at the earliest possible date.” In addition to the office of the

under-secretary-general, there were to be five branches: weapons of mass destruction; conventional arms; monitoring, database, and information; regional disarmament; and the Conference on Disarmament (the Geneva branch)—plus the three regional centres. Annan informed the General Assembly in 1998 that “my vision of the Organization places disarmament near the centre of its mission of peace and development.”⁵⁸ He later added that “Disarmament is a critical element of the United Nations strategy for peace and security.”⁵⁹

In March 1999, the secretariat’s Office of Internal Oversight Services issued the results of an “in-depth evaluation” of the UN’s disarmament program.⁶⁰ It found that while delegations were “generally satisfied” with DDA’s support to multilateral bodies, the department had various “shortcomings” that were “partly, but not entirely” due to a 22 percent decrease in regular budget funds since 1992 (when DDA was moved into DPA), and a significant drop in extra-budgetary funds (from \$6.3 million in 1990-1991 to \$1.4 million in 1996-1997).⁶¹

The secretary-general issued a new *Bulletin* describing the functions and structure of ODA in 2004, with the structure of the department remaining unchanged from the last *Bulletin* issued in 1998.⁶² Its norm creation function in disarmament was somewhat expanded to cover “promoting, strengthening and consolidation such norms and agreements in all the fields of disarmament.” Its role vis-à-vis nuclear weapons moved slightly from a specific function concerning the promotion of nuclear disarmament (1998) to promoting multilateral

disarmament efforts and the non-proliferation of all WMDs and “in particular nuclear weapons.” A new function was added: promoting gender-related policies—a role stemming from the department’s “gender mainstreaming action plan” launched by Dhanapala in 2003.

The office of the under-secretary-general, instead of “preparing reports and notes,” would henceforth provide “authoritative analysis and assessment” of disarmament issues. The WMD branch was also given the responsibility to handle the issue of WMD delivery systems.⁶³

DDA worked hard to promote the negotiation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, the first such zone entirely north of the equator. In 2002, Dhanapala visited all five states—meeting with all five foreign ministers and three presidents—to promote such a zone. DDA’s Asia Pacific Regional Centre worked for many years to promote the negotiation of a treaty. In their press release issued upon signing the treaty in September 2006, the Central Asian states thanked the UN, “which has directly participated, for the first time ever, in drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone.”⁶⁴

DDA’s mandates and responsibilities in the field of nuclear non-proliferation have long been focused on its role as the de facto secretariat of the NPT. DDA’s role expanded after the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004, which required all states to prohibit the proliferation or terrorist acquisition of any weapons mass destruction.⁶⁵ Yet DDA has had

essentially no direct involvement in handling either the Iran or North Korean nuclear issues in the last several years—these issues have been handled by small groups of states working outside the United Nations, with the exception of the Security Council in terms of its role in adopting sanctions resolutions.

While Ban Ki-moon rarely spoke on nuclear disarmament before becoming secretary-general in 2007, he came to office with more personal experience in dealing with nuclear weapons issues than any of his predecessors. He had participated in the Six-Party Talks over the North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and had served in 1999 as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. He had also been vice chair of the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission following the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992.

In an interview shortly before being elected secretary-general, he said his “highest priority” would be reforms of the UN, adding that “I will try to change the whole mind-set of the United Nations secretariat.”⁶⁶ Citing UN sources, Reuters reported that one reform under consideration would be to “combine the existing disarmament and political affairs departments and put them under one undersecretary-general who would also be responsible for leading anti-terrorism programs.”⁶⁷

On 16 January 2007, the first press reports appeared that the secretary-general intended to “downgrade” disarmament in the secretariat by moving it

back into DPA.⁶⁸ Representatives of several NGOs—including the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy, the International Peace Bureau, and Reaching Critical Will—immediately criticized the proposal.⁶⁹

These criticisms were joined by concerns from the UN diplomatic community.⁷⁰ Noting that an American was likely to be the new head of DPA, one ambassador from the 166-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) said that “Having an American as head is like putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.” An Asian diplomat called the move “a retrograde step” regardless of who will head DPA, adding that “We will only be repeating the blunder that Boutros Ghali made and which Kofi rectified.” He also said that “Burying disarmament in the department of political affairs will kill it, and especially so under a US national as its head.”

A proposal was reported on 18 January to keep DDA intact, but place it under the leadership of an assistant secretary-general, a rank lower than under-secretary-general.⁷¹ The report noted that the proposal was “not likely to fly” given the NAM’s preference for leaving DDA “virtually untouched.”

The concerns or outright opposition voiced by the NGOs, the NAM, the 130-member Group of 77 (G-77), and several other delegations (including Austria, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden), indicated that the proposal was clearly in trouble. As early as 19 January, the Associated Press (AP) reported that the secretary-general had “dropped” the proposal to merge the two

departments “because of opposition from a powerful bloc of developing countries.”⁷²

The report described a meeting between Vijay Nambiar, the secretary-general’s Chef de Cabinet, and the NAM’s “troika” (Malaysia, Cuba, and Egypt—NAM’s past, current, and future chairs, respectively), at which Nambiar proposed that DDA would keep its structure but become part of the office of the secretary-general, and be headed by an assistant secretary-general “who would be the special representative” for disarmament. Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz of Egypt later warned that the merger would result in “overpoliticization ... particularly if somebody from a nuclear weapons state will occupy the Department of Political Affairs”; he added that the move would “affect the balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” A representative of Zimbabwe later questioned the motivation for the proposal: “was it a problem of structure which prevented us from making progress on disarmament or was it a more substantive problem?”⁷³

On 23 January, *Terra Viva* reported that the secretary-general was making the reform proposal because he wanted to keep disarmament “closer to him.”⁷⁴ The article quoted one NAM ambassador as saying the various non-papers were “still vague on details and on reporting lines”; he asked, “why not keep things as they are?” Meanwhile, the article reported that several NGOs “have launched a campaign” against dismantling DDA.

