This paper takes up the issue of animal actions and animal-human interactions, specifically studying house cat perception, behavior, and thinking. Although ultimately an in-depth and concrete treatment of my interactions with Cat1 is intended, there are methodological difficulties that confront us as we begin to ponder how to gain access to this realm. My aim is to deal with some of the substantial methodological difficulties involved and to clear the ground for further inquiry into the modes of being of nonhumans and the implications for the understanding of our own being. The discussion begins with the Cartesian roots of Husserls phenomenology (which is indebted to Heidegger in language and approach). This leads to a brief but pivotal consideration of the peculiar status of animal being and its political and social implications (and draws upon the work of Donna Haraway and Evelyn Fox Keller). The last section explores directions opened up by my ontological and methodological reconstruction (drawing upon the works of Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze).
The title of this essay is cat phenomenology, but its subject is reason and the subsequent construction of the human-nonhuman divide. No inquiry into cat being can take place without a thorough and circumspect account of our particular notion of reason and the role it plays in situating humans in the world. Therefore, this meditation aims to bring that which presently is at a distance from humanity into a relationship of nearness to us. For although we can easily see many animals in zoos, aquariums, parks and nature television, and some even share their living spaces with other creatures, our conception of reason prevents us from encountering them in their own being. Cat phenomenology requires not only openness to the being of cats, but a critical awareness of human subjectivity.
Phenomenology offers one avenue into the investigation of human-animal relations. Its emphasis on everyday interaction and routine is certainly germane to the study of the day-to-day interactions which human society maintains with animals. People encounter animals in many different facets of social life. When humans and animals live together there is an everyday relationship and a co-habitation of space. Phenomenology should be well suited to thinking about these types of cross-species interactions.
Let us proceed along the lines of a phenomenological inquiry, going "back to the things themselves," just as Husserl directs. We shall be following an empirical path, looking to the cat and relations with the cat. Yet, let us look at Husserls dictum, to try to gain the greatest possible clarification from the phenomenological credo. The phrase "back to" describes a movement and begs us to ask "from where"? This empirical emphasis in Husserl is initiated by Descartes, to whom Husserl explicitly refers. Indeed, Husserl could hardly be more explicit than in the beginning of the Paris Lectures:
I am filled with joy at the opportunity to talk about the new phenomenology at this most venerable place of French learning, and for very special reasons. No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene Descartes, Frances greatest thinker. Phenomenology must honor him as its genuine patriarch. It must be said explicitly that the study of Descartes Meditations has influenced directly the formation of the developing phenomenology and given it its present form, to such an extent that phenomenology might almost be called a new, a twentieth century, Cartesianism.2
In retrieving Husserls thinking from the Paris Lectures (which would become his Cartesian Meditations) we may locate the Cartesian roots of phenomenology. Husserl is impressed by the goal of Descartes Meditations, which he says is "a complete reform of philosophy, including all the sciences."3 This reform is crucial because"[o]nly through systematic unity can the sciences achieve genuine rationality . . . What is needed is a radical reconstruction which will satisfy the ideal of philosophy as being the universal unity of knowledge by means of a unitary and absolutely rational foundation."4 Descartes is so important to Husserl because he offers the potential for the reformulation of science along rational lines: a scientific epistemology. The technique by which Descartes does this is well-known: radical doubt leading to the realization of the cogito, the thinking subject.
Husserl adopts the cogito, the decisive basis of Cartesianism, as foundational for phenomenology. In fact, Husserl finds Descartes procedure of radical doubt and unconcealing of the cogito to be so important that he explicitly repeats the process, "We thus begin, everyone for himself and in himself [sic], with the decision to disregard all our present knowledge. We do not give up Descartes guiding goal of an absolute foundation for knowledge."5 Continuing in line with Part Six of Descartes Meditations (the demonstration of the existence of the "outside world," outside the cogito), Husserl is "satisfied to discover the goal and nature of science by submerging ourselves in scientific activity"6 in a belief that "science demands proof by reference to the things and facts themselves, as these are given in actual experience and intuition."7 Phenomenology becomes a scientific and empirical epistemology. This emphasis is in keeping with Husserls conception of the lifeworld and the immanent basis of practice. Merely paragraphs later Husserl states that "all science refers to the world, and before that, our ordinary life already makes reference to it. That the being of the world precedes everything."8 Husserls emphatic focus on the surrounding world (Umvelt) corresponds with the empirical studies of scientific epistemology. However, this analysis of the world does not explain the entire methodology operating in his phenomenological research.
Although Husserl highlights the importance of the world, stating even that its being precedes everything, this is not the final foundation of rational knowledge articulated by Descartes. Husserl explains that "even the experience of the world as the true universal ground of knowledge becomes an unacceptably naive belief. We can no longer accept the reality of the world as a fact to be taken for granted. It is a hypothesis that needs verification."9 Scientific epistemology runs deeper than the emphasis on the world. And, as Husserl acknowledges, this is strictly in line with Descartes who in the Meditations begins the First Part by doubting everything up to and including the existence of the world and ends the Sixth Part by turning the radical scientific awareness of the reduced cogito upon the "outside world" to study it:
Might it not turn out that the world is not the ultimate basis for judgement, but instead that its existence presupposes a prior ground of being?
Here, specifically following Descartes, we make the great shift which, when properly carried out, leads to transcendental subjectivity. This is the shift to the ego cogito, as the apodictically certain and last basis for judgement upon which all radical philosophy must be grounded.10
Now that scientific epistemology is more fully laid out, we are better able to understand the relation between world and science. Initially the being of the world was identified as prior to everything. However, the existence of the world explicitly presupposes a prior ground of being. Just as in Descartes, the primary existential question circles around the cogito. Although there is an empirical emphasis of research, it is a result of recognizing this cogito and then reflecting it out at the world. The "back to" of Husserls credo is from the position of the subjective cogito. Thus, even in the analyses of empirical inquiry, the "descriptionwhich attempts to grasp the concrete and rich phenomena of the cogitationesmust constantly glance back from the side of the object to the side of consciousness and pursue the generally existing connections."11 The recognition of "the world" in phenomenology is reliant upon a separate or prior position. This is the very foundation of the subject-object split.
