I,
Conservative
Mark Goldblatt
It’s rare
that a single passage encapsulates an entire benighted mindset, but
Michael Kinsley accomplished the trick the Sunday after the November
presidential election in his Washington Post postmortem on the Bush-Kerry
outcome. Declaring that we now live in the “Disunited States,”
one side conservative and one side liberal, Kinsley writes: “We
on my side of the great divide don't, for the most part, believe that
our values are direct orders from God. We don't claim that they are
immutable and beyond argument. We are, if anything, crippled by reason
and open-mindedness, by a desire to persuade rather than insist. Which
philosophy is more elitist? Which is more contemptuous of people who
disagree?”
For its sheer callow narcissism, Kinsley’s passage calls to
mind Jesse Ventura’s notorious pronouncement in Playboy that
organized religion is “a crutch for weak-minded people,”
or perhaps, going further back, Allen Ginsberg’s passionate
declaration in the opening of “Howl” that he’d seen
the “best minds of [his] generation destroyed by madness.”
Such statements invariably tell you more about the intended audience
than about the actual state of things. Just as the typical Playboy
reader would naturally regard churchgoers as superstitious hayseeds
denying themselves pleasures of the flesh out of an irrational attachment
to fairy tales, and just as the typical 1950s bohemian would naturally
identify doped-up poets bopping around the Village—rather than,
say, physics geeks pulverizing atoms at Princeton—as the true
geniuses of his era, likewise, the typical liberal nowadays naturally
holds an exceedingly warped view of the relative reasonableness of
liberals versus conservatives. Indeed, if you travel in left-liberal
circles—and I live in Manhattan and teach at a State University
college, so I do—you’re struck not only by the heartfelt
rage towards conservatives but also by a kind of reflexive snobbery.
Liberals, in general, see conservatives as brutish God-drunk bigots
determined to crush whomever stands in their way in order to preserve
the inequities of the status quo; by contrast, liberals see themselves
as worldly, open-minded, kind-hearted paragons of social virtue whose
guiding principle is their determination to look out for those less
fortunate than themselves.
As wrongheaded as such perceptions are, they merit scrutiny—and
Kinsley’s formulation is especially telling. In supposing that
liberals are “crippled by reason and open-mindedness, by a desire
to persuade rather than insist,” Kinsley slyly suggests that
conservatism’s ace in the hole is its narrow-mindedness—the
fact that it’s not responsive to counterarguments. The hidden
premise here is that liberals, though not fanatically tied to particular
policies, ultimately know what’s right—in Kinsley’s
words, “a society where women are free to choose abortion and
where gay relationships have full civil equality with straight ones”—and
the only reason they cannot turn conservatives from their errant opinions
is conservatives’ own prejudice and obstinacy.
Kinsley ironically resembles the medieval Iconoclast who thought that
the main obstacle to converting Jews and Muslims to Christianity was
the offense given by iconic images of Jesus; if only these were eradicated,
Jews and Muslims could be won over. Such thinking rules out the possibility
that Jews and Muslims might have coherent belief systems of their
own.
***
Setting aside
Kinsley’s navel-gazing, it’s nevertheless true that a
cognitive divide runs through American politics. It’s worrisome,
but also perhaps inevitable since what’s at stake runs deeper
than specific courses of action. Indeed, there are foundational differences
between liberals and conservatives, irreconcilable epistemologies
which underlie what each groups deems reasonable. On this score, several
general observations can be made.
Conservatives, the vast majority of whom come from one or another
Judeo-Christian tradition, tend to accept on faith that human nature
is unchanging and prone to sin, or at minimum not altogether virtuous.
Every just government must acknowledge, as its actuating principle,
that people cannot be perfected, and thus, that societies will always
be plagued by individual wrongdoing and collective inequities. In
short, conservatives are never utopians. They point to the horrific
body counts rung up by would-be utopian societies that attempted to
alter human nature—Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China—as
evidence of the dangers of governments refusing to recognize this
basic truth.
The vast majority of liberals also come from one or another Judeo-Christian
tradition, and many still cling to it, but they are loathe, as Kinsley
notes, to claim their values are “direct orders from God.”
This is a caricature of conservatism of course. Every liberal’s
dream conservative is a cross between Archie Bunker and Elmer Gantry;
their nightmare is a cross between Victor Davis Hanson and Thomas
Sowell. But Kinsley is onto something here since liberals, despite
their backgrounds, are more likely to imagine themselves as products
of Enlightenment secularism. (It’s worth noting that the same
week as Kinsley’s column appeared, Garry Wills used a New York
Times op-ed to ask whether America, in light of Bush’s re-election,
could “still be called an Enlightened nation.” Times regulars
Maureen Dowd and Nicholas Kristof echoed the theme.) Kinsley’s
sense of liberals’ openness to persuasion derives, without question,
from an Enlightenment sensibility. This matters because one of the
hallmarks of the Enlightenment was its rejection of the doctrine of
mankind’s inherently sinful condition. In contrast with conservatives,
liberals tend to regard human nature as essentially malleable—and,
thus, to support government policies which propose, directly or indirectly,
to tinker with human nature, to make human nature more perfect. Liberals,
unsurprisingly, are readily drawn to utopian visions, inspired by
collectivist rhetoric wherein everyone pulls together. But of course
realizing such a vision requires remaking human nature.
