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Cuba Project |
US-Cuban Relations:
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As there are no formal presentations, the
discussions will be focused on both general and specific questions
concerning four categories of negotiations. The following questions
were suggested by participants and are aimed at stimulating discussion.
The discussions do not, however, need to be limited to the following
questions. |
1. Given the experiences of the participants,
including direct dealings with Fidel Castro, what have been the
principal negotiating objectives of the Cuban government? |
2. Over time what have been the principal
negotiating objectives of the US government and how have they
changed? Are there priorities other than these that should/could
be pursued? |
3. To what degree has the Cuban government
been flexible in negotiating with the US? To what degree can it
be flexible? |
4. To what degree has the US government been
flexible in negotiating with Cuba? To what degree can it be flexible? |
5. “Track Two” strategies have
acquired a problematic image in US-Cuban relations. However the
historical experience of such efforts by non-governmental agencies
and people to people exchanges has generally been positive in
terms of bilateral relations. What lessons can be drawn from these
efforts that might make future US-Cuban relations more mutually
beneficial? |
6. How have US domestic politics affected
US-Cuban negotiations? |
7. What have been the principal impediments
to greater success in US-Cuban negotiations? |
8. What are the actual US interests with
respect to Cuba? |
9. What Cuban objectives have been achieved
by negotiations since the 1960s? |
10. What US objectives have been achieved
by negotiations since the 1960s? |
11. What strategies have proven most effective
in US-Cuban relations in achieving mutually beneficial interests?
Are there mutually beneficial interests? |
12. Could the OAS or other multilateral organization
play a role in facilitating US-Cuban relations? |
13. Have other countries played a role in
facilitating US-cuban Relations? |
Session
I: Humanitarian Issues and Counterterrorism: The Experience of
the 1960s and 1970s Moderator: Dr. Margaret E. Crahan, CUNY Discussion leader: Dr. Jorge Dominguez, Harvard |
1. What were the essential elements facilitating
agreement concerning political prisoners? Impediments? |
2. What were the essential elements in facilitating
agreement concerning family reunification? Impediments? |
3. What strategic, domestic political, security
coordination, and other obstacles prevented reaching the 1973
anti-hijacking accord earlier? |
4. Why did the Carter administration tend
to ignore the provisions of the anti-hijacking agreement during
the 1979-80 spate of maritime hijackings from cuba? |
5. How difficult was it for the negotiators
to agree and what were the principal impediments to agreement? |
6. How difficult was it for the negotiators
to persuade their respective governments to agree to the accord? |
7. What has been the policy re such as omega
7, posada, brothers to the rescue? |
8. Should the absence of due process of law
in Cuban judicial proceedings affect whether or not Cuban hijackers
are returned to Cuba? |
9. Does the heightened security requirements
after 9/11 make the antihijacking accord in need of revision? |
10. In the aftermath of these agreements
what were the principal areas of consensus? |
11. In the aftermath of these agreements
what were the principal areas of disagreement? |
Session
II: Diplomatic Representation and Exchange Moderator: Dr. Alfonso Quiroz, CUNY Discussion leader: Dr. Philip Brenner, American University |
1. Why did the 1970s witness an increase
in diplomatic exchanges and improved US-Cuban relations? |
2. Beginning in 1974 there were numerous
trips to Cuba by members of congress and staff, as well as congressional
hearings and proposed legislation to relax the US embargo. What
impact did this congressional activity have on decisions in the
executive branch to improve relations with Cuba? To what degree
did such efforts serve as a stimulus to Cuban government interest
in and commitment to negotiations? |
3. There is a common perception that diplomatic
discussions between the US and Cuba were suspended in 1975, after
Cuba sent troops to Angola. In fact, some discussions continued
in 1976. Would the early 1977 agreements on maritime issues and
on opening the interest sections have been possible without the
continuity that the 1976 talks provided? |
4. Did the interest sections attempt to replicate
the role and experiences of the earlier US and Chinese diplomatic
liason offices? |
5. US officials were aware that Ramon Sanchez
Parodi, the first head of the Cuban interest section in Washington,
had been or was an intelligence officer. Did Cuba’s decision
to appoint Sanchez Parodi undermine confidence in Cuba’s
commitment to improved relations? Was it an impediment to improved
relations? |
6. There was speculation in June 1977 that
Ambassador Robert White would be named to head the US interest
section in Havana. Why was White not named and Lyle Lane was? |
7. Ultimately what were the prime prerequisites
for achieving the 1977 accord re the interest sections? |
8. Why was it not possible to capitalize
on the increased diplomatic exchanges of the late 1970s? |
9. To what degree have the interest sections,
and particularly the chiefs of the interest sections, influenced
US-Cuban relations since 1977? |
10. How well have the interest sections functioned
to achieve the goals for which they were intended? |
11. Are there additional functions that both
the US and Cuba might find it useful for the interest sections
to perform? |
12. In what ways have the interest sections,
at times, aggravated US-Cuban relations? How can this be avoided?