This same move also makes possible scientific epistemology by creating a position for the scientist to observe and study the world. And it explains the back and forth motion described by Husserl, glancing from one side of a divide to another. Heidegger, in commenting upon this position reached by transcendental and eidetic12 reductions, notes that "this unity of the stream of experience is now regarded ideatively. Every moment which specifies it as individual is now suspended. What is now discerned in the concretely lived experience is simply the structure belonging to a perception, representation, or judgement as such."13 Further, Heidegger notes that "this double reduction (the transcendental and the eidetic) draws from the initially given concrete individuation of a stream of experience what is called the pure field of consciousness, that is, a field which is no longer concrete and individual, but pure."14 Hence we see that the true "absolutely rational foundation" which Husserl spoke of is the cogito, the foundation for scientific knowledge itself. As for observation, Husserl states, "[p]henomenological experience as reflection must avoid any interpretive constructions. Its descriptions must reflect accurately the concrete contents of experience, precisely as they are experienced."15 So the capacity for scientific study of the world is guaranteed through the ability to go concretely and accurately back to the things themselves.
We are at a decisive point in our movement. The path of Cartesianism in phenomenology is charted and the meaning of Husserls credo ("back to the things themselves") is clarified. As such, we are in a position to realize, with Heidegger, that "this connection with Descartes and the explicit formulation of this connection is important for the critical understanding of the ontological character of this region obtained by these so-called reductive considerations."16 In order to continue our clarification of Husserls credo and attempt to carry out the empirical inquiry he directs, we must proceed yet further along the path of Husserls thinking about the cogito and evaluate the determinations of pure consciousness which he gives. Following this path, Heidegger, a student of Husserls, asks, "Does this elaboration of the thematic field of phenomenology, the field of intentionality, raise the question of the being of the region, of the being of consciousness?"17 To clarify as far as possible the notion of "pure consciousness," Heidegger looks to the determinations of the field of consciousness in Husserl:
Consciousness is 1) immanent being; 2) the immanent is the absolutely given being. This absolute givenness is also called absolute being pure and simple. 3) This being, understood as absolute givenness, is also absolute in the sense that nulla re indiget ad existendum (thus the old definition of substance is adopted): "it needs no res in order to be." Res is here understood in the narrower sense of reality, transcendent being, that is, any entity which is not consciousness. 4) Absolute being in these two significationsabsolutely given and needing no realityis pure being, in the sense of being the essence, the ideal being of lived experience.18
The resonance with Descartes is deep. Heidegger goes through each one of these determinations to ascertain the posited relation between consciousness and being. Regarding the first determination, consciousness is immanent being (where immanence pertains to a relation between lived experiences, as between reflecting and reflected). Heidegger remarks that "this relation is characterized as a real-in-one-another, but nothing is actually said about the immanent reality [Reellitat], about the entity for the whole of this region. A relationship of being between two entities, and not the being as such, is determined here."19 Here we have a perfect restatement of Husserls earlier thinking, derived from Descartes: consciousness, or the cogito, is the prior ground of being. The scientific subjectobject split and its back-and-forth motion is retainedindeed, it is the very statement of this immanent relation. However, no further clarification of pure consciousness is given. Rather it seems that its purity makes possible the relationship of reflection. The second determination, consciousness itself as absolute being, states it quite clearly: consciousness itself is being.
Although it still contains no determination of the being of consciousness, the third of Husserls proposed determinations of being does help to fill out the geography of the cogito as it functions in this phenomenological inquiry. It states that consciousness needs no physical reality or matter to exist. It is the consciousness of Descartes cogito, that engages in radical doubt at the moment when the existence of the world is denied and yet remains sure of its existence through thinking. Husserl is eager to follow Descartes along this train of thought, saying, "The worldwhose conceivable non-being does not extinguish my pure being but rather presupposes itis termed transcendent, whereas my pure being or my pure ego is termed transcendental."20 Clearly consciousness is separate from and prior to the world. In commenting on this determination of consciousness Heidegger remarks, "[T]his consideration means that consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is the presupposition of being on the basis of which reality can manifest itself at all."21 Proceeding toward a crucial topography of this region of consciousness, Heidegger notes that "this means that the character of absolute being is now attributed to consciousness insofar as it is regarded in the horizon of a theory of reason, in terms of the question of the possible demonstration of reality in rational consciousness."22 In a key move, consciousness has now become rational consciousness, and this has big implications for the relation between entities: "Consciousness in this sense of the absolute means the priority of subjectivity over every objectivity. This third determination [ . . . ] does not determine the entity itself in its being but rather sets the region of consciousness within the order of constitution and assigns to it in this order a formal role of being earlier than anything objective."23 Still, there is no determination of the being of consciousness, but it becomes evident how this region of consciousness relates to and shapes our inquiries into the nature of the world.
In the fourth determination, that of consciousness as pure being, we see the Cartesian lineage again. We gain no further clarification into our phenomenological credo, we do not learn any better what it is that characterizes consciousness. Instead, we see all the more vividly that
[t]his character of being, consciousness as pure, shows especially clearly that what matters here is not the ontological characters of the intentional but the determination of the being of intentionality, not the determination of the being of the entity which has the structure intentionality, but the determination of the being of the structure itself as intrinsically detached.24
Husserl does indeed remain true to Descartes throughout his attempts to specify the determination of consciousness, but in the end we are left with no further idea of the being of this consciousness.
