|
In the preface to his Royal Commentaries of the Incas published in 1609, the Inca Garcilaso
described himself as a native of "Cuzco, which was another Rome in that Empire,"
and throughout his long history, he made comparisons, whether implied or explicit, between the
Incas and the Romans. Garcilaso was a man of great learning, and he derived these comparisons
from his own reading of the classical historians. At the same time, the idea that Cuzco was
another Rome had been mentioned by earlier historians of the Incas, and arose from protracted
reflection as to how the achievements of the Incas could be conveyed to Europeans who had
never been in the Andes. This idea, furthermore, resulted from the long process, going back to
the thirteenth century and beyond, of translating Roman historians into Spanish, and of explaining
what Spanish cultural and political identity owed to the Roman occupation of the Peninsula. In
addition, when Garcilaso wrote about his Inca forbears, Spanish historians, lawyers and royal
officials who were familiar with the Andean world had already been collecting and translating Inca
historical narratives, and Andean people in their turn were striving to let their voices be heard in
this re-shaping of their culture and their past. This historiographical and linguistic enterprise had
legal and political repercussions, and in this paper, I will be tracing the interconnections between
these two poles, the practical and political on the one hand, and the theoretical and scholarly on
the other.
The earliest accounts of the Incas share a certain hesitancy: a recognition, on the one hand, that
here was a remarkable polity, the likes of which had not been seen before; and on the other hand,
a search for appropriate vocabulary accompanied by cursory and clumsy comparisons between
Inca comportment and the comportment, for example, of "moors and Turks,"
between Andean sacred buildings and the "mezquitas" of the recently conquered
kingdom of Granada. Before long, however, a stable theme crept into these comparisons. This
was that in some sense, the Incas resembled the Romans. The Roman aqueduct of Segovia was
compared to Inca monumental construction, and Inca roads reminded Spaniards of Roman
counterparts. Scholarly memories of ancient Rome thus provided sixteenth century students of
Inca history, culture and politics with an explanatory context. There existed, however, a further
dimension to these reflections about Incas and Romans, a dimension which was rarely if ever
stated explicitly, even though it helped to determine what Spaniards observed about the Incas and
how they described it. The Romans, as everyone knew, had acquired their power by conquest,
and among the regions thus conquered had been the Iberian peninsula. Sixteenth century
interpretations of this reality diverged widely. Some historians, perpetuating the ideas expressed
in the Primera Cronica general de Espana of Alfonso X, viewed Spanish cultural and national
identity as going back to the beginnings of human history in the Peninsula. The Romans had
indeed ruled in Spain, but they had done so by virtue of their capacity for equity and moderation
and had, for the most part, allowed the freedom-loving Iberians to act not as subjects but as
partners and "friends." Other historians, such as Ambrosio Morales and Antonio
Agustin, as well as the linguistic scholar Bernardo Aldrete, who subjected ancient sources to a
more critical scrutiny, viewed Roman government in the peninsula in less rosy terms. According
to them, the Roman presence in Spain had been characterized by periods of bitter warfare, by the
exaction of tribute and by the imposition of the Latin language, thanks to which only remote
traces of earlier Iberian languages survived in contemporary Spanish.
At the same time, there was one issue on which exponents of these divergent interpretations of
Roman governance in Spain and throughout Europe did agree: for they all accepted as valid the
Roman claim to sovereignty about which they read in Roman imperial literature and legislation.
The extensive ancient literature of Roman self-criticism and of resistance to Roman rule, on the
other hand, found little or no resonance in early modern Spain and Europe. Underlying these
attitudes was a recognition of empire as a distinct and legitimate form of government, a form of
government that differed from national monarchies, aristocracies or republics. A similar
recognition also speaks in several early modern histories of the Incas, and indeed was present in
writings about the Incas from the very beginning. Miguel de Estete, who was among the
followers of Francisco Pizarro at Cajamarca, where in 1532 the Inca ruler Atahuallpa was
captured and then killed, noticed a contrast between the polities on and beyond the frontiers of the
Inca empire and that empire itself. Describing how Pizarro's company had reached the Inca
settlement of Tumbez in Northern Peru, Estete observed:
From this settlement begins the peaceful dominion of the lords of Cuzco and the good land. For
although the lords further back and the lord of Tumbala, which was large, were subject to the
Inca, it was not as peacefully as from here onwards. For these lords only recognized the Incas
and offered a certain tribute, but no more; from here onwards, however, they were all very
obedient vassals.
Some twenty years after Estete wrote his account of Peru, Pedro Cieza de Leon, a great
connoisseur of the Incas and the Andes, who had studied some of the classical historians,
produced a description of Peru and a history of the Incas. The imperial scale of Inca governance
that had impressed Estete was now investigated and described in much greater detail and on the
basis of information which Cieza had collected from Inca nobles in Cuzco. A handful of
incidental, although explicit, comparisons between Inca and Roman buildings and institutions are
scattered throughout Cieza's text, but here also, the most crucial comparisons with Rome are tacit
and concern not so much this or that particular of Inca dominion but rather the principles on
which this dominion was built.