Other concerns were registered from an unexpected quarter: US Congressmen Ed Markey and Christopher Shays, co-chairs of the Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation in the US House of Representatives, sent the secretary-general a letter voicing their concerns about reports that DDA would be “downgraded.”⁷⁵ In a statement reminiscent of Hammarskjöld’s “dynamic instrument” metaphor, they called DDA “a crucial tool to help the world eliminate weapons of mass destruction and halt illegal arms trafficking.”

On 26 January, Reuters reported that it had acquired a UN memo indicating that DDA would be reorganized into an “office” (which the article claimed “carries less weight”) that would be headed by a “high representative” reporting directly to the secretary-general.⁷⁶ Included in the rationale for the change was the need for “a greater role and personal involvement” of the secretary-general in handling disarmament issues.

Reuters reported on 29 January that another motive for the change was that it would enable the secretary-general “not to increase the number of undersecretaries-general.”⁷⁷ The report also noted continuing concerns within the NAM, including South Africa’s UN Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo and Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, the chair of the G-77. One European diplomat later warned that the proposal faced a “death of 1,000 meetings.”⁷⁸ At a closed-door meeting of the G-77 on 30 January, several states reportedly voiced their concerns over the proposal, including the lack of consultation.⁷⁹ The report quoted one

South Asian ambassador as saying, “The secretary-general is not the King, and the Secretariat is not the King’s court.”

The secretary-general addressed the General Assembly on 5 February and explained his proposal. He highlighted “the need to revitalize the disarmament agenda, through a more focused effort.”⁸⁰ This requires “sustained and determined leadership at the highest level” and the new office would therefore have a “direct line to me, thus ensuring access and more frequent interaction.” He said that disarmament was “an integral part of the policy decision-making process at the highest level.” The office would be headed “by an SRSG [special representative of the secretary-general] or High Representative” to “maximize the flexibility, agility, and proximity to the secretary-general” and to permit “a strengthened advocacy role.” The office would keep DDA’s mandates.

There were in this period some reports that the United States was behind the disarmament reform initiative. Inter Press claimed that the United States provided the “strongest support” for the proposal.⁸¹ AP had earlier cited “UN diplomats” as claiming that “Washington has been lobbying for disarmament to be added to the job [at DPA].”⁸² These reports, however, did not provide any evidence to document such claims.

On 6 February, UN spokesperson Michele Montas told reporters that the secretary-general “had adjusted his proposals in accordance with their concerns” and that “he does not want to downgrade disarmament.”⁸³ The next day, twelve

NGOs addressed a joint letter to all 192 permanent missions to the UN in support of keeping an independent department with its own mandate and under-secretary-general.⁸⁴

On 15 February, the secretary-general sent a letter to the president of the General Assembly containing a detailed description of the roles and structure of the new office for disarmament affairs, which indicated that there would no downgrading of either.⁸⁵ The main change would be in the greater role and personal involvement of the secretary-general in revitalizing the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. In his address the next day to the General Assembly, he stated that “having heard strong views from member states,” he was “ready to propose that the high representative would be appointed at the rank of under-secretary-general.”⁸⁶

The reform effort came to closure on 15 March, when the General Assembly formally endorsed the secretary-general’s plan to establish the office for disarmament affairs, headed by a high representative with the rank of under-secretary-general, and maintaining the office’s “budgetary autonomy” and existing structures and functions (resolution 61/257, 15 March 2007). On 2 July, the secretary-general announced the appointment of Sergio de Queiros Duarte, a widely-respected Brazilian diplomat and former president of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as the high representative for disarmament affairs.⁸⁷

Some Specific Approaches to Disarmament Offered by the Secretaries-General

The discussion thus far has focused on organizational mandates and structures. Yet there has also been some considerable variation in specific approaches offered by the secretaries-general to address nuclear challenges.

Trygve Lie

“Negotiation on this problem [nuclear disarmament] should not be deferred until the other great political problems are solved, but should go hand-in-hand with any effort to reach political settlements.”

Trygve Lie, “Twenty-Year Programme for Achieving Peace through the United Nations” (1950).

On 6 June 1950, days before the start of the Korean War, Lie sent a memorandum to all UN member states containing his “Twenty-Year Programme for Achieving Peace through the United Nations.”⁸⁸ In this document, he suggested that the Security Council could “instruct” the secretary-general to “call a conference of scientists,” which would serve as a “reservoir of ideas” on the control of WMDs and the promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy. He called for an “interim agreement” to halt “an unlimited atomic arms race.”

Dag Hammarskjöld

Now there is, of course, a kind of shuttle traffic between the improvement in the international atmosphere and disarmament. On the one hand ... disarmament is not likely to come about in an efficient, effective way short of a further improvement in the international situation. On the other hand, I do not think any single policy move will contribute more to an improvement in the international atmosphere than an agreement on even the most modest step in the direction of disarmament.

Dag Hammarskjöld, Press Conference, Prague, 7 July 1956.

Hammarskjöld had a distinctly analytical approach to disarmament—he understood the value of breaking the disarmament challenge down into its components and making progress by working with these parts:

[B]y isolating certain non-political, scientific elements from the politically controversial elements in the total problem of disarmament, the area of conflict has been somewhat reduced ... [I]t may be worth considering whether those elements of the problem lending themselves to objective study by experts in science and technology, in military experience, and in law might not be singled out for separate treatment.⁸⁹

He referred to disarmament as a “hardy perennial” at the United Nations, stressing its importance but recognizing that it would take time to achieve.⁹⁰

During his tenure, he called upon the Security Council to request the secretary-general to prepare a “technical and scientific study of an international control system for the suspension of nuclear tests.”⁹¹ A conference of experts did in fact occur in July-August 1958 on this issue, which resulted in a consensus that

it was indeed possible to verify a test ban. He suggested that the council might sponsor the idea of “a summit meeting on disarmament,” a proposal not implemented.⁹²