Although we began by trying to be as rigorous as possible in our following of Husserls (Cartesian) dictum "back to the things themselves," neither philosopher offers a further clarification of this being. Instead, it is realized "[t]o the extent that they are brought out as determinations of the being of consciousness, they immediately qualify as obstacles in the path of asking about the being of this entity and so also about the clearer elaboration of this entity itself."25 We have reached a peculiar point in our considerations. Although seeking to clarify the phenomenological credo and technique, the determinations of consciousness, which are supposed to give clarity, instead divert us away from the matter at hand. Why is it the case that all of Husserls determinations elide questions of being? What is it that makes Husserl turn away from the ontological path at this crucial moment of the determination of being? Heidegger answers these questions decisively:
In point of fact, all of these determinations of being are derived with a view to working out the context of lived experience as a region for absolute scientific consideration [ . . . ] Husserls primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science.26
Heidegger argues that it is the project of scientific epistemology itself which causes the neglect of the question of the being of consciousness. As we have seen, this aporia is not only in and of Husserl: "This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes."27 We come back to the Cartesian problematic: the cogito is the only determination of the being of consciousness and it subsequently serves as the foundation for scientific epistemology.
We must recall that we are concerned here with cats and cat phenomenology. In Descartes a link is forged between thinking-consciousness-reason-being, but the conception of reason and being examined thus far includes only humans. It is not merely the subjective turn and subject-object split which are retained from Descartes, there are other ontological divisions accompanying these moves. It could not be otherwise, for scientific epistemology and anthropocentrism are not simply related, they are the same thing. As Descartes argues in the aptly named Discourse on Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of Science:
I discovered everything that can exist without thinking; everything that is except that which is contributed by the soul: that part of us distinct from the body whose essence, as we have previously said, is to think. These functions are the same as those in which the unreasoning animals resemble us, and do not include any of those which are dependent on thinking and which belong to us as men [sic].28
This delineation also serves as a foundation for philosophy, and there is no doubt about the position of animals in relation to this constellation:
By these two methods we can also recognize the difference between man [sic] and animals. For it is a very remarkable thing that there are no men, not even the insane, so dull and stupid that they cannot put words together in a manner to convey their thoughts. On the contrary there is no animal, however perfect and fortunately situated it may be, that can do the same."29
For Descartes rationality includes only humans; animals are not entitled to being upon this axis. Additionally, the issue of language is tied to reason for Descartes: "And, this proves not merely that animals have less reason than men, but that they have none at all, for we see that very little is needed to talk."30 The insane and the stupid possess reason, at least enough to talk. Animals have none. Descartes emphasizes the point in saying that a well-trained monkey or parrot might approach or resemble the functioning of the lowest-functioning human, "if their soul were not of a wholly different nature from ours."31 Humans and animals cannot be brought into a commensurable domain, for their natures are totally different.
For Descartes, reason is clearly the sine qua non of humanity. The once innocent-seeming cogito is now seen to be defined by a conception of thinking which is predicated on a separation between humans and nature and therefore between humans and other animals. There is, then, for Descartes an ontological difference between the two spheres. The link formed between thinking-reason-consciousness-being is one which includes only human (human-defined) thinking. The turn which founds science turns away from the being of animals (and as I shall argue from part of human being). As Descartes remarks about industrious animals, "It proves, on the contrary, that they are not rational, and that nature makes them behave as they do according to the disposition of their organs; just as a clock, composed of wheels and weights and springs, can count the hours and measure the time more accurately than we can count with all our intelligence."32 Descartes offers a final warning to those whose conviction might weaken on the matter, "There is none which is so apt to make weak characters stray from the path of virtue as the idea that the souls of animals are of the same nature as our own, and that in consequence we have no more to fear or to hope for after this life than have the flies and ants."33
The conception of thinking and reason coming from Descartes (and through Husserl) is premised upon a division between humanity and nature and correspondingly between humanity and animality. Whence does this division arise? Why is it the case that such an anthropocentrism, and such a separation, is inextricably built into scientific epistemology? Why has it persisted for centuries? The key to this division, and to our seeking up to this point, is evident in Husserls Cartesian path, "Then, through their mediation, he deduces objective reality as a dualism of substances."34 Thinking back to Husserls third determination of consciousness (from Descartes), that of nulla re indiget existendum, the nature of this dualism comes into view. Extended reality, res, is one thing, but consciousness/thinking(human) is a different type of substance and has existence even without physical, extended reality.
Evelyn Fox Keller, quoting from Robert Boyle, describes how this metaphysical doctrine affects the positioning of humans as thinking subjects outside of (and ready to intervene in) nature:
Her (natures) domain, though it encompasses all animal kind, does not include the sons of God: I shall here consider the world [that is, the "corporeal works of God"] but as the great system of things corporeal, as it once really was towards the close of the sixth day of creation, when God had finished all his material works, but had not yet created man (Boyle 1744, 4:364) Arriving only on the seventh day, man stands apart, and abovehis proximity to God measured by his distance from nature."35
Despite claims to the contrary, consciousness is anything but pure. Rather, it is contaminated at its inception with the transcendental metaphysics of a Christian God (this of course explains the identification of "pure" ego and consciousness as "transcendental"). We can see this particularly well when we recall that humans are distinct from nature and animals in Descartes (although they partly partake of those realms) due to their partaking in the spiritual substance of God. God and the thinking he imparts lifts humans above the level of the mechanical and the animal.
When we recall that we are concerned here with cat phenomenology, we realize that the very techniques by which we might attempt to access the realm of interactions with cats through phenomenology are, in fact, centrally implicated with a stroke of metaphysical anthropocentrism which sets humanity over-against nature. The pure position we were seeking in order to carry out empirical observation is a decidedly non-neutral stance, and not pure. Striving for a pure position is not merely a matter of epistemological skewing, it also involves a number of political and ontological consequences. Donna Haraway considers some further implications of this issue when she powerfully reminds us of some quite dangerous sides to the striving for pure position:
For the moment, however, I want to focus only on the Western theme of purity of type, natural purposes, and transgression of sacred boundaries. The history and current politics of racial and immigration discourses in Europe and the United States ought to set off acute anxiety in the presence of these supposedly high ethical and ontological themes. [ . . . ] In the appeal to intrinsic natures, I hear a mystification of a kind and purity akin to the doctrines of white racial hegemony and U.S. national integrity and purpose that so permeate North American culture and history.36
Up to this point, our treatment of phenomenology and the drive for pure consciousness has focused more on the epistemological then the ontological dimensions of this trope. Haraway reflects on the notions of ontological difference and pays attention to how they easily slide into the ethical and the political.37 Purity is not merely an innocent idea of nonbiased apprehension, it is also tied up in discourses of race and rank.
Although Haraway does not mention it here, attitudes of animal impurity could easily be added to the configuration. Michel Foucault makes this point when discussing the pairing of the insane and the animal:
The negative fact that "the madman is not treated like a human being" has a very positive content: this inhuman indifference actually has an obsessional value: it is rooted in the old fears which since antiquity, and especially since the Middle Ages, have given the animal world its familiar strangeness, its menacing marvels, its entire weight of dumb anxiety.38
Despite Descartes wishes, our "pure" consciousness does not exist outside of or prior to the social world in which we find ourselves. Haraway shows us that that term which is supposed to 39 indicate objectivity and dispassionate perception is part of a very ominous cultural history by looking at the social and political dimensions of our cultural category of scientific objectivity and purity. The phrase "modest witness" (from the title of her 1997) refers to a term of Robert Boyles discussed in Shapin and Schaffer (1985). Shapin and Schaffer explain that "[a] man whose narratives could be credited as mirrors of reality is a modest man: his reports ought to make that modesty visible."40
Haraway explicates this notion of modesty, related to purity, in terms that could just as easily refer to our earlier discussion of Descartes and Husserl,
In order for the modesty, referred to in the epigraph above, to be visible, the manthe witness whose accounts mirror realitymust be invisible, that is, an inhabitant of the potent "unmarked category," which is constructed by the extraordinary conventions of self-invisibility. In Sharon Traweeks wonderfully suggestive terms, such a man must inhabit the space perceived by its inhabitants to be the "culture of no culture."41
One must aspire to a position outside of or beyond this world, and this is why Descartes metaphysical split keeps returning to our considerations since, again, this division was expressed in the cogito and the unique location of humans at the intersection of physical and spiritual substance. One attempts to gain a position outside of this world by aspiring to godliness, as in the spiritual and thinking substance of Descartes.42 Emotions and animality are seen as disrupting this deificationthey obscure or break the clarity of the mirror of reality and human emotions are said to be at odds with the reason.
The notion of a distinctive position for humans is paramount. Donna Haraway describes the persistence of this ideal, "The distinction between nature and culture in Western societies has been a sacred one; it has been at the heart of the great narratives of salvation history and their genetic transmutation into sagas of secular progress. What seems to be at stake is this cultures stories of the human place in nature, that is, genesis and its endless repetitions."43 Again, Haraway attunes us to the cultural history of purity as tied to a privileged position for humans vis-a-vis nature. Recalling and extending Foucaults analysis of the pairing of the animal and the insane, she reminds us that "it is a mistake in this context to forget that anxiety over the pollution of lineages is at the origin of racist discourse in European cultures as well as at the heart of linked gender and sexual anxiety."44 The notion of purity is not only consistently tied to political valuations, it is also ultimately predicated upon the assumed division of humans and nature (animals). The human/nonhuman divide is a primary one which lends weight to many different forms of social stigma and hierarchy.
We are now glimpsing the tracings of an anthropocentric predisposition which has been the mirror image of scientific inquiry throughout the modern age. We have already seen that the tradition of an otherworldly god plays a distinctive role in scientific epistemology as formulated in Descartes. In fact, we have identified that the setting-up of the scientific stance is predicated already on a godly conception of humans. Again we recall Kellers analysis that, according to Boyle, distance from nature (manifested as closeness to God) enables the privileged position of human scientific inquiry. This shift in epistemology, which we have been discussing under the name Descartes, may be the beginning of a human transition to greater and greater godliness.
This characterization of human reason is a means of denying human animality. As Babich argues,
In todays scientific knowledge, in the evaluation of knowledge as the highest ideal, we are progressing toward what Deleuze speaks of as "the replacement of God by man": "But what is this replacement if not the reactive life in place of the will to nothingness, the reactive life now producing its own values?" The ultimate salvation, as Sartre surmised, may well be the deification of the manipulative knower.45
Even if Descartes notion of humanitys closeness to God is not explicitly retained, his doctrine of two substances, is since humanitys being is still transcendental. Again, it is no coincidence that this entails the separation of humans and animals.
Babich explains that "the impulse of the ascetic ideal to deny nature and the body is converted to the interests that mark the development of science. The original opposition is retained: the scientist is in the business of mastering or subduing nature."46 Again we see the decisive topography of the cogito as the mental (spiritual) seat of being and its attendant attempt to shun and escape from the physical and the worldly. Far from being nonpolitical, the scientific structure retained in Cartesian phenomenology is identical with a politics of anthropocentrism. Recalling Heideggers discussion of Husserls determinations of consciousness, there is a continued interest in situating human inquiry accompanied by a characteristic blindness to much of that which is decisively human. If we are to continue on our path toward animal being, we must attempt to discern yet more precisely the form and reach of this deep bond between anthropocentrism and scientific epistemology. Babich analyzes the effects of the register shift between human and pure, "this organic disposition of our knowing apparatus and self-reference of our epistemic standards is what Nietzsche means when he speaks of science in general and our knowledge of nature in particular as humanization in summa."47
This last concern described by Babich is one which intensely occupied Spinoza throughout his philosophical work but especially in The Ethics. On its first page this concern is expressed as Spinoza defines attribute as "that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance."48 From the outset, Spinoza calls attention to the human-centered perception which shapes or selects our understanding of the world (substance). Two definitions later he explains, "By God, I mean a being absolutely infinitethat is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality."49 God is the one substance which constitutes all of existence.
We may feel as if the world has been turned upside-down. In one simple definition, Spinoza takes away the basis for the cogito and for scientific epistemologys conceptions of consciousness and science itself. In contradistinction to Descartes two substances, which provided the foundation for an anthropocentric wedge between "humans" and "nature," Spinozas immanent turn is predicated upon just one substance, which is God, and which encompasses everything.
