This fascinating book explores the political psychology behind the invasion, conquest and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in the summer of 1990 and the subsequent United States-led war of 1991. What motivated the major actors to do what they did? What elements went into the decisions that were made, and how adequate were these decisions? Essays by a broad array of academic experts address these and other questions from diverse perspectives. In the first part of the book, on the war's psychological origins, L. Carl Brown examines the "Arab collective self-image'' and its role in the war. Part two focuses on George Bush and Saddam Hussein, including analyses of Bush's tendency to lash back aggressively when challenged and Hussein's need to best his traditional political rival, President Assad of Syria. Other sections focus on the unfolding of the Gulf War and the role of the media, and the ways in which the populations in the U.S. and the Middle East both affected and were affected by the process of conflict. This book vividly illustrates how both personal and group psychology interact with the contexts in which decisions are made. It also underscores the fact that political contexts are themselves psychological. Renshon edits the journal Political Psychology.