He viewed disarmament not as an issue exclusively for the attention of the great powers, but, as Brian Urquhart once put it, a “central preoccupation of the UN.”⁹³ Speaking to both UK Houses of Parliament in 1958, Hammarskjöld said that “It is obvious that controlled disarmament will be possible only through the United Nations, because any disarmament system has to be adopted and administered by a world organization whose members include practically all nations of the world.”⁹⁴ He was critical of the establishment in 1959 of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee that was outside the UN and his criticisms led to a four-power communiqué stressing that the committee “in no way diminishes or encroaches upon the UN responsibilities in this field.”⁹⁵ During the negotiations in 1955 to establish the IAEA, he sought to ensure that the new agency would be closely linked to the UN.⁹⁶

He was the only secretary-general not to reorganize the Secretariat in the field of disarmament. In his words, “Organizational arrangements ... do not change realities ... Essential difficulties encountered within the UN are based on realities and not on the specific constitution of the Organization.”⁹⁷

Ironically, three days after his death, the United States and Soviet Union issued a joint statement of agreed principles on general and complete disarmament.⁹⁸

U Thant

It is not by force of nature but by his own will that man finds himself engaged in a race between building a better world and destroying an imperfect one.

U Thant, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (1965).

Like his predecessor, U Thant did not believe that nuclear disarmament was only the business of the nuclear powers.⁹⁹ He once said that “The hydrogen bomb is a greater evil than any evil it is intended to meet.”¹⁰⁰ Thant believed that the UN’s new majority of developing countries had an important role to play in promoting progress in disarmament. He featured disarmament issues prominently in virtually all of his *Reports on the Work of the Organization*, though he was never satisfied with the UN’s progress in the field, saying in his 1966 report that the UN “has devoted a great deal of time and discussion to disarmament. The results so far are extremely meagre”¹⁰¹

Thant was perhaps the first secretary-general to call for the “reduction and elimination of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons”¹⁰² and to call for steps to “halt the proliferation of nuclear Powers and weapons.”¹⁰³ He

successfully proposed that the General Assembly declare the 1970s a “Disarmament Decade.”¹⁰⁴ He asked the assembly to request “a comprehensive international expert study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and massive military expenditures.”¹⁰⁵ He stated that “The time has come to inquire whether the United Nations should not be officially informed about the progress of the arms limitation discussions.”¹⁰⁶ Before leaving office, he said he had “often felt the need for more scientific advice and assistance” on nuclear disarmament issues.¹⁰⁷

Thant has received little credit for his contributions in helping to resolve the Cuban missile crisis. As documented by Walter Dorn, Thant advanced the idea of trading a US no-invasion pledge in exchange for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. Dorn argues persuasively that Thant “helped the superpowers to pull back from nuclear annihilation.”¹⁰⁸

Kurt Waldheim

The long-term reason for the necessity of disarmament ... is that without it our Organization will not be able effectively to play its primary role—a role which in the present circumstances is vital to the survival of organized life on our planet.

Kurt Waldheim, *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* (1975).

Kurt Waldheim is seldom recognized for his efforts to promote disarmament, but he made many such efforts—it would scarcely be fair to blame the expansion of nuclear arsenals in the 1970s as somehow his fault.

Waldheim consistently devoted vast portions of his annual *Reports on the Work of the Organization* to disarmament. He once observed that “Disarmament ... has from the outset been a major objective of the United Nations and has represented, in terms of effort, perhaps the most continuous activity of the United Nations.”¹⁰⁹ Waldheim believed that “The maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary objective of the United Nations, depends to a great degree on major progress in the field of disarmament.”¹¹⁰ He said that “the United Nations cannot hope to function effectively on the basis of the Charter unless there is major progress in the field of disarmament.”¹¹¹ He stressed that “the interest of the United Nations, and the international community as a whole, in these issues is not merely that of a passive spectator.”¹¹²

He expanded the UN’s role in undertaking research, in providing information to the public on disarmament—including through publication of the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* and the periodical *Disarmament*, and in promoting public education in disarmament.¹¹³ He sent numerous reports to the General Assembly on many disarmament issues, ranging from the social and economic effects of the arms race, to weapons in outer space.

Waldheim also contributed to the institutional development of the UN in disarmament. He persuaded the General Assembly to create an “advisory board” to provide counsel to the secretary-general. He elevated the status of the DPSCA’s disarmament affairs division to a centre for disarmament headed, for the first time, by an assistant secretary-general. Waldheim persistently advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban, was the first secretary-general to stress the dangers of plutonium recovered from power reactors.¹¹⁴ He was also the first to propose the establishment of regional or international fuel cycle centers.¹¹⁵

By 1980, his concern grew over the lack of progress in disarmament after the historic SSOD-I in 1978—at the UN, he said, “disarmament activities seem to remain largely confined to organizational and procedural matters rather than substantive ones.”¹¹⁶ In his last year in office, he called for greater attention to the fears and suspicions that stand as obstacles to disarmament.¹¹⁷ He was one of the few secretaries-general to write at length on disarmament in his memoirs, devoting a chapter to the subject, which concluded:

The lack of success in the disarmament process is not due to the occasionally cumbersome UN machinery or the often emotional and protracted debates in its fora. The United Nations is as good or bad as its members permit it to be. The lack of success is due simply to the attitude of the major parties, which currently lack the political will to take

advantage of the international machinery at their disposal for the disarmament process.¹¹⁸

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

It is my belief that nothing poses a greater threat to the international community than the continuing arms race, above all, the nuclear arms race.
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Address to the General Assembly, 12 December 1984.