Cieza was deeply impressed by the sheer extent of the Inca empire and interested himself in
how this vast territory could have been gained. From his informants in Cuzco and elsewhere, he
learnt that the Incas had proceeded by a combination of alliance building and military pressure, but
whenever possible had avoided open warfare. This was why the Alfonsine model of Roman
diplomacy and warfare in Spain, inspired as these had been by the Romans' perceived capacity for
love and friendship, amor y amistad, resonated in Cieza's conception as to how the Incas had
acquired and managed to retain their empire. In general, he thought, the Incas approached
prospective subjects in friendship, bestowing on them benefits such as inculcating a civilized life
style, and teaching agriculture and textile production; here, according to Cieza, was the reason
why, frequently, people were willing to obey the Incas without the need for military intervention.
When, however, a war did have to be fought, the Incas, who rarely lost a battle, were ready to
grant generous terms, and their demand for tribute was moderate. On the other hand, their
vengeance for rebellion could be ferocious, and their judicial system was harsh. The Inca state
storehouses, for example, were always filled with all manner of supplies for war and peace.
When thus the Inca was lodged in his dwelling and the men of war had been accomodated, there
was never lacking so much as one single item, however large or small, with which to supply them
all. But if thanks to theft or a breach of the peace anything at all was missing (from the
storehouses) ..., the (offenders) were punished with great severity. In this matter, the Inca lords
adhered so closely to justice that they would not have omitted exacting punishment, even if it had
to be upon their own sons.
The cultivated sixteenth century reader might here remember a variety of exempla in early
Roman history when fathers punished their sons for rebellion or disobedience. In addition,
Vergil's memorable precept, that Rome's task was "to spare the conquered and subject the
proud" exactly described the methods of Inca warfare as understood by Cieza. And finally,
Cieza, like Estete, thought of Cuzco as the "head of the empire of the Incas and their royal
seat." The four royal roads, leading to the four parts of the empire started out from Cuzco's
central square; "in this way," added Cieza, "just as in Spain, the ancient
(Romans) divided the entire country into provinces, so these Indians took stock of the provinces
of this vast land by means of their roads." Even the historian Juan de Betanzos, who had
married a sister of the Inca Atahuallpa and was deeply steeped in the historical memories of her
kinsmen, on occasion turned to Roman antecedents. He thus compared the religious institutions
of the Inca Pachacuti to those of the Romans, and described the older women, Cozcoynacacuna,
who were responsible for educating Inca girls as resembling the "Roman matrons"
who had been entrusted with a similar task in Roman times.
Such incidental analogies between Rome and the Incas became part of a larger structure when
it came to considering the history of the Incas from its very beginnings to the Spanish invasion.
The origin of the Incas and the foundation of Cuzco appeared to be veiled in legends. Cieza, who
was the first European to try to sort these legends from historical fact, found that different
versions of the Inca myth of origins could not be reconciled and therefore chose to follow the
account given him by the Inca nobles of Cuzco. Three brothers and their three sisters had set out
from openings in a rock at Pacaritambo, the "inn of the dawn." After a variety of
supernatural occurrences, Manco Capac, who was one of the brothers had, with his sister consort,
founded the city. Their simple abode was later to be transformed into the temple of the Sun
known as Coricancha, the "enclosure of gold." However much Cieza respected the
Inca nobles of Cuzco, this story of their origins did not satisfy him because of the many obviously
mythological episodes that it contained. He therefore interpreted the story historically by
rationalizing it. The three brothers from Pacaritambo likely as not had been
three brave and valiant men of lofty outlook who originated from some village near Cuzco or
arrived from some other part of the highlands of the Andes and, after due preparation conquered
and gained their empire.
Similar rationalisations of myths of origin were also current in classical antiquity, and Cieza
perhaps derived his method of interpretation from Diodorus Siculus, whose work he mentioned.
There was, however, one component of the foundation myth of Cuzco that Cieza,
rationalisations notwithstanding, accepted at face value. The Inca rulers claimed that they, like
their first progenitor Manco Capac, were sons of the Sun, and that it was at the Sun's behest that
they pursued their imperial mission. In accord with this claim, Cieza divided Andean history into
a period before, and a period after the advent of the Incas. Before the Incas, Andean people lived
separated from each other in scattered hilltop settlements and forts, embroiled in perennial warfare
and speaking "strange languages." Government, beyond the episodic dominion of
some warrior chief, was unknown. It was the Incas who created nucleated villages and towns at
lower altitudes, as well as introducing agriculture and the other arts of civilisation. The imperial
mission of the Incas was thus part and parcel of the story of their origins. Indeed, the story of
origins ratified that mission. The same is the case with regard to the story of the origins of Rome
as told by Livy and other Roman historians. On the one hand, Livy questioned the accuracy of
the traditions about the gods and heroes who were involved in the legendary foundation of Rome.