Should it be? |
13. Rumours circulate periodically about
the possible closing of the interest sections — what is
the likelihood of this? |
14. What type of accord would be necessary
to make the interest sections better meet the mutual interests
of the US and Cuba? |
15. What roles have the Cuban mission to
the UN played? |
16. What were the prime areas of consensus
in the late 1970s? |
17. What were the prime areas of disagreement
in the late 1970s? |
Session
III: Migration: From the 1960s to 1990s Moderator: Dr. Mauricio Font, CUNY Discussion leader: Dr. William Leogrande, American University |
1. What worked and what didn’t in the
process of achieving the 1984 and 1994 migration agreements? |
2. Why did the Carter administration tend
to ignore Cuban warnings of a maritime exodus prior to mariel
and why did it not respond to Cuban requests for talks re migration? |
3. In August 1982 the state department formulated
a proposal to present to cuba regarding the return of Cuban “excludables”
and the US processing of immigrant applications. Why was the US
government willing to enter into negotiations on this issue at
that time? |
4. During 1983-84 the US proposed talks on
Immigration issues repeatedly and Cuba’s response was negative
until July 1984. Why did the US persist and why did Cuba finally
agree to talks? What does this suggest about US-Cuban negotiations
in general? |
5. In the November 1984 negotiating sessions,
Cuba appeared to soften its position significantly and agreement
was reached. Why did the Cuban position shift? What did the Cuban
government get from the final agreement? |
6. In May 1985 Cuba suspended the 1984 agreement
when Radio Marti went on the air. What was behind this suspension
besides Radio Marti? |
7. After two years of failed initiatives
aimed at restoring the 1984 migration agreement in November 1987
Cuba agreed to reinstate it. Why? |
8. Did the US or Cuba ever seriously consider
these migration talks as opening up the possibility of broader
talks? If so, why did they not result in such talks? |
9. In mid-August 1994 as the rafters crisis
began, the US refused to open talks with Cuba about the crisis.
What were the internal US government debates? Why did the US position
change by late August? |
10. The US reportedly insisted that the talks
be confined to migration issues. Press reports suggested that
the Clinton administration felt constrained by Cuban American
opinion. Was there any basis for this and what were the actual
reasons for the talks being limited? |
11. During the migration talks there were
some suggestions that they might lead to broader talks. Was that
really the US position despite public declarations to the contrary?
Was that possibility conveyed to the Cuban government? |
12. In September with the talks at an impasse
Cuba suddenly accepted an agreement on migration. Why did they
change their position? |
13. Did Cuba or the US take the initiative
to begin the 1995 secret talks on the disposition of the detainees
and the return of future migrants? Were other issues raised during
those negotiations? |
14. Why did the US not follow its commitment
under the 1994 accords to “discontinue its practice”
of granting paroles to all Cuban migrants who reached US territory
in irregular ways? |
15. Was the policy of calibrated response
an effort to find a way to change US policy without incurring
the political pressures that direct negotiations would generate? |
16. What precipitated the present suspension
of migration talks and how serious is this development? |
17. What has been the role of civil society
institutions, including churches, in facilitating and/or promoting
migration? |
Session
IV: Mutual Interests and the Changing Framework for US-Cuban Relations Moderator: Dr. Cristina Eguizabal, Ford Foundation Discussion leader: Dr. Peter Kornbluh, National Security Archive |
1. What prompted the 1999 agreement and subsequent
dialogue? Does the agreement suggest mutual interest on the US
and Cuban sides in negotiating solutions to current problems? |
2. Can progress on such issues lay the basis
for loosening trade restrictions? |
3. Why have there been periodic US-Cuba negotiations
in spite of ongoing hostility? |
4. What are the current areas of greatest
consensus? |
5. What are the current areas of greatest
disagreement? |
6. What strategies have proven most effective
in facilitating US-Cuba negotiations in the past? Are the relevant
to the present? |
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Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere Studies |