In the history of disarmament at the UN, Pérez de Cuéllar will perhaps be most remembered for his role in converting DPSCA's centre for disarmament into the department for disarmament affairs. He was secretary-general during two Special Sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament (in 1982 and 1988). He stated in 1986 that "As long as they exist, nuclear weapons will entail the risk of totally unacceptable destruction to life and to human achievement."¹¹⁹ In his first annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization, he said that the world is "perilously near to a new international anarchy," and that "it is imperative for the United Nations to dispel that sense of insecurity through joint and agreed action in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament."¹²⁰

Like Thant and Waldheim, he often stressed the impact of arms races on social and economic development. He opened SSOD-II by observing that "it is ironic that the accumulation of arms is one of the few expanding industries in a period of economic depression and gloom," adding that "the arms race represents

an abdication of our responsibilities for human welfare, a perversion of ingenuity and an offence against the dignity of man.”¹²¹

He often stressed the potential role of the UN in the field of verification. In his opening address to SSOD-III, he identified verification as “an area in which the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution”—he added that it might be “possible in the future to create, under its auspices, verification machinery.”¹²² In 1990, he submitted to the General Assembly a major study on verification.¹²³ He also highlighted this issue in his reports on the work of the organization from 1985 through 1988.

Like Waldheim, he submitted many other studies to the assembly—all together, he submitted twenty-four such reports during his tenure, on nuclear-related subjects ranging from issues in specific countries (e.g., Israel and South Africa) to options for unilateral nuclear disarmament. He stressed the importance of the World Disarmament Campaign in raising public awareness, and once proposed the establishment of a “multilateral nuclear alert centre.”¹²⁴

Also like Waldheim, Pérez de Cuéllar believed that real progress on nuclear disarmament required progress in détente and nuclear reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union. He said in his 1983 annual report on the work of the organization that “the key to its solution is in the hands of the two major nuclear Powers,” a theme repeated in his 1984 report.¹²⁵ Yet he also said

that “a durable improvement in international relations depends on the success of the United Nations in discharging its mandate in this field [of disarmament].”¹²⁶

In his last year, and anticipating changes to come during the tenure of Boutros-Ghali, he said the UN must “weave collective approaches in this field more tightly into the fabric of peace-making and conflict control.”¹²⁷ He also noted the important role of the secretariat in organizing regional and interregional meetings on disarmament issues.¹²⁸

It is curious that, despite his great interest in the issue, he never discussed any disarmament issues in his memoirs.¹²⁹

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

It is my belief ... that the full array of hazards posed to humanity by these weapons cannot be adequately dealt with until we have crossed the threshold of the post-nuclear-weapon age.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (1992).

Boutros-Ghali came to office in 1992 with two very distinct goals in mind with respect to disarmament, one organizational, the other substantive. His organizational goal was achieved in 1992 when he downgraded the department for disarmament affairs to an office within DPA, as described earlier in this chapter. His substantive goal was essentially to re-conceptualize disarmament, by framing it as an issue that was subordinate to the larger problem of the peaceful

resolution of disputes, which may help to explain why he failed to mention disarmament in his first annual report on the work of the organization.

His early focus was clearly on administrative reforms; as he said in his memoirs, the UN was in a “financial crisis” and that the secretariat was “bloated, slack, and out of touch.”¹³⁰

He recognized, however, that arms have their own destabilizing effects. In his *New Dimensions* report, he observed that “The relentless accumulation of armaments by States is not only a symptom of political tension; it can also cause and heighten such tensions and increase the risk of conflict.”¹³¹ He said that “the international community can aim for no less a goal than the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.”¹³² He also called for stronger nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and particularly for controls over “long-range delivery systems” and “dual-use technology.”¹³³ He repeated this emphasis on non-proliferation in his 1996 annual report on the work of the organization, saying that “efforts towards the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament go hand in hand with efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction.”¹³⁴

His memoirs, however, scarcely mention disarmament.

Kofi Annan

The continued existence of nuclear stockpiles leaves the shadow of nuclear war hanging over our world—particularly given the existence of clandestine networks dealing in nuclear materials and the prospect of terrorists with extreme ambitions gaining access to these materials.

Kofi Annan, Message presented at the Peace Memorial Ceremony in Hiroshima, 6 August 2004.

Kofi Annan was certainly not the first secretary-general to emphasize the close relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation as multilateral policy objectives, but he devoted more effort than the others in elaborating on this theme.

He also concluded that the NPT is facing a twin “crisis of confidence” stemming from insufficient progress on either disarmament or non-proliferation. More than any previous secretary-general, he framed the “compliance” issue as applying not just to non-proliferation, but also disarmament—the world was, he feared, “sleepwalking” toward a nuclear disaster.¹³⁵ He warned that the chronic stalemate in multilateral nuclear diplomacy has resulted in “mutually assured paralysis.”¹³⁶ Paralleling such concerns, a group of seven middle-power states called the “New Agenda Coalition” pressed forward in both NPT settings and the First Committee with specific disarmament proposals.¹³⁷

Annan’s legacy in this field will also be shaped by his role in raising the priority of other related issues, most notably missile proliferation¹³⁸ and WMD terrorism, especially in implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 (resolution 60/288, 8 September 2006) and in underscoring the reality of the threat of nuclear terrorism.¹³⁹

Annan stressed the importance of the UN disarmament machinery, but warned that it was showing signs of “rust,” which he called “a problem due not to the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it.”¹⁴⁰ As for the secretariat, he defended his decision to re-establish the department for disarmament affairs, saying in 1997 that “I think it was a mistake to have downgraded disarmament. I think disarmament is one of the crucial issues of our day and I am correcting that mistake.”¹⁴¹

Annan viewed the “essential role” of the UN in disarmament as “one of norm-setting and of strengthening and consolidating multilateral principles for disarmament.”¹⁴² His tenure reflected the intention to strengthen those norms and the role of the United Nations in advancing them.

Ban Ki-moon

[R]evitalizing the international disarmament agenda, and the United Nations’ own effectiveness in this area, has been a personal priority of mine from my very first day in office.

Ban Ki-moon, statement to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 18 July 2007.

There is much continuity apparent in the approach to disarmament taken by Kofi Annan and his successor, Ban Ki-moon, as well as some nuances of change. Annan’s valedictory speech on disarmament referred to nuclear weapons

as presenting “a unique existential threat to all humanity,”¹⁴³ while Ban stated in one of his inaugural addresses that “weapons of mass destruction” present “a unique existential threat to all humanity.”¹⁴⁴ Both came to office intent on “revitalizing” the disarmament agenda and the UN’s role in advancing it. Both voiced their concerns over the “crisis of confidence” facing the NPT.

In terms of their vision of the role of the secretariat, Ban is much closer to Annan than to Boutros-Ghali, who downgraded disarmament by cutting its staff and budget, ending its institutional autonomy, and even omitting the issue from key publications. By contrast, the present (2008) office for disarmament affairs had the same budget, personnel, mandates, and institutional autonomy as the former department; its high representative retained the rank of under-secretary-general with a position on the UN’s high-level Policy Committee; and the secretary-general repeatedly voiced his personal determination to give disarmament a higher priority.

Some Preliminary Conclusions and a Look Ahead

The conclusions of this analysis are only preliminary, since the role of the UN in disarmament is continuing to evolve, virtually on a daily basis.

There is clearly no single, dominant agent of change in the way the secretariat goes about addressing nuclear weapons issues. There is an intuitively appealing argument that the great powers are in total control of the UN’s agenda

in disarmament, but surprisingly little corroborating evidence for this assumption, and many cases where other states (developing countries or middle powers) or even NGOs have had their own significant effects upon the work of the entire UN disarmament machinery.

The “New Agenda Coalition” has played an important role in advancing the norms of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation both in the NPT and First Committee. The secretariat’s record of issuing publications, promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education, and expanding its networking with groups in civil society is due as much to the secretariat’s recognition of the value of such initiatives, as to rising demands from civil society for greater information and access.

There is some reason to believe that administrative reforms in the secretariat are driven largely by parochial internal concerns over efficiency and effectiveness, rather than by power politics. Every secretary-general has had to deal with the problem of setting priorities in an environment of limited resources. Sometimes strong personal policy preferences of the secretary-general can make a difference (e.g., Annan’s determination to re-establish DDA even over the opposition of the United States). Yet there are enormous limitations in what the secretary-general or the secretariat can accomplish in disarmament, given that the most fundamental decisions are made by the UN’s sovereign member states.

Perhaps the secretariat's greatest contributions for the cause of disarmament are in helping to raise it as an international priority, to sustain and strengthen its basic legitimacy, to explain it to the public, to provide a forum for the public to make its own contributions, to serve as a kind of global "town hall" for debating relevant initiatives, and—above all—to create, build, sustain, and adjust international norms or standards of conduct concerning the possession, proliferation, or possible terrorist use of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. The secretariat's independent contribution to these abstract goals is of course difficult to measure, though the sheer persistence of the UN's fundamental goals of WMD disarmament and conventional arms regulation owes a lot to the work of the secretariat, year after year.

The tools used by the secretariat are quite familiar: public statements, publications, assistance to delegations involved in the UN disarmament machinery and multilateral treaty conferences, research and analysis, and coordinating liaison relationships with other intergovernmental, regional, and non-governmental organizations. The secretariat is more than just a document repository, but also the institutional memory of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Its experts are careerists, not political dilettantes; their loyalties are to the global institution rather than the interests of only specific states.

A disarmament function has continued in the secretariat since 1946 despite often strong resistance from the nuclear-weapon states. It has survived varying

priorities of the secretaries-general. Its work is influenced by broader trends in international relations—including the end of the Cold War, the age of decolonization, strains between the great powers, wars in the Middle East, and other such conditions. Yet it has also made its own contributions in promoting deeper public understanding of disarmament issues, advancing its norms in multilateral settings, and in strengthening standards that constrain the behavior of states.

All the secretaries-general recognized the importance of disarmament, yet each has had his own approach. Lie, Hammarsköld, and Thant drew attention to the role of science and technology in advancing disarmament. Thant and Pérez de Cuéllar stressed the social and economic costs of the arms race and rallied support for disarmament among developing countries. Waldheim and Thant both presided over a wave of new disarmament-related publications by the secretariat. Pérez de Cuéllar often called for the UN to play a greater role in verification. Boutros-Ghali tried to integrate disarmament into the broader process of peace building. Annan raised the priority of disarmament and added a new emphasis on non-proliferation and counter-terrorist themes. And Ban has indicated his intention to give the issue even a higher priority.

The work of the secretariat in disarmament has also been influenced by influential, opinion-leading states and blocs of states. Sweden's efforts to create a centre for disarmament affairs in 1976, and Norway's 1982 resolution to elevate

the centre to a department are good examples, as was the role of the NAM and G-77 states in the establishment of an independent office for disarmament affairs in 2007, with help from NGOs. This history does not provide much evidence at all for any dominance of the secretariat's work in disarmament by the great powers.

It is fair to conclude that secretaries-general have found it easier to re-organize the UN's work in disarmament than actually to achieve this goal, which is not surprising, given the extent that progress in disarmament still depends on decisions by the member states.

Moreover, the re-organizations that have occurred in disarmament have neither saved the UN much money nor significantly "streamlined" the secretariat. The issue is one of scale. In 2007, for example, the UN spent more on procurements relating to "cleaning and waste disposal services" (\$10.1 million) than it budgeted for disarmament (less than \$9.9 million). For decades, the secretariat only employed about a couple of dozen officials to work on disarmament issues and its current staff—consisting of about fifty employees—still constitutes a miniscule part of the secretariat staff of 8,900.

Although the work of the secretariat in disarmament is not a significant drain on UN resources, its work remains very important in the eyes of member states—both large and small—whose political and financial support will be crucial for the future of this work. This support, combined with the leadership

and priorities of the secretary-general, will determine what the future will hold for disarmament in the secretariat.