That this shift is intricately tied to Spinozas endeavor to trace the extent of anthropocentrism in knowledge is underscored by the intermediate definition of a mode as "modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself." Humans and animals are both modes, and have their existence in substance (nature). There is no special substance or reason unique to humans. There is no cogito, and all existence (including thought) is immanent. Spinoza scrutinizes the many ways in which humans have installed their image in "truths" about God and nature. As Stambaugh explains, "For Spinoza, man is not created in the image of God, rather man in his ignorance tries to create God in the image of man."50 As Spinoza explains, "So, also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity."51 And, "Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions."52 Spinoza is wary of the analogy between humans and god which is the key to a belief that humans do or can stand outside of nature. He reverses the Platonic metaphysics of the backworld (or transcendental ideas or forms) which undergirds Descartes conception of two substances by denying the distinction and making God part of, indeed the sum total of, this world:
Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
Proof.Besides God, no substance is granted or can be conceived (by Prop. XIV.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which is in itself and is conceived through itself.53
There is no cogito or transcendental being which can be apart from (or survive even in light of the destruction of) the world, existence, nature. Everything is referred back to immanent substance, the this-worldly.
Emphasizing that this substance is all-encompassing, Deleuze reminds us that for Spinoza "modes can neither be, nor be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only through it be conceived."54 Since humans as well as animals are modes (as is any other discrete "thing" we might perceive, such as rocks, stars, etc.):
Man himself [sic]is a fully immanent (or, in Spinozas terms, "natural") being, with no supernatural gifts, obligations, or deficiencies; he neither lacks something more elevated residing in a superior world, nor is he endowed with special powers emanating from such a transcendent domain. Man has no separate, eternal soul, no "transcendental self" to replace it, no a priori reason demanding to impose itself externally upon nature and life. As finite mode, man is, however, but a drop in the immanent universe and as such is inescapably bound and constrained by it.55
If we think back upon our earlier discussion of Descartes and scientific epistemology, it becomes clearer that Spinozas ontological considerations have dramatic consequences for our position as humans. Boyle felt comfortable in invading or manipulating a nature conceived, along Cartesian lines, as below humans and God. In Spinoza, nature, world, substance are God, and are all that exist. Indeed, for Spinoza, "perfection and reality are the same thing. Reality, however, is God or nature or substance."56
Spinozas immanent, un-Cartesian conception is also ecological, emphasizing the impossibility of humans being separate and apart from nature. Indeed, as Deleuze explains, "[E]very existing mode may be referred to another, precisely because it cannot exist by itself."57 In the postulates of Part II of The Ethics, Spinoza underscores the continuity, rather than separation, of humans from nature, "The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated."58 Each mode has its existence in one substance. In contrast, "Cartesian clarity is dual, rather than some single thing. Descartes himself asks us to distinguish a material evidence, as it were, the clarity and distinctness of an ideas objective content, and a formal evidence, a clarity attaching to the "ground" of our belief in the idea. This dualism extends into the Cartesian division of understanding and will."59 We see again that Descartes dualism of substances grounds scientific epistemology and is retained by phenomenology. The clear point of the cogito attempts to create a space outside of immanence, and it grounds the hieratic notion which distances animals and humans in an attempt to admit a pure thinking, a substance unto itself. However, this is the very tectonic shift executed by Spinoza. Modes, as beings in the world, are defined by their capacity to affect and to be affected. In an immanent conception, there is absolutely no outside point from which to observe or exist, not even the point of God, which is the very definition of the immanence.
Spinozas assertions about substance are directly related to his reflection on anthropocentrism, as Deleuze explains, "What is involved is no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather the laying out of a common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all individuals are situated."60 And bodies, minds, and individuals include nonhumans. Indeed, cats and humans are situated together on this common plane of immanence. Deleuze further clarifies the implications of this shift while discussing Spinoza and Descartes: "Now, it is just insofar as one admits a basic inequality between forms of being, that the infinitely perfect can come to designate a higher form which may be taken for the Nature of God."61 Spinoza is concerned quite directly with the humanistic implications of the theistic metaphysics which preceded him. Anticipating our reflection on Husserls dictum "back to the things themselves," Spinoza attempted to question as far as possible the way in which our perceptions and assumptions form our images of God.
Throughout our considerations it has been shown that certain images of God are intimately involved with the special positions of reason and the human. As such, it is no happenstance that Spinoza chooses to carry out his critical reformulation around God. The idea of God as separate substance beyond this world had been dominant for millennia before Spinoza as Platonic formal reality and Judeo-Christian otherworldliness and asceticism. This conception of God functioned to assert and support the distinctiveness of humans in terms of a privileged relationship to being. Spinoza, presaging a Nietzschean reversal of Platonic-Christian metaphysics, makes God and nature the very category through which the reversal is carried out. In reflecting on Spinozas shift, we are forced to ask, "What is an immanent and non-anthropomorphic god?" Although Spinoza retains the term "God," there is little similarity with the dominant conception he is engaging. Nietzsche, following Spinoza, answers our question in The Will to Power:
Let us remove supreme goodness from the concept of God: it is unworthy of a god. Let us also remove supreme wisdom: it is the vanity of philosophers that is to be blamed for this mad notion of God as a monster of wisdom: he had to be as like them as possible. No! God the supreme powerthat suffices! Every thing follows from it, "the world" follows from it!62
Nietzsches resonance with Spinoza here is extreme. Spinoza holds that "from Gods supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of thingsthat is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of ways, or always follow from the same necessity."63 Nietzsche even notes the anthropomorphism which has contributed to the mis-recognition of God. Stambaugh, reflecting on the dimensions of Spinozas God, says that "if we can conceive of God as power and spontaneous intellect together, we approach the nonanthropomorphic and nonanthropological dimension of Spinozas God."64 In addition to furthering our reflection about anthropocentrism and how it affects our relations with animals and nature, spontaneous intellect underscores immanence and repudiates the cogito. Spinoza reports that "all the philosophers I have read admit that Gods intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit that Gods intellect, and Gods will, and Gods essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a different actual intellect and a different will, his essence would have been different."65 There is no "could have been otherwise" which is the product of attributing human will to God (as Stambaugh says, trying to "create" God in mans imagebut here image should be taken in the sense that Spinoza uses it as the first kind of knowledge, which is also the source of error: humans try to prove their will by attributing it to God). There is no separate, thinking component to God, God is the world. Spinozas use of "God" functions metonymically. By letting "God" stand in for nature, he is able to carry out a reflection on the ways in which we shape and represent nature in human form.