This is where liberals get mugged by reality. For human nature is
not malleable, much less perfectible—conservatives have simply
got that right. It’s also the central insight of Freud and the
central error of Marx. Even worse for the intellectual life of liberals
is the fact that their commitment to utopianism engenders a kind of
schizophrenia of ideals: on the one hand, a utopian society would
have to establish and maintain equality; on the other hand, a utopian
society would have to safeguard liberty (or else wind up dystopian,
as in Brave New World). The trouble is that the two goods—liberty
and equality—are fundamentally incompatible. If people have
the liberty to capitalize on their natural abilities, a hierarchy
will necessarily emerge that undermines equality. The only way to
ensure equality, thus, is to prevent people from capitalizing on their
natural abilities—in other words, to deny them liberty. Bill
Gates’ kids and Michael Jordan’s kids are born with advantages
most other kids will likely never overcome. Do we therefore deny Gates
and Jordan the freedom to provide advantages for their families? If
we do that, what is their incentive to excel? Would we be a better
society if we stifled the excellence of a Gates or a Jordan?
***
In a nutshell,
what makes liberals liberal and conservatives conservative are their
different responses to the tension between liberty and equality.
When liberty and equality come into conflict, conservatives pay lip
service to equality but tend, in the final analysis, to favor liberty.
Conservatives believe they’re making the world a better place,
but “better,” for them, is never a utopian ideal; it just
means “more prosperous” and “more free.” It’s
not that conservatives are against improving the lives of the poor—which
is, of course, an egalitarian impulse. It’s just that they point
to the fact that most government efforts to redistribute wealth have
resulted in less total wealth, and thus, the poor winding up worse
off than before. Favoring liberty over equality is wholly consistent
with conservatives’ non-utopian aims since they can argue, on
a preponderance of evidence, that the liberty to excel, even though
it fosters actual inequality, ultimately creates greater wealth to
benefit the collective. The shorthand for this comes from the movie
Wall Street: “Greed works.” Wealthy societies are awash
with inequities, but even those at the bottom are well off compared
with those in poorer societies. As Adam Smith wrote, "In competition,
individual ambition serves the common good."
Certainly, the conservative priority of liberty can become dogmatic—which
perhaps (to be fair) accounts for Kinsley’s perception of conservatives
as unreasonable. Indeed, it can even place conservatives on the wrong
side of history. This happened during the civil rights movement, a
moment in which the equality demands of African Americans should have
trumped the liberty demands of whites to determine the character of
their communities. It’s happening again now, as I have argued
elsewhere, in the gay marriage movement. The demands for equality
by homosexual Americans should trump the liberty demands of heterosexuals
to define marriage in traditional terms. But there’s a logical
consistency to conservative positions, even when wrongheaded.
By contrast, liberals tend to favor equality when liberty and equality
come into conflict. Though liberals pay lip service to notions of
individual liberty, they often seek to curtail liberty when they deem
it incompatible with their egalitarian agenda. The phenomenon of political
correctness in the workplace and on campus is a manifestation of the
liberal commitment to equality at the expense of the liberty to express
intellectually incendiary, or emotionally hurtful, ideas.
Unlike conservatives, however, who readily acknowledge the tension
between liberty and equality, liberals won’t admit such an opposition;
if they did, they’d have to abandon their utopian visions. They’re
determined to make the world a better place, but if you ask them to
define “better,” they’ll reply “fairer”
and “freer”—logic be damned. This is the nature
of utopianism; it’s why liberals struggle in debates with conservatives.
Conservatives accuse them of attempting to stifle liberty, and cite
instances where it’s plainly the case—for example, utilizing
the federal tax code to redistribute wealth, or outlawing election
campaign contributions above a certain dollar amount—but liberals
won’t own up to what’s going on. They’ll claim that
they’re fighting corruption, or the potential for corruption,
or oppression, or greed itself; they won’t admit that they’re
curtailing liberty. Their commitment to utopianism trumps even their
commitment to speaking the truth.
Which returns us to Kinsley’s observation about liberal “open-mindedness.”
I suspect what he’s actually perceiving in not open-mindedness
but logical mushiness. Conservative politics tends to flow in a direct
line from conservative premises—and the premises themselves
are taken as axiomatic. Hence, to liberals like Kinsley, conservatives
seem unreasonable. Liberal politics, on the other hand, constitutes
a theoretical grab bag. Liberals gravitate towards whatever seems
likely to make society fairer, but also whatever seems likely to make
people freer, except when the two conflict, and then, well, what does
it matter if the two conflict? What matters is that liberals’
hearts are in the right place.
That, for liberals like Kinsley, is the very definition of being open-minded.
Mark Goldblatt (English 1990) teaches at F.I.T. He is a widely
published columnist and the author of Africa Speaks, a satire of black
urban culture. His website is MarkGoldblatt.com.