But on the other, he integrated these traditions into his account of the unfolding of Roman
history, thereby validating Roman expansion as a process that was not simply the product of
aggressive warfare but had been divinely sanctioned.
The resulting difficulty was noticed by Garcilaso de la Vega, who had read the early books of
Livy with care. There was no avoiding the fact, Garcilaso thought, that the stories of Inca origins
were legendary. But equally, it was obvious that the Incas themselves had in some sense believed
these stories and had referred to them by way of explaining their conduct, just as Livy's Romans
had done with regard to their myths of origin. However, seventy years after the Spanish invaders
had destroyed the Inca empire, it was not enough to say on the one hand that the ancient stories
were legendary and on the other that they articulated an imperial mission. For, by the time
Garcilaso began to write, a number of lawyers and theologians seeking to justify the Spanish
invasion had claimed that the Incas had been tyrants and their story of origins a simple
falsification.
In the face of such assertions, Garcilaso coined a new term, which he derived from Livy, to
describe the traditional stories of Inca beginnings: they were fabulas historiales, historical fables,
distinct from pure fiction, but not the same as history. In his childhood, Garcilaso had listened to
his Inca kinsmen recounting the historical fables of their forebears, and when he grew older, they
instructed him in
their laws and government; comparing the new government of the Spanish with that of the Incas,
distinguishing different crimes and punishments and their severity; they told me how their kings
acted in peace and war, how they treated their vassals and how they were served by them.
Beyond that, they told me as being their own son all their idolatry, their rites, ceremonies and
sacrifices, their greater and lesser festivals and how they celebrated them ... In sum, they told me
everything that they had in their republic.
There was thus a crucial difference between ancient histories as told to the young, and a
practical, fact based understanding of Inca government, law and religion, such as was appropriate
for adults. Nonetheless, the two were inseparable. Having described the foundation of Cuzco by
the first Inca Manco Capac as a fabula historial, Garcilaso noted that the doings of this first Inca
were emulated by all his descendants, "so that, having spoken of his achievements, we will
have spoken of those of all the others." In short, Garcilaso recognized that the character of
Inca governance was defined by Inca origins and by how these origins were remembered. The
position in ancient Rome had been very similar. In a grief-stricken poem about the Roman civil
wars, Horace recalled how when founding Rome, Romulus had killed his brother Remus:
It is thus: a harsh fate drives the Romans,
the crime of fratricide:
for the blood of innocent Remus was spilt on the earth,
a curse on all his descendants.
Garcilaso viewed Inca origins in a more positive light, but he also recognized that the present was
conditioned by the past, even if that past was legendary. "We will carefully tell those
events," he wrote,
which are more historical, leaving aside many others as irrelevant or too detailed; and although
some of what has been said, and of what will be said hereafter may appear legendary, I thought it
best not to omit these matters in order to avoid removing the foundations upon which the Indians
draw when recounting what was greatest and best in their empire.
Spanish historians of the Incas thought about the Andean past by way of returning, again and
again, to the explanatory context of the Roman empire and classical antiquity in general. But this
European context could serve no useful purpose without trustworthy Andean informants, without
individuals whose understanding of the historical past could be viewed as being in some sense
comparable to a European understanding. From quite early on, Spaniards had observed that Inca
celebrations were accompanied by the recitation of cantares, of "songs" praising past
rulers by way of instructing and exhorting the ruler of the present. For example, Cieza learned
from the Inca nobles of Cuzco that when an Inca ruler died, his deeds and character were
evaluated and a formal record was composed of these matters which was so reliable that
"today they tell among each other what happened five hundred years ago as though it had
been ten." This record was in due course recited before the newly inaugurated Inca ruler.
"Oh Inca, great and powerful," a wise old man would intone,
"may the Sun, the Moon, the earth, the mountains, the trees and rocks and your fathers
preserve you from misfortune and make you prosperous, blessed and fortunate above all others
who have been born. Know that the things that befell your predecessor are these." And
then, saying this, with eyes lowered to the ground, and hands held down, they gave account and
reason of all that they knew, which they were able to do very well because there are many among
them who have a long memory, a subtle mind and lively judgement, able to give a full account, as
we who are here today and hear them can testify."
While Inca governance, and the Incas' ideas about their origins reminded Spanish historians of
imperial Rome, the recitations about the Inca past that Spaniards heard in Cuzco had analogues
closer to home. Like others who described such recitations, Cieza often referred to them as
cantares, "songs." This term had a very specific meaning. A variety of epic poems
described as cantares circulated in sixteenth century Castile in both print and manuscript, among
the most famous being the story of Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar known as the Cid. As early as the
thirteenth century, the compilers of Alfonso X, recognizing the historical content of this and
several other cantares, integrated parts of them into the Primera Cronica General de Espa a,
which circulated in a published version in Cieza's day. Elsewhere, Cieza described recitations
about the Inca rulers of the past as romances y villancicos, ballads and carols. These likewise had
been widely practiced genres of legendary and historical poetic narration in medieval Castile, and
examