RuCCS Series of Lectures on Mind Reading
:: RuCCS Announces :: A Series of Lectures on Mind Reading Tues, March 24 at 1:00 in RuCCS A139 Robert Gordon (Univ of Missouri) "Simulating other worlds" Jane Heal (Cambridge University) "Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach" Future events in the series will include: Fri, April 3: Alison Gopnik (Berkeley) with a reply by John Campbell (Oxford) Alvin Goldman (Arizona) Fri, April 17: Susan Carey (NYU) James Blair (London) There will be a pizza lunch at noon in A139 preceding the talks. Please RSVP to Trish Anderson atif you plan to attend the lunch. Sponsored by: The Lab for Language and Cognition (SROA) Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS)
CUNY Sentence Processing Conference:
PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT AND
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
12th Annual CUNY Conference on Human Sentence Processing
Hosted by CUNY Graduate Center
33 West 42nd Street, New York NY
(POSITIVELY the last CUNY Conference on 42nd Street!)
March 18-20, 1999
______________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT DEADLINE (PAPERS): November 16, 1998
ABSTRACT DEADLINE (POSTERS): January 11, 1999
(For detailed information on abstract submission, see the final panel
of this announcement.)
______________________________________________________________________
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONFERENCE
SPECIAL SESSIONS
I. "Hard Constraints and Soft Constraints", organized and introduced
by Mark Johnson (Brown University). Invited speakers will include:
Hans Uszkoreit (University of the Saarland)
Eugene Charniak (Brown University)
II. "Syntactic Features in Sentence Processing", beginning with a
linguistics tutorial on "The Syntax of Features" by Marcel den Dikken
(CUNY Graduate Center), and followed by submitted papers. Paper and
poster submissions related to this topic are especially welcomed.
III. The first of a new series of special sessions called "What Would
it Take to Decide Whether ...?". For this first year, the issue will
be "... Whether Parsing is Serial or Parallel", moderated by Charles
Clifton, Jnr. (University of Massachusetts). Speakers will be:
Richard Lewis (Ohio State University)
Edward Gibson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
CONFERENCE DATES AND LOCATION
The conference will be held in the Harold M. Proshansky Auditorium of
the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of
New York, in midtown Manhattan (42nd Street between Fifth and Sixth
Avenues). Sessions will start at 12 noon on Thursday March 18
(registration from 10:30 am), and will end at 6:00 pm on Saturday
March 20. There will be poster sessions in the evenings of March 18
and 19.
Information about local, reasonably priced hotels will be available in
our next announcement, to be sent out at the end of October.
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
The CUNY Conference operates on a shoe-string. We have always kept
registration fees as low as possible, especially for students. We
also make travel awards to students.
The way we make ends meet (barely!) is by contributions from CUNY and
other institutions. We are immensely grateful for this financial
support, and we encourage you to encourage your administration to
make a donation to this good cause. We can provide paperwork to
support your request and the billing process. Any amount is welcome!
In the past, contributions have ranged from $300 to $5,000.
So please -- approach your dean, your provost, the financial officer
of your company, and explain what a valuable forum the CUNY Conference
is for the exchange of research ideas.
CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS
Janet Dean Fodor
Dianne Bradley
Ph.D. Program in Linguistics
CUNY Graduate Center
33 West 42nd Street
New York NY 10036
Address for correspondence:
______________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT SUBMISSIONS
The 12th Annual CUNY Conference on Human Sentence Processing is
soliciting abstracts for papers and posters presenting theoretical,
experimental, and/or computational research on any aspect of human
sentence processing. Abstracts will be reviewed anonymously, and will
be considered for both the general conference sessions and the special
session on "Syntactic Features in Sentence Processing".
SUBMISSION DEADLINES
For consideration in the spoken paper sessions: November 16, 1998
For consideration as a poster only: January 11, 1999
WHAT TO SUBMIT IN YOUR ABSTRACT
Abstract text should be no longer than 400 words. In addition, you
may include examples, data summaries, and references; however the
latter, together, should not exceed 15 lines.
At the top of the abstract, please include the names and affiliations
of all authors, and the email address of the author who will handle
correspondence. Also indicate whether you wish your abstract to be
considered for PAPER ONLY, POSTER ONLY, or PAPER OR POSTER. The last
category means that you would be willing to present your work as a
poster should the abstract not be accepted for the spoken paper
sessions. Please leave several blank lines between this information
and the abstract proper (title and text), to facilitate anonymous
review.
HOW TO SUBMIT ABSTRACTS
We will accept email submissions only. These should be addressed to:
Please use plain text if possible, and use the subject header:
"Abstract"
If you submit more than one abstract, each must be separately mailed
(and each will be separately acknowledged).
Linguistics Program Colloquia:
For more information, contact the Ph.D Program in Linguistics
SPRING 1998
Friday 30 January
Anthony Kroch, University of Pennsylvania
"Statistical signatures of grammatical structure"
4pm, Room 202
Tuesday 3 March (changed from Friday 13 February)
Paul Postal
"What the Strong Crossover Effect Isn't"
4pm, Room tba
Tuesday 17 February
Viviane Deprez, Rutgers University
12.15pm, Room tba
Thursday 19 February
Ian Roberts, University of Stuttgart
4.15pm, Room tba
Tuesday 24 February
Joanne Sher Grumet, Baruch College, CUNY
"Acquisition of Tense and Aspect in L2 English"
6.30pm, Room 1127
Thursday 26 February
Hamida Demirdache, University of British Columbia
4.15pm, Room tba
Thursday 5 March
Marcel Den Dikken, University of Leiden
4.15pm, Room tba
Thursday 26 March (not 19 March as previously announced)
Harald Clausen, University of Essex
"Syntax and Morphology in Williams Syndrome"
4.15pm, Room 207
PHILOSOPHY SPRING 1999 COLLOQUIUM SERIES
CUNY GRADUATE CENTER, 33 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10036
Each colloquium is 4:00 pm on Wednesday.
Call (212) 642-2051 for further information.
Feb. 3 Virginia Held, Distinguished Professor, Hunter College
and GSUC
"Caring Relations and Principles of Justice"
Feb. 10 Jorge Garcia, Rutgers University
"Some Questions about Supererogation"
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
Feb. 17 Chalmers Clark, College of Staten Island
"The Art of Science: Quine's Naturalism Naturalized"
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
Feb. 24 Rex Martin, University of Kansas
"The Essential Indeterminacy of Rawls' Difference
Principle"
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
March 3 TBA
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
March 10 Frederic Schick, Rutgers University
"Ambiguity and Reason"
(4:00 P.M., PROSHANSKY AUDITORIUM, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
March 17 David Pears, FRS, Yale University
"Precursors of the Private Language Argument in
the Tractatus"
(4:00 P.M., PROSHANSKY AUDITORIUM, 33 W. 42 ST.)
March 24 Haim Marantz, Visiting Research Fellow, GSUC
"On Describing the Emotions"
(Room N1858, 25 W 43rd St, NY)
March 31 SPRING BREAK. NO COLLOQUIUM
April 7 SPRING BREAK. NO COLLOQUIUM
April 14 Sarah Broadie, Princeton University
"Pessimism and Plenitude in Plato"
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
April 21 Dudley Shapere, Wake Forest University
"Testability and Empiricism"
(4:00 P.M., PROSHANSKY AUDITORIUM, 33 W. 42nd St, NY)
April 28 Christia Mercer, Columbia University
"Spinoza and Leibniz on Substance"
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
May 5 Lydia Goehr, Columbia University
"Radical Modernism and the Problem of Style"
[A Philosophical Reading of Pelleas and Melisande]
(Room 202 GS, 33 W 42nd St, NY)
May 12 Simon Blackburn, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill and GSUC
"The Lost World"
(Room 1502, Grace Building)
May 19 Christopher Morris, Bowling Green
"Conventionalism and Contractarianism in Ethics"
(4:00 P.M., PROSHANSKY AUDITORIUM, 33 W. 42nd St, NY)
PHILOSOPHY FALL 1997 COLLOQUIUM SERIES
CUNY GRADUATE CENTER, 33 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10036
Each colloquium is on a Wednesday, at 4:00 P.M., Room 19B North Building,
25 West 43rd Street, Queens College Center for Labor Education
Call (212) 642-2051 for further information.
Sept. 3 Reception for New Students
Sept. 10 Ernest Sosa (Boston University & GSUC)
"The Requirements of Reflective Knowledge"
Sept. 17 Virginia Held (Hunter College & GSUC)
"The Normative Import of Action"
Sept. 24 Jerrold J. Katz (GSUC)
"The Problem in Twentieth Century Philosophy"
Oct. 1 NO COLLOQUIUM. Rosh Hashanah at sundown.
Oct. 8 FIRST MARX W. WARTOFSKY MEMORIAL LECTURE
Arthur Danto (Columbia University)
"Seeing and Showing"
Oct. 15 Frances M. Kamm (New York University)
"Faminine Ethics and the Problem of Moral Distance"
Oct. 22 Galen Strawson (Oxford University & New York University)
"On Being a Materialiust--Realistic Monism"
Oct. 29 Jaegwon Kim (Brown University & GSUC)
"Making Sense of Emergence"
Nov. 5 Phillip Pettit (Australian National Univ. & Columbia Univ.)
"Response Dependence: Ubiquitous but Unsurprising"
Nov. 12 Miriam Solomon (Temple University)
"Whig Realism"
Nov. 19 Jonathan Vogel (Amherst College)
"The New Relevant Alternatives Theory"
Nov. 26 THANKSGIVING RECESS
Dec. 3 KOLITCH MEMORIAL LECTURE
Michael Levin (City College & GSUC)
"The Refutation of Skepticism"
Dec. 10 Kit Fine (New York University)
"Temporary Parts"
FALL 1996 Philosophy Program Colloquia:
September 11 No Colloquium: Meeting for
for New Students
September 18 David Owens (University of Sheffield)
"Belief and Evidence"
September 25 No Colloquium: Graduate Center
on a Monday schedule
October 2 Ned Block (New York University)
"Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back"
October 9 Jonathan Adler (GSUC and Brooklyn College)
"Lying or Deceiving"
October 16 Jody Azzouni (Tufts University and GSUC)
"On 'On What There Is'"
October 23 Gareth Matthews (University of
Massachusetts)
"The Career of Perplexity in Plato"
October 30 Alan Hausman
"Descartes's Secular Semantics"
November 6 Thomas Sorell (University of Essex
and Harvard University)
"Science and Tolerance: Hobbes, Boyle, Descartes"
November 13 Frances Egan (Rutgers University)
"A New Look at the Moon Illusion"
November 20 Alex Orenstein (GSUC and Queens College)
"The Logical Form of Categorical Sentences"
November 27 No Colloquium: Thanksgiving Break
December 4 William Earle (GSUC and Baruch College)
"Platitudes and Paralogisms of
Cognitive Advance"
December 11 Charles Chihara (University of
California, Berkeley)
"Mathematical and Modal Realism"
SPRING 1997 Philosophy Program Colloquia:
January 29 Joel Kupperman (University of Connecticut)
"How Values Congeal into Facts"
February 5 Austen Clark (University of Connecticut)
"Sensing and Reference"
February 12 No Colloquium; Lincoln's Birthday
February 19 Graham Priest (University of
Queensland and GSUC)
"What's So Bad about Contradictions?"
February 26 Bonnie Kent (Columbia University)
"Can Morality Be Second Nature: Habits
in the History of Virtues"
March 5 Donald R. Morrison (Rice University and
Princeton University)
"Citizenship and Constitutional Legitimacy in
Aristotle's Politics" (Politics III, 1, 6)
March 12 Stephen P. Stich (Rutgers University and GSUC)
and Michael Bishop (Iowa State University)
"The Flight to Reference"
March 19 Scott Soames (Princeton University and GSUC)
"What is it for a General Term to be a
Rigid Designator?"
March 26 Gerald Press (Hunter College)
"The Crisis in Contemporary Plato Studies"
April 2 Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (University of
Barcelona and New York University)
"Indexicals as Token-Reflexive Expressions:
A Defense of Reichenbach"
April 9 Jonathan Adler (GSUC and Brooklyn College)
"Belief's Ethics of Belief"
April 16 Jerry Fodor (Rutgers University)
"There Are No Recognitional
Concepts: Not Even RED"
April 23 No Colloquium; Spring Break
April 30 Bernard H. Baumrin (GSUC, Mt. Sinai School
of Medicine, and Lehman College)
"Divorce"
May 7 Karen Neander (The Johns Hopkins University)
"What Are Lycan's Qualia Really Like?"
May 14 Hartry Field (GSUC)
NEW TITLE: "Epistemological Nonfactualism
and the A Prioricity of Logic"
Spring 1997 Philosophy Colloquia
Fall 1996 Philosophy Colloquia
Back to Announcements and Events
Back to the Main Cognitive Science Menu
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in
touch with the Coordinator
and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in
touch with the Coordinator
and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Spring 1997 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites,
get in touch with the Coordinator
and with the Executive Officer of the relevant
program.
Fall 1997 Courses for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, contact the Coordinator and the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Spring 1998 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Spring 1998 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Fall 1998 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
Special Cognitive Science Course:
U701.01 - Topics in Cognitive Science: Innateness of Language
GSUC, M, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Room 1124, 3 credits, Prof. Fodor
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
We'll focus on the nature of sensory mental states and their distinctive qualitative properties, with particular emphasis on the connections these states have with other types of mental functioning, such as thought and desire, and their differences from those other types. We'll discuss both perceptual sensa- tions, such as visual and auditory sensations, and bodily sensa- tions, such as pains.
Among the main topics will be: (1) Characterizing and distinguishing among the qualitative properties distinctive of the different types of sensory state. (2) The difference between the qualitative properties of perceptual sensations and the nonmental, physical properties characteristic of the objects of perception. (3) Whether distinct sensory fields exist for the various modalities or a single perceptual field within which sensory states of all modalities occur. And, if there are multiple fields, how they are related and why sensory qualities from distinct modalities seem unified. Research about the early stages of visual processing will be considered in this connection. (4) The differences between sensory states and intentional states, such as thoughts and desires. (5) How the sensory and intentional states are related; in particular, whether intentional states can occur without sensory states. (6) Whether the nature of one or the other of these two kinds of mental state must be understood by reference to the nature of the other, and whether the concept of either makes tacit appeal to the other. (7) Whether sensory states are invariably or necessarily conscious states, and whether their qualitative properties can occur without our being conscious of them. We may appeal here to blindsight, visual agnosia, and other dissociative phenomena. (8) The alleged possibility of inverted qualia: what that would amount to, its significance, and how and whether it could be detected. (9) How qualitative properties figure in distinguishing and characterizing the various types of emotion. (10) The difference between sensing and perceiving.
Readings will be from authors such as Roderick Chisholm, Wilfrid Sellars, Sydney Shoemaker, Ned Block, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson, Christopher Peacocke, Brian Loar, Daniel Dennett, David Lewis, and G. E. M. Anscombe, and, occasionally, relevant work of experimental psychologists and neuropsychologists. ------------------------------------------------------------
Spring 1999 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Philosophy U772.02 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Core) 3 Credits
Professor David M. Rosenthal GS, Thu. 2:00-4:00
1858 North Building
We'll focus on four problems about the nature of mind: (1) How
we know about minds, both our own and others'; (2) whether mental
phenomena are physical; (3) how to characterize mental phenomena, such
as thinking and sensing; and (4) the nature and significance of psych-
ological explanation, especially for getting an answer to (3).
Because knowing requires mental functioning, nineteenth-century
discussions usually follow Kant and Descartes in mind in terms of its
role in knowing. But knowing is at best a very specialized aspect of
mental functioning; so that strategy ignores mental phenomena whose
role in knowing is small or nonexistent, focussing instead on epistem-
ic concerns irrelevant to the nature of mind itself. The contemporary
shift from seeing knowing as basic in approaching philosophical issues
to seeing language and action as basic has thus resulted in a salutary
focus on mental phenomena as such, rather than in terms of their role
in knowing.
Still, residual concern with knowing explains why that new
focus on mind in its own terms began with the issue of how we know
about mental states. Our knowledge about our own mental states often
seems unmediated by inference and independent of evidence, whereas we
seem not to know about the mental states of others in any such way.
An initial problem, then, is how we can know about others' mental
states. How do we know what others are thinking and feeling and,
indeed, even that they think or feel anything at all? It's crucial
here to examine how it is we know our own mental states, and how such
knowing contrasts with the way we know those of others.
This problem points to a second. We presumably know about the
minds of others by way of connections that mental states have to
bodily states or to behavior. So a solution to the first problem
requires first determining, at least in general terms, how mind and
body are related. Perhaps mental states are simply a special case of
bodily states; perhaps they're nonphysical states with a causal
relation to bodily states. This question is the mind-body problem.
But how can we settle whether mental phenomena are physical or
not without first determining what it is for a phenomenon to be mental
in the first place? We'll approach the problem of characterizing men-
tal phenomena by focusing on three large classes: intentional mental
states, such as thinking, doubting, and desiring; sensory mental
states--including both bodily sensations such as pains and tickles and
the kinds of sensation that figure in perceiving; and consciousness.
Often we can best determine the nature of something by its role
in explaining things; so psychological explanation may help determine
the nature of the various types of mental state. Psychological states
figure in the explanations of behavior cast in both commonsense and
scientific terms. We'll consider both types, asking how such states
enable us to explain behavior, what constraints there are on such
explanation, and whether the explanations of scientific psychology
cast doubt on our commonsense psychological concepts.
We'll use The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal, Oxford University Press
(available at Papyrus Booksellers, Broadway and 114th Street, [212]
222-3350), with occasional xeroxes on reserve in the library.
------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------
Spring 1999 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Philosophy U772.01 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Core) 3 Credits
Professor David M. Rosenthal GS, Thu. 2:00-4:00
We'll focus on four problems about the nature of mind: (1) How
we know about minds, both our own and others'; (2) whether mental
phenomena are physical; (3) how to characterize mental phenomena, such
as thinking and sensing; and (4) the nature and significance of psych-
ological explanation, especially for getting an answer to (3).
Because knowing requires mental functioning, nineteenth-century
discussions usually follow Kant and Descartes in mind in terms of its
role in knowing. But knowing is at best a very specialized aspect of
mental functioning; so that strategy ignores mental phenomena whose
role in knowing is small or nonexistent, focussing instead on epistem-
ic concerns irrelevant to the nature of mind itself. The contemporary
shift from seeing knowing as basic in approaching philosophical issues
to seeing language and action as basic has thus resulted in a salutary
focus on mental phenomena as such, rather than in terms of their role
in knowing.
Still, residual concern with knowing explains why that new
focus on mind in its own terms began with the issue of how we know
about mental states. Our knowledge about our own mental states often
seems unmediated by inference and independent of evidence, whereas we
seem not to know about the mental states of others in any such way.
An initial problem, then, is how we can know about others' mental
states. How do we know what others are thinking and feeling and,
indeed, even that they think or feel anything at all? It's crucial
here to examine how it is we know our own mental states, and how such
knowing contrasts with the way we know those of others.
This problem points to a second. We presumably know about the
minds of others by way of connections that mental states have to
bodily states or to behavior. So a solution to the first problem
requires first determining, at least in general terms, how mind and
body are related. Perhaps mental states are simply a special case of
bodily states; perhaps they're nonphysical states with a causal
relation to bodily states. This question is the mind-body problem.
But how can we settle whether mental phenomena are physical or
not without first determining what it is for a phenomenon to be mental
in the first place? We'll approach the problem of characterizing men-
tal phenomena by focusing on three large classes: intentional mental
states, such as thinking, doubting, and desiring; sensory mental
states--including both bodily sensations such as pains and tickles and
the kinds of sensation that figure in perceiving; and consciousness.
Often we can best determine the nature of something by its role
in explaining things; so psychological explanation may help determine
the nature of the various types of mental state. Psychological states
figure in the explanations of behavior cast in both commonsense and
scientific terms. We'll consider both types, asking how such states
enable us to explain behavior, what constraints there are on such
explanation, and whether the explanations of scientific psychology
cast doubt on our commonsense psychological concepts.
We'll use The Nature of Mind, ed. Rosenthal, Oxford University Press
(available at Papyrus Booksellers, Broadway and 114th Street, [212]
222-3350), with occasional xeroxes on reserve in the library.
Spring 2000 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Fall 2000 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
For more information, especially about prerequisites, get in touch with the Coordinator and with the Executive Officer of the relevant program.
Ph.D Program in Clinical and Experimental Cognition: PSYC. 70000 - History of Psychology C: W, 5:30-8:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Greenwood, [90731]
Fall 2001 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
IDS Concentration in Cognitive Science Prof. David Rosenthal, Coordinator 817-8836 BIOL. 72301 - Neurosciences I: Lecture GC: F, 1:00-5:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 4 credits, Profs. Wallman/Chappell, [60332] BIOL. 79302 - Cognitive Ethology B: 2 credits, Prof. Basil, [60320] Meets in Rm. NE-200. C SC. 83000 - Comp Nat Lang Lrng/Data Mining GC: R, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Sakas, [60613] Cross listed with LING 79400 IDS. 70100 - Innateness of Language GC: T, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fodor, [60261] Cross listed with LING & PHIL LING. 70100 - Intro Theoretical Linguistics GC: W, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Den Dikken, [60521] LING. 70600 - Intro to Psycholinguistics GC: M, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Bradley, [60522] LING. 71400 - Phonology II GC: T, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Cairns, [60524] LING. 72100 - Syntax I GC: W, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Den Dikken, [60525] LING. 72400 - Semantics II GC: W, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. McClure, [60526] LING. 76500 - Pragmatics GC: T, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fiengo, [60528] LING. 79300 - Sem: Innateness of Language GC: T, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fodor, [60536] Cross listed with IDS 70100 & PHIL 76800. LING. 80300 - Rsch Meth Psycholing/Cog Ling GC: W, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Bradley, [60529] LING. 81500 - Advanced Syntax GC: M, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Den Dikken, [60530] LING. 85100 - Theories of Speech Perception GC: M, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Strange, [60531] Cross listed with SPCH 80400 PHIL. 76800 - Innateness of Language GC: T, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fodor, [60295] Cross listed with LING 79300 & IDS 70100 PHIL. 76900 - Modality, Conditionals & Games GC: R, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Parikh, [60296] PHIL. 80100 - Adv Topics in Phil of Mind GC: R, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Rosenthal, [60304] PSYC. 70000 - History of Psychology C: T, 5:30-8:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Greenwood, [60733] PSYC. 70100 - Adv Experimental Psych I C: W, 9:30-11:30 a.m., W, 12:30-3:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 4 credits, Prof. Gomes, [60734] PSYC. 75200 - Language and Thought C: M, 11:20 a.m.-1:50 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Tartter, [60738] PSYC. 73800 - Cognitive Psychology C: M, 4:00-6:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Antrobus, [60737] PSYC. 73800 - Cognitive Psychology Bar: W, 1:00-3:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. O'Brien, [60054] PSYC. 73800 - Cognitive Psychology B: W, 6:05-8:35 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Sailor, [60384] PSYC. 80100 - Language & Thought in Devlpmnt GC: T, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 0/3 credits, Prof. Brooks, [60415] PSYC. 80100 - Neurocognition B: M, 4:00-6:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Kurylo, [60394] PSYC. 80100 - Topics in Developmental Psych GC: T, 11:45 a.m.-1:45 p.m., Rm. TBA, 0 credits, Prof. Stetsenko, [60389] PSYC. 80103 - Cogn/Dynam Aspects of the Mind C: W, 9:30-11:20 a.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Rosen, [60714] SPCH. 70500 - Speech Science GC: T, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Strange, [60626] SPCH. 71300 - Neurophysiology of Language GC: W, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Shafer, [60628] Cross listed with LING SPCH. 71500 - Intro to Neurolinguistics GC: R, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Obler, [60629] Cross listed with LING SPCH. 80400 - Theories of Speech Perception GC: Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Strange, [60631]
Spring 2002 Course Cross Listings for Cognitive Science:
Interdisciplinary Concentration in Cognitive Science Prof. David Rosenthal, Coordinator, (817-8836) BICM. 88800 - CT: Neurobiochemistry GC: F, 10:00 a.m.-12:45 p.m., Rm. TBA, 1 credit, Prof. Kushner, [50184] Meets 3/8, 3/15, 3/22, 4/5, and 4/12 BIOL. 72302 - Neurosciences II: Lecture GC: F, 1:00-5:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 4 credits, Prof. Levitt, [50453] Cross listed with PSYC 71100 BIOL. 79301 - Neuroscience Journal Club CSI: W, 9:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 1 credit, Prof. Trenkner, [50497] BIOL. 79302 - Modules in Neuroscience GC: F, 9:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Ma, [50494] BIOL. 79305 - Hot Topics Devel Neurobiology H: T, 10:10 a.m.-12:00 noon, Rm. 926HN, 3 credits, Prof. Filbin, [50460] Per mission of instructor required, 772-5270 C SC. 74010 - Logical Fndtns Artfcl Intllgnc GC: W, 11:45 a.m.-1:45 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Artemov, [50097] This course is required for all students who entered the Ph.D. Program in Computer S cience in Fall 2001. EPSY. 72300 - Thries & Principles of Soc Psy GC: W, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Saltzstein, [50267] EPSY. 80800 - Metacog/Cognit Proc Lrn & Inst GC: R, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Zimmerman, [50269] LING. 71300 - Phonology I GC: W, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Cairns, [50508] LING. 72200 - Syntax II GC: M, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Den Dikken, [50509] LING. 72300 - Semantics I GC: F, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. McClure, [50510] LING. 72500 - Sentence Processing GC: M, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fodor, [50511] LING. 78100 - Computational Linguistics GC: R, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Teller, [50518] LING. 79100 - Acquisition of Phonology GC: M, 4:15-6:15 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Bradley, [50520] LING. 79100 - Semantics of Imagntv Discourse GC: R, 6:30-8:30 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Orenstein, [50521] LING. 84600 - Sem Semantic Theory: Questions GC: T, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Fiengo, [50523] PHIL. 76900 - Meaning, Rules & Justification NYU: T, 4:00-7:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Profs. Horwich/Boghossian, [50281] Classes begin Tuesday, January 22, 2002. Meets in NYU Philosophy Department C onference Room. There will be preparatory class meetings in the NYU Philosophy Department Conference Room on Mondays, 5:00-6:00 p.m. PHIL. 77100 - Personal Identity GC: W, 11:45 a.m.-1:45 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Greenwood, [50280] PSYC. 70804 - Behavioral Neuroscience Q: M, 10:00-10:50 a.m., R, 10:00-11:50 a.m., 3 credits, [50081] Course meets in Rm. RZ 220. PSYC. 71100 - Neuroscience II GC: F, 1:00-5:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Gordon, [50197] Cross listed with BIOL 72300 PSYC. 72100 - Developmental Psychology II Q: T, 11:00 a.m.-12:50 p.m., 3 credits, Prof. Moreau, [50083] Meets in Rm. S B A302. PSYC. 72100 - Developmental Psychology II GC: W, 9:30-11:30 a.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Glick, [50346] PSYC. 73800 - Cognitive Psychology H: Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Chodorow, [50219] PSYC. 80103 - Ecological Concepts in Psych GC: W, 9:30-11:30 a.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Saegert, [50345] SPCH. 80700 - Cross-Language Differences GC: T, 2:00-4:00 p.m., Rm. TBA, 3 credits, Prof. Strange, [50315]