The Advocate

Reflections on the Revolution in ... Israel?

William Adler
During the winter break, I traveled with my family to Israel, spending most of my time in Jerusalem. I thought it would be interesting to convey the current political and social situation I found there to the Graduate Center community, much of which may not follow the rapidly moving events and byzantine political alliances. Please note that this article reflects my own biases on politics and events.

The outstanding issue confronting Israeli politics right now is Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan that would remove all Jewish settlements from Gaza and a few from the northern West Bank. Settlements on territory captured during the 1967 war have long been condemned by the international community for violating the terms of the Geneva Convention, but Israel pressed ahead nonetheless. Sharon was at the forefront, pushing settlement expansion during the 1980s when he was Housing Minister. For that reason he was beloved by nationalist Likud supporters, as well as religious Zionists who believe the land was promised to them by God.
Sharon himself never made a religious case for settlements, but rather a military one: they gave Israel a foothold on key areas, especially the Jordan Valley, which would be important to repelling a sudden invasion. When the Labor Party regained power in the 1992 elections, its leaders negotiated a peace plan with the PLO based on the concept of land-for-peace, a move which not only inflamed the settlers but created deep divisions within Israeli society. Yitzchak Rabin’s assassination by a right-wing extremist cooled the internal debate somewhat, as many realized that the violence pushed too far. But many still believed that the PLO was not serious about making peace, continuing to support (or at least not preventing) terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.

Later in the 1990s, Ehud Barak became Prime Minister, promising to negotiate a final settlement with the Palestinians. President Clinton brought Barak and Yasser Arafat together for a summit meeting at Camp David in 2000, with every issue on the table: settlements, the right of return, Jerusalem, borders, military capabilities. Barak made what most Israelis considered a very generous, if not outright dangerous, offer: the entire Gaza strip and 97% of the West Bank would become a mostly demilitarized Palestinian state, with control over East Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, perhaps the single most contested real estate on the planet. Arafat rejected the offer due to lingering disagreements over the right of return and several settlements that would remain outside Jerusalem. Barak’s government collapsed, as the Israeli Left struggled to reconcile its support for peace with Arafat’s rejection of the best offer any Israeli Prime Minister had ever made (and ever could make, politically speaking). In the wake of the terrible intifada that followed, Ariel Sharon has since won two overwhelming electoral victories, giving his Likud Party a dominant 38 seats in the 120-member Knesset, compared to 19 for Labor.

Sharon’s first coalition government in 2001 was a national unity government of Likud, Labor and a religious party for Sephardic Jews, Shas. Pressure from both the right and left wings led to the collapse of that coalition, with new elections in 2003 leading to the above results. Significantly, a new political party based on opposition to the special privileges afforded the ultra-Orthodox, called Shinui (the Hebrew word for change) won 15 seats, stunning everyone, including Shinui’s leaders. Sharon proceeded to form a coalition of Likud, Shinui, the National Union (a hard-right party), and the National Religious Party, which represents religious Zionists and settlers. The Religious Affairs Ministry, a stronghold of the ultra-Orthodox, was dismantled, and funding for religious programs and institutions was sharply cut. But the government as a whole continued with right-wing policies regarding Palestinian relations, with the continuing occupation of many West Bank cities, the building of the security fence, and refusal to negotiate with Arafat. This coalition collapsed late last year, leading to a new national unity government of Likud, Labor (with Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister) and United Torah Judaism, the main ultra-Orthodox party.

So the big question, of course, is how Sharon could go from anti-ultra-Orthodox policies to including their party in his government, in such a short span of time? The answer leads back to the Gaza disengagement plan, which Sharon proposed in early 2003 and has been pushing for since. The right-wing parties in his previous coalition refused to support it, but the ultra-Orthodox don’t particularly care if the disengagement happens or not. They’ll support it in exchange for increased funding to their institutions (no separation of church and state here; in fact, no real constitution at all). President Bush has endorsed the plan as a step in the “road map” to peace. To all appearances, Sharon can now carry out his plans…right?

Well, perhaps not. The right wing of his own Likud Party is in open rebellion against his plans, threatening to torpedo his coalition yet again. Massive protests have continually rocked the country, with over 100,000 people showing up to the latest protest (in a country of only six million people, not an insignificant amount). Protestors have even been living on the Knesset lawn to fight the planned withdrawal (though they’ve now decided to do traveling protests instead). The tense divisions within society are rivaling those during Rabin’s early negotiations with Arafat during the mid-1990s. A clear majority support Sharon’s disengagement plan, but a defeat in a Likud Party referendum last year placed Sharon in a difficult position, taking a stand against many from his own party. The Knesset is set to approve payments to settlers who agree to leave those areas peacefully, but many are going to fight to the end to stay. Opponents of the plan claim to have the signatures of 20,000 soldiers who would disobey an order to evacuate the settlement. That number is probably an exaggeration, but it is still a cause for concern. Many settlers believe that God promised them that land, and they’re not going to willingly leave. The possibility of bloodshed seems real.
The recent meeting between Sharon and the new Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas seems a hopeful step in stopping the violence, but how long will that truce hold? Already there are signs that Hamas will refuse to participate in the cease-fire, and Israel is not releasing nearly as many prisoners as Abbas demands. Israelis in general are skeptical of peace promises from the other side. Arafat constantly talked a good game, and many wanted to believe him, but he then turned around and incited his followers to be “martyrs” for the cause. Even then, Barak made him a generous offer to create a Palestinian state, and Arafat walked away. As the Israeli author Amos Oz has remarked, “The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” The fact that Abbas seems willing to end violence against Israeli civilians gives hope to some that peace could really be at hand this time – but Sharon will never make as good an offer as Barak did. An Israeli taxi driver I spoke to believed that everyone was tired of fighting, that even Hamas might cool things down and stop its attacks. He was even convinced that peace with Syria was just around the corner, an unlikely prospect to say the least. But when even the Israeli Left urges caution, you know there will be a rough road ahead. “Trust, but verify,” Ronald Reagan once said; the Israelis have learned that the hard way.

William Adler is a student in the PhD program in Political Science.