Looking ahead over the next few decades, this analysis points to at least three possible futures for the secretariat in the field of disarmament—revolution; evolution; and devolution.

Revolution would entail a comprehensive reform of the structures and functions of the UN disarmament machinery. If member states so desire, the secretariat could gradually acquire new mandates, as well as consolidate and integrate many of the diverse multilateral activities underway in disarmament. This could lead to the creation of new global institutions, including a disarmament organization, a verification agency, a disarmament academy, along with global organizations to deal with peaceful uses of outer space, to promote renewable energy and energy conservation, or to conduct various sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle activities. Significant increases in budgets, staff, and the scope of mandates would provide some indicators of the emergence of a revolutionary course.

Evolution suggests a future based on incrementalism. An evolutionary approach stresses the importance of doing existing tasks better—more effectively and efficiently—rather than overhauling existing institutions or mandates. Budgets would remain largely flat. Priorities would essentially remain unchanged, or evolve slowly in response to international events and shifting coalitions of political support. While a tendency to incremental evolution is easy

to predict, its consequences are not, especially if the evolution is away from disarmament toward more regulatory approaches to dealing with nuclear weapons. Evolutionary change has its highest potential when nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation progress together, rather than at each other's expense.

Devolution encompasses a future in which global norms and institutions lose their relevance in the day-to-day activities of states. In this vision, global institutional structures and functions would increasingly operate on regional, sub-regional, or local levels. The creation and enforcement of the global norms of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation would increasingly emerge as activities undertaken by coalitions of states, rather than institutions of universal membership. Devolution could occur as a result of public and governmental frustrations with the slow rate of progress in existing multilateral institutions, or from growing perceptions of the limitations of global norms and institutions in alleviating immediate threats to security. States may also come to conclude that they have greater voice or influence over decisions made in more restrictive arenas.

In all probability, the global nuclear regime and its associated machinery will continue to “muddle through” until an unusual configuration of forces—which might include dynamic leadership among key member states or elsewhere within the UN, a catalytic event, a historic breakthrough in US/Russian strategic

relations, or other such unpredictable circumstance—creates conditions that will lead to more fundamental changes. As long as weapons stockpiles keep declining, and proliferation risks remain stable or decline, this may be the most practical route to a safer world for all.

Whichever route the world chooses to take, except in the most extreme case of devolution, there will be important roles for the secretary-general and secretariat to play. In their own way, they have proven to be indispensable.

Notes

¹ The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. The author wishes to thank Ye Joon Rim and Renata Zaleska for their assistance in undertaking background research for this chapter.

² Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, 4th Edition (New York: Random House, 1971), 211.

³ Ibid., 211, quoting from Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 88.

⁴ Dag Hammarskjöld, *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960-15 June 1961* (General Assembly document A/4800/Add.1), 1.

⁵ Article 11 establishes the disarmament mandate of the General Assembly, while Articles 26 and 47 concern the mandates of the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee.

⁶ The General Assembly expanded this mandate by adopting decision 54/418 on 1 December 1999.

⁷ Kurt Waldheim, *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, (General Assembly document A/10001/Add.1), 11 August 1975, 4.

⁸ Ibid..

⁹ General Assembly resolution 3484 B, 12 December 1975.

¹⁰ General Assembly document A/AC.181/3, 9 June 1976.

¹¹ *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament*, (General Assembly document A/31/36), 1976.

¹² The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* was first published in 1976 and has appeared annually ever since. It is also available at <http://disarmament.un.org/e-yearbook.html>. The secretariat also published a periodical, *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, from 1978 through 1997.

¹³ The first assistant secretary-general for the centre was Rolf Björnerstedt of Sweden.

¹⁴ General Assembly resolution 34/87 E, 11 December 1979.

¹⁵ *Study of the Institutional Arrangements Relating to the Process of Disarmament, Report of the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/36/392), 11 September 1981.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 30. This is probably the first official reference to the notion of creating a “department” for disarmament affairs in the secretariat.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁸ *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly*, (General Assembly document A/S-12/32), 9 July 1982, 101.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

²⁰ The first under-secretary-general for disarmament affairs was Jan Martenson of Sweden.

²¹ As summarized in the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1982), 130.

²² *Secretary-General's Bulletin*, (Secretariat document ST/SGB/199), 17 December 1982.

²³ *Secretary-General's Bulletin*, (Secretariat document ST/SGB/Organization, Section AA), 1 June 1983.

²⁴ General Assembly resolution 41/60 J, 3 December 1986. The name change occurred pursuant to General Assembly resolution 43/76 H, 7 December 1988.

²⁵ General Assembly resolution 42/39 D, 12 December 1987. The name change occurred pursuant to General Assembly resolution 44/117 F, 15 December 1989.

²⁶ Secretariat document ST/SGB/Organization, Section: DDA, 2 August 1988.

²⁷ *Report of the Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations* (General Assembly document A/41/49), 15 August 1986.

²⁸ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (General Assembly document A/45/42), para 32. A full text appears also in General Assembly document A/51/182, 20 June 1990.

²⁹ *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1991* (New York: United Nations, 1991), 396.

³⁰ Security Council resolution 687, 3 April 1991.

³¹ *Ibid.*, , paragraph 9(b).

³² *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 1991*, 397.

³³ For a further description of the function of UNMOVIC's "college of commissioners" see

<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/commissioners.asp>.

³⁴ "UN Leader Fires 14 Senior UN Officials in Reorganization Plan," *United Press International*, 7 February 1992.

³⁵ “UN Chief Announces Major Reorganization, No Layoffs, Savings Unknown,” *Associated Press*, 7 February 1992.

³⁶ *Note by the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/46/882), 21 February 1992.

³⁷ *Secretary-General’s Bulletin*, (Secretariat document ST/SGB/248), 16 March 1992.