Spinoza had already been concerned with the implications of anthropocentrism in terms of expression and relation vis-a-vis animals/nature. He describes how humans have intricately combined interpretations of their surroundings, anthropocentrism, and an image of an anthropomorphic God. According to Spinoza, humans in general
as they find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist them not a little in their search for what is useful; for instance, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding fish, etc., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining such conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use.66
Spinozas critical analysis fits the Genesis notion of humans and nature and could apply to Robert Boyle as well. In a genealogical fashion, Spinoza projects the way that humans continue(d) to construe nature anthropocentrically: "After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to themselves, and to account those things the best of all which have the most beneficial effect on mankind."67 Humans convinced themselves of their privileged place in existence by conceiving of a God that could justify an instrumental view of nature (which Heidegger identifies as the very essence of technology). Thus, humans come to judge and shape nature through and through with their unacknowledged interpretation. However, as Stambaugh explains, "These are merely human ways of thinking and feeling; essentially they say nothing about the actual nature of what is being judged. Furthermore, such judgements make sense for Spinoza only in relation to man-made objects, objects of techne; they are totally inapplicable and inappropriate to things of nature, which just are as they are and cannot be otherwise."68 Stambaugh re-expresses the metonymy: "Reality, however, is God or nature or substance." Spinoza discusses God and the anthropomorphic casting of God, but he is also talking about our misrecognition of nature. The full power of Spinozas reflection on anthropocentrism comes into view when we keep in mind that God has been the key grounding point of the anthropocentric conception of nature.
Spinoza proceeds on his path of interrogating the anthropomorphizing tendency which has affected our conception of God and nature. As Spinoza explained before, God is made in the image of the human, invested without qualities and measurements. Spinoza is forthright: "I know that there are many who think that they can show, that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to Gods nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in ourselves."69 However, his reply to this view is precise:
Futher (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some significations quite different from those they usually bear. For intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God, would perforce be as far apart as the poles of the human intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.70
This passage contains an apropos example for the matter with which we are engaged. Remembering the metonymy, we must be wary of taking our thinking or perception as an absolute measure of nature. Although our thinking and perception are expressions of nature, they are not the form of all thinking and perception in nature.
Given the immanence thesis and reflection on anthropocentrism, any possibility for a distinctive human position is eliminated. Indeed, Spinoza carries his genealogy to the point where he "will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused."71 As with the confusion derived from attributing human qualities to the divine, human limitation often gives rise to groping characterization of that which exceeds it. In this way, according to Spinoza, many of our notions about the transcendent are formed. Spinozas reflection takes us very deep within our knowledge, as "the ideas which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies."72 This gives us one way of pursuing cat phenomenologyfeeling the vibration of their purr or their fur against our skin; sensing the impression of their meow on our eardrums. Since our ideas are perceived through and by our physical selves, we cannot help but have a particular, but not all-encompassing, view. Babich calls this organization of perception an "ecophysiological ground."73 There is no Archimedean point, no scientific position of a "culture of no culture," no cogito, nor is there pure consciousness. Instead of this kind of centered certainty, "we live in a state of perpetual variation"74 in the "order of composition and decomposition, which infinitely affects all of nature."75 Underscoring this dynamic, Spinoza says that "all particular things are contingent and perishable."76
Spinoza has identified Descartes doctrine of two substances as an anthropomorphic projection upon nature. In addition to reversing a certain deistic metaphysics, Spinoza reverses the earlier order of being (which sheltered anthropocentrism). Extension and Thought, the two attributes we perceive, are not substances or categories which we share with our creator. As Deleuze explains, "Spinoza doesnt say that attributes exist of themselves, nor that they are conceived in such a way that existence follows or results from their essence. Nor again does he say that an attribute is in itself and conceived through itself, like substance."77 These attributes are our perception, our perspective.
Further illustrating the difference from Descartes, Deleuze points to Spinozas "axiom of powers: understanding has no more power to know than its objects have to exist and act; the power of thinking and knowing cannot be greater than a necessarily correlative power of existing."78 No privilege is accorded to thinking and consciousness. On the contrary, the powers of thinking and existing are the same. The transcendental link has been severed: we are immanent beings composed of, dependent on, and among other immanent beings. We now gain a sense that "unknown attributes tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what they are. In other words: the very fact of our existence is not exhausted by the attributes we know."79
The break with Descartes and phenomenology goes yet further: "There is no reason to trust the criteria of psychological consciousness (clarity and distinctness) any better than a mere combination of words."80 Spinoza speaks of the need for a "new consciousness," and proceeds along this path, according to Deleuze, by a
devaluation of consciousness (in favor of thought): Spinoza the materialist. Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body. He proposes to establish the body as a model: "We do not know what the body can do . . . " This declaration of ignorance is a provocation. We speak of consciousness and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the body, of dominating the body and the passionsbut we do not even know what a body can do."81 All thinking, like all existence, is in substance, and the thinking of any particular mode is a perspectival sliver on existence. The attribute of Thought "is not only a kind of existence, but also the condition for ascribing to any thing a power of thinking, understanding and knowing."82 Hardly the exclusive province of humans, thinking is a power of any thing. Certainly the cat thinks, for it is a mode in substance just as we are. Again the depth of Spinozas reflection comes into view, as "the perfection of things is to be reckoned from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind."83 So distant from the privileged relationship between humans and being, "against Descartes, Spinoza posits the equality of all forms of being, and the univocity of reality which follows from this equality.84
So we have finally reached a point in our considerations which may provide us with a start for a cat phenomenology: common immanent modality, equality of being, perspectival relations to the world. This journey required an extensive scrutiny of reason and led to its detachment from the divine and the seat of being and made a mere property of human consciousnessone among an infinity of other types of thought in substance.
We now realize that the cat had leaped ahead of us on the project. For throughout, the cat has lay down on the desk or the books, or the computer. From the Cartesian perspective such actions may have seemed wrong, annoying, or obstructive. However, having reflected upon anthropocentrism, we are now in a position to see these cat actions as perfect and fascinatinga quite legitimate yet un-rational usage of these surfaces usually perceived and conceived in terms of their human and rational uses. By hearkening to our reflection, we can see (some of) the truth (aletheia85) of the cat. The cat unconceals different uses of surfaces and spaces within our living area which have remained well beyond our grasp. For instance, earlier in the paper we saw that Cat had written a section, by resting on the keyboard. Of course we as humans are very accustomed to seeing the keyboard as an implement of writing. But the cats form of writing expands our conception of what writing can be. Our form of typing is indeed one valid use of the keyboard, but Spinoza notes that "the more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God."86 Cats use of the keyboard is not wrong or a misuse of the surface, it is an-other use of it. A cat phenomenology should aim at attuning humans to modes of being and relation which expand our capacity to affect and to be affected.
Although "the limit of perspective cannot be overcome,"87 since we are on a common modal plane it is possible to reflect upon our intersubjective relations with animals. Cats and other animals (as well as plants and even mountains) can help us to multiply our perspective. As Deleuze emphasizes, Spinoza encourages us to live an ethology, based on relations: ethology.
The approach is no less valid for us, for human beings, than for animals, because no one knows ahead of time the effects one is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation, requiring a lasting prudence, a Spinozan wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency.88
Spinoza endeavors to sustain a life as little affected by anthropocentrism as possible, where we realize through immanence that we as human animals are part of nature. The task becomes one of transcending the anthropocentric conceit which has long dominated our thinking and behavior. On the plane of immanence, recalling Deleuzes equality of being, there are no privileged human activities or attributes. A radical revaluation of animal behavior and a new attentiveness to the relations between humans and animals is called for. Within this immanent conception, an important dimension keeps re-emerging: there is no link to being which is outside of this world, existence is in substance, and existing is a power which includes thinking. Whereas the initial (Cartesian-Husserlian) conception of thinking harbored a special form of being for humans and deafened us to animal or nature thinking, Spinoza restores our hearing or at least beckons us to listen. Emphasizing this immanence, Deleuze says "Ethology is first of all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing."89 Cat phenomenology demands the cultivation of a new sense of rhythm which can be attentive to these relations of speed and slowness. And these considerations, as in Spinozas whole reflection, hover around questions of human-animality and anthropocentrism, "[s]o the animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world."90 This applies to all animals (including humans), and all modes. Indeed, Spinoza and Deleuze seemed to have just such human-animal and other-animal relations in mind.
"[L]astly, ethology studies the composition of the relations or capacities between different things."91 We are trying to study cat and human interactions. In this process
you will not define a body (or a mind) by its form, nor by its organs or functions, and neither will you define it as substance or subject. Every reader of Spinoza knows that for him bodies and minds are not substances or subjects, but modes. It is not enough, however, merely to think this theoretically. For, concretely, a mode is a complex relation of speed and slowness, in the body but also in thought, and it is a capacity for affecting or being affected."92
Interacting with the cat on the mutual plane of immanence, forming relations, affecting, being affected, this is our cat phenomenology. We type on the keyboard with our fingers, cats with their torsos or heads. We stroke cats fur with our hands, cats preen our fur with their tongues. The cat, like ourselves, is a complex relation of speeds, one that has properties in common with us but also has a different ecophysiological ground. Ultimately the question is, "How can a being take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the others own relations and world"?93 So far from the nature which we would merely study or subordinate to our own interests, cat being is a part of the immanent being of which we are a part. For now I must fall silent, as, taking direction from Spinoza and Deleuze, cat phenomenology can only be accomplished through these reflections up to a point. After (before) that comes ethology, intersubjective interaction. And as the cat has so brilliantly pointed out, those interactions demand an un-rational ground.
The feline with which I share my living space is called Cat in hopes that the use of the general English designation will focus attention on the fact that this is only a human linguistic designation. The interactions and the ethology discussed later in the paper are much more crucial than the issues of naming.
Edmund Husserl, Paris Lectures, in Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Robert C. Solomon, New York, Harper & Row, 1972, p 43.
Husserl, p. 43.
Husserl, p. 43, italics in original.
Husserl, p. 47.
A procedure certainly shared by Garfinkel who emphasizes the importance of submerging oneself in scientific activity and who continually reiterates the necessity of "discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical common sense actions from within actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings" (Studies in Ethnomethodology, Polity, 1967, p. viii).
Husserl, p. 46, italics in original.
Husserl, p. 46, italics in original.
Husserl, p. 47.
Husserl, p. 47, italics in original.
Husserl, p. 54.
These are technical terms indicating the methods by which Husserl tries to guarantee the purity of the transcendental consciousness which founds rational certainty in his phenomenology. "Eidetic" derives from the Greek eidos which is often translated as "ideal" or, in Plato, "form." Hence the reference by Heidegger to regarding this unity ideatively.
Martin Heidegger, The History of the Concept of Time, trans. by Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 100.
Heidegger, p. 100, italics in original.
Husserl, p. 53.
Heidegger, p. 101.
Heidegger, p. 102.
Heidegger, p. 103.
Heidegger, p. 103, where immanence implies "to be in another."
Husserl, p. 51, italics in original.
Heidegger, p. 105.
Heidegger, p. 105.
Heidegger, pp. 105106.
Heidegger, p. 106.
Heidegger, p. 106.
Heidegger, p. 107, italics in original.
Heidegger, p. 107, italics in original.
Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking Truth in the Field of Science, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur, New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1960 (first published 1637), p. 35.
Descartes, p. 42. This quotation as well leaves no doubt about the anthropocentric divide of humans and animals by the wedge of reason. It is also significant in that it extends the barrier between human and animal to include a linguistic as well as a rational division. Descartes claim is wrong: he did not acknowledge the songs of whales or many other examples of communication among animals. Many of these examples of animal communication (and tool use) have only somewhat recently been noticed by humans due to this very assumption which was motivated by Descartes among others. This will be one of the paths along which we shall seek to dismantle Cartesian anthropocentrism later.
Descartes, p. 42.
Descartes, p. 43.
Descartes, p. 43.
Descartes, p. 44.
Husserl, p. 44.
Evelyn Fox Keller, "Secrets of God, Nature, and Life," Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death, New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 66.
Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse, New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 61.
Recall that Spinozas major ontological work is called The Ethics.
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard, New York, Random House, 1965, (originally published 1961), p. 73. Although Descartes writes of an absolute division between the human (even mad) and animal realms, we can see that he relies on the same type of economy which Foucault identifies here. For, although they may yet be distinct, it is clear that for Descartes mad humans are closer to the animal realm than rational ones.
This unusual script was entered by the cat while sleeping on the computer keyboard. I have left it in because it makes a crucial point in our considerations which we will discuss in the latter part of the essay.
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (1985), quoted in Haraway, p. 23.
Haraway, p. 23.
This is why Descartes can argue that his cogito could survive if his physical body were destroyed.
Haraway, p. 60.
Haraway, p. 60.
Babette E. Babich, Nietzsches Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life, Albany, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 200.
Babich, p. 202.
Babich, p. 136.
Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, New York, Dover, 1955, p. 45.
Spinoza, p. 45.
Joan Stambaugh, "Amor dei and Amor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche," The Other Nietzsche, Albany, SUNY Press, 1994, p. 7677.
Spinoza, p. 49.
Spinoza, p. 55.
Spinoza, p 55.
Spinoza, p. 55.
Yirmiyahu Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Adventures of Immanence, Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 1989, pp. 106107.
Stambaugh, p. 78.
Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin, New York, Zone, 1990, p. 32, italics in original.
Spinoza, p. 97.
Deleuze, p. 132.
Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley, San Francisco, City Lights, 1988, p. 122, italics in original.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 72.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage, 1967, p. 534, aph. 1037.
Spinoza, pp. 6061. In spontaneous intellect there is no distinction between thinking and acting (or being); there is no reflective consciousness.
Stambaugh, p. 77.
Spinoza, p. 73.
Spinoza, pp. 7576. This exposition by Spinoza dramatically presages the Heidegger of "Question Concerning Technology," although for Heidegger there is a greater emphasis on the making, the challenging-forth. The positions critiqued by each are reliant on the same privileged position for humanity vis-a-vis nature. Perhaps the difference could be explained as Nietzsche explained the difference between himself and Spinoza as "due more to the differences in time, culture, and science." Significantly, humans do not merely think that it was any being that created for them, they believe that it was a supreme being in their image, "[a]s they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything to human use. They are bound to estimate the nature of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honour." (Spinoza, p. 76, Part I, Appendix).
Spinoza, p. 79, Part I, Appendix.
Stambaugh, p. 78.
Spinoza, p. 60, Part I, Prop. XVII, Note.
Spinoza, p. 61, Part I, Prop. XVII, Note.
Spinoza, p. 111, Part II, Prop. XL, Note I.
Spinoza, p. 98, Part II, Prop. XVI, Corollary II.
Babich, Ch. 3.
Spinoza, p. 267, Part V, Prop. XXXIX, Note.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 19.
Spinoza, p. 107, Part II, Prop. XXXI, Corollary.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 41.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 86.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 119.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 73.
Deleuze, Practical, pp. 1718.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 130.
Spinoza, p. 81, Part I, Appendix.
Deleuze, Expressionism, p. 167.
Recalling Heideggers appropriation of the Greek term and conception for "truth." For him it is not a quality of accuracy or falsity, it is a revealing [the initial "a" is an alpha privative, reversing the meaning of lethe (concealing, forgetting)]. So there is a "truth" to cats in the way that they inhabit and use spacethey can make us aware of distinct uses of "familiar" spaces and objects.
Spinoza, p. 260, Part V, Prop. XXIV.
Babich, p. 59.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 125.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 125.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 125.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 126.
Deleuze, Practical, pp. 123124.
Deleuze, Practical, p. 126.
Babich, Babette, Nietzsches Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on the Ground of Art and Life, Albany, SUNY Press, 1994.
Deleuze, Gilles, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin, New York, Zone, 1990; originally Spinoza et le probléme de lexpression, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1968.
Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, San Francisco, City Lights, 1988; originally Spinoza: Philosophie Pratique, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970.
Descartes, René, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Laurence J. Lafleur, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1960.
Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. Richard Howard, New York, Vintage, 1988.
Garfinkel, Harold, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Cambridge, Polity, 1967.
Haraway, Donna J., Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan_Meets_OncoMouse, New York, Routledge, 1997.
Heidegger, Martin, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985.
Husserl, Edmund, "The Paris Lectures," in Robert C. Solomon, Phenomenology and Existentialism, New York, Harper & Row, 1972.
Husserl, Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970.
Keller, Evelyn Fox, Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender, and Science, New York, Routledge, 1992.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Penguin, 1954.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage, 1967.
Solomon, Robert, From Rationalism to Existentialism, Lanham, University Press of America, 1972.
Spinoza, Benedict de, The Ethics, trans. R.H.M. Elwes, New York, Dover, 1955.
Stambaugh, Joan, "Amor Dei and Amor Fati: Nietzsche and Spinoza," The Other Nietzsche, Albany, SUNY Press, 1994.
Yovel, Yirmiyahu, Spinoza and Other Heretics: Adventures in Immanence, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989.