³⁸ General Assembly resolution 46/232, 2 March 1992.

³⁹ Vladimir Petrovsky, “Petrovsky on Disarmament,” *Disarmament Times*, May 1992, 1.

⁴⁰ *An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/47/277 and S/24111), 17 June 1992. The reference is in paragraph 22, which cites disarmament as one of several initiatives that have “contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world.”

⁴¹ *Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/C.5/47/2), 31 July 1992: 12 and 13.

⁴² “SG Reports on UN’s Future,” *Disarmament Times*, 8 October 1992, 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era, Report of the Secretary-General*, (A/C.1/47/7), 27 October 1992.

⁴⁵ , *Verbatim Record of the 29th Meeting, 11 November 1992*, General Assembly, First Committee, , (General Assembly document A/C.1/47/PV.29), 22 December 1992. [First Committee, 1992]

⁴⁶ General Assembly decision 47/422, 9 December 1992.

⁴⁷ *Verbatim Record of the 43rd Meeting, 9 March 1993*, General Assembly, First Committee, (A/C.1/47/PV.43), 20 April 1993, 7.

⁴⁸ General Assembly resolution 47/54 G, 28 April 1993. During the debate on this resolution, many delegations voiced their concern over the adequacy of funding for ODA, including Japan, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, and Nigeria, while others (including the United States) voiced the opposition to any move of ODA to Geneva. For further discussion, see “Comm I Debates Future of Disarmament Machinery, ODA,” *Disarmament Times*, April 1993, 1, 4.

⁴⁹ “NGOs Seek More Active Role,” *Disarmament Times*, April 1993, 2.

⁵⁰ *Report of the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/48/358), 20 September 1993, 2.

⁵¹ *Secretary-General’s Bulletin*, (Secretariat document ST/SGB/Organization, Section: DPA), 15 February 1996.

⁵² *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General* (General Assembly document A/51/950), 14 July 1997. The quotes in this paragraph are from pages 40 and 41 of the report.

⁵³ *Report of the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/52/303), 11 September 1997. The expenditure figure for 1996-1997 is found in “Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2000-2001,” (General Assembly document A/54/6/Rev.1, Volume II), 19 July 1999, 148.

⁵⁴ “NGOs Support Secretary-General’s Bid to Create UN Disarmament Dept.,” *Disarmament Times*, 25 September 1997, 1.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General* (General Assembly document A/51/950/Add.3), 14 October 1997.

⁵⁷ Thalif Deen, a keen observer of politics at the UN, has offered the following explanation for the name change: “... some countries feared that ‘arms regulation’ was a codeword to pursue a hidden agenda: nuclear non-proliferation. As a result of protests from several countries, including Pakistan and Egypt, ‘arms regulation’ was dropped from the mandate of the department.” Thalif Deen, “Sri Lankan Named to Head Department,” *India Abroad*, 23 January 1998, 14.

⁵⁸ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1998* (General Assembly document A/53/1), 27 August 1998, 5.

⁵⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 2000* (General Assembly document A/55-1), 30 August 2000, 13.

⁶⁰ *Note by the Secretary-General*, (Economic and Social Council document E/AC.51/1999/2), 31 March 1999.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶² *Secretary-General's Bulletin*, (Secretariat document ST/SGB/2004/12), 11 August 2004.

⁶³ In 1999, Kofi Annan had issued a statement drawing international attention to the lack of multilateral norms for missiles. (UN Press Release SG/SM/6960), 15 April 1999.

⁶⁴ *Press Release issued by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan* on 8 September 2006, available at www.cns.miis.edu. While welcome at the UN, the praise is not entirely accurate. UN staffer William Epstein made significant contributions in the drafting of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, as documented in William Epstein, "The Making of the Treaty of Tlatelolco," *Journal of the History of International Law* 3, no. 2 (2001): 153-179.

⁶⁵ Security Council resolution 1540, 28 April 2004.

⁶⁶ "Reform Should be Highest Priority for Next UN Chief, Front-Runner Says," *Associated Press*, 3 October 2006.

⁶⁷ "New UN Chief Speeds Plans to Reshape Bureaucracy," *Reuters*, 4 January 2007.

⁶⁸ Thalif Deen, “UN: Move to Downgrade Disarmament Triggers Protests,” *Inter Press Service*, 16 January 2007.

⁶⁹ Ibid..

⁷⁰ All quotes in this paragraph are from *Inter Press Service*, 16 January 2007.

⁷¹ “Disarmament to Survive—Under an ASG?” *Terra Viva*, 18 January 2007.

⁷² “UN Chief to Drop Merger Plan,” *Associated Press*, 19 January 2007.

⁷³ “A SRSB for Disarmament?” *Inter Press Service*, 19 January 2007.

⁷⁴ Thalif Deen “UN Chief Moves to Restructure World Body,” *Asian Tribune*, 24 January 2007.

⁷⁵ “Reps. Markey, Shays Urge UN Secretary-General Ban to Strengthen Arms Control Department, not Downgrade It,” *US Fed News*, 24 January 2007.

⁷⁶ “UN Chief Wants to Split Peacekeeping Department,” *Reuters*, 26 January 2007.

⁷⁷ “Ban’s UN Reform Plans Make Developing States Wary,” *Reuters*, 30 January 2007.

⁷⁸ “UN Chief’s Reform Plans May be Stalled in Meetings,” *Reuters*, 5 February 2007.

⁷⁹ “South Rejects Deadline for UN Restructuring,” *Inter Press Service*, 31 January 2007.

⁸⁰ *Address to the General Assembly by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon*, 5

February 2007.

⁸¹ “UN Chief Tries to Avoid Roadblocks on Path to Reform,” *Inter Press Service*, 6 February 2007.

⁸² “UN Chief to Drop Merger Plan,” *Associated Press*, 19 January 2007.

⁸³ Michele Montas, Regular News Briefing, UN Headquarters, 6 February 2007.

⁸⁴ “Anti-war Groups Reject Move to Downgrade DDA,” *Inter Press Service*, 7

February 2007. The full text of the letter is available at

<http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/dda-letter.htm>. Jonathan Granoff, President of

the Global Security Institute, sent his own 6-page letter to the President of the

General Assembly and all the permanent missions on 1 February 2007.

⁸⁵ *Letter dated 15 February 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly*, (General Assembly document A/61/749, Annex II, 15 February 2007).

⁸⁶ “UN Chief Picks Up Support for Reforms After Some Compromise,”

Associated Press, 17 February 2007.

⁸⁷ UN Press Release SG/A/1075, 2 July 2007.

⁸⁸ *Note by the Secretary-General*, (General Assembly document A/1304), 26 June 1950.

-
- ⁸⁹ Dag Hammarskjöld, *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1958* (General Assembly document A/3844/Add.1), 1.
- ⁹⁰ *Press Conference by Dag Hammarskjöld*, New York, 19 May 1955.
- ⁹¹ Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972): 317.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, 318.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, 322.
- ⁹⁴ *Address to Both Houses of Parliament by Dag Hammarskjöld*, 2 April 1958.
- ⁹⁵ Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 324.
- ⁹⁶ Brian Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche: An American Life* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 257.
- ⁹⁷ Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 327.
- ⁹⁸ The McCloy-Zorin statement of 20 September 1961 is accessible at <http://www.nuclearfiles.org>.
- ⁹⁹ He made this point in his *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1962* (1962), 2.
- ¹⁰⁰ U Thant, "Progress toward Peace," Address at the University of Warsaw, Poland, 31 August 1962.
- ¹⁰¹ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1966* (General Assembly document A/6301/Add.1), 3.
- ¹⁰² *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1964*, (General Assembly document A/5801/Add.1), 2.

¹⁰³ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1965*, (General Assembly document A/6001/Add.1), 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1969*, (General Assembly document A/7601/Add.1), 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1970*, (General Assembly document A/8001/Add.1), 4. The General Assembly granted his request and he submitted his report (General Assembly document A/8496/Rev.1) in 1971.

¹⁰⁶ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1971* ⊕ General Assembly document A/8401/Add.1), 6.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ A. Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk “He Saved the World,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 22 October, 2007, A11; and A. Walter Dorn, “Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *Diplomatic History*, (accepted for publication).

¹⁰⁹ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1975* (General Assembly document A/10001/Add.1), 2.

¹¹⁰ Kurt Waldheim, “Foreword,” *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* (New York: United Nations, 1976), iii.

¹¹¹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1977* (General Assembly document A/32/1), 5.

¹¹² Ibid., 6.

¹¹³ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1976* (General Assembly document A/31/1/Add.1), 31 August 1976, 5. Here he called on the General Assembly “to discuss various ways in which public concern about disarmament could be stimulated and channeled in constructive ways.”

¹¹⁴ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1974*, ⊕ General Assembly document A/9601/Add.1), 7.

¹¹⁵ *Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1975* (General Assembly document A/10001/Add.1), 4.

¹¹⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1980* (General Assembly document A/35/1), 6.

¹¹⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1981* (General Assembly document A/36/1): 6.

¹¹⁸ Kurt Waldheim, *In the Eye of the Storm* (Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler, 1986), 263.

¹¹⁹ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1986* (General Assembly document A/41/1), 4.

¹²⁰ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1982* (General Assembly document A/37/1), 1, 2.

¹²¹ *Statement by the Secretary-General at the opening of SSOD-II*, 7 June 1982.

Available in *Disarmament* 5, no. 2 (1982): 10, 12.

¹²² *Statement by the Secretary-General at the opening of SSOD-III*, 31 May 1988.

Available in *Disarmament* 11, no. 3 (1988): 5.

¹²³ *Study on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification*, (General Assembly document A/45/435), 28 August 1990.

¹²⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1986*, 4.

¹²⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1983* (General Assembly document A/38/1): 2, also *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1984* (General Assembly document A/39/1), 3.

¹²⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1988* (General Assembly document A/43/1), 14 September 1988, 7.

¹²⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1991* (General Assembly document A/46/1), 6 September 1991, 5.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹²⁹ Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, *Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General's Memoir* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

¹³⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished* (New York: Random House, 1999), 15, 16.

-
- ¹³¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: United Nations, 1992): 10.
- ¹³² *Ibid.*, 14.
- ¹³³ *Ibid.*, 16.
- ¹³⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 1996, (General Assembly document A/51/1), 20 August 1998, 149.
- ¹³⁵ Address Delivered at University of Tokyo, (UN Press Release SG/SM/10466), 18 May 2006.
- ¹³⁶ He elaborated this theme in a major speech at Princeton University in 2006. (UN Press Release SG/SM/10767), 28 November 2006.
- ¹³⁷ For a concise description of NAC, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Agenda_Coalition.
- ¹³⁸ UN Press Release SG/SM/6960, 15 April 1999. On missile defense and proliferation, see also *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 2001, (General Assembly document A/61/1), 6 September 2001, 13.
- ¹³⁹ He addressed this theme in his remarks to the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, (UN Press Release SG/SM/8624), 6 March 2003. He elaborated the UN's role in countering terrorism in a major speech in Madrid on 10 March 2005. (UN Press Release SG/SM/9757), 10 March 2005.

¹⁴⁰ *Remarks by the Secretary-General at the opening of the 2000 NPT Review Conference*, (UN Press Release SG/SM/7367), 24 April 2000.

¹⁴¹ *Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations Headquarters on 16 July*,(UN Press Release SG/SM/6285), 16 July 1997.

¹⁴² *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1998*, 6.

¹⁴³ *Lecture delivered at Princeton University*. .

¹⁴⁴ *Remarks of the Secretary-General to the Security Council*,(UN Press Release SG/SM/10833), 8 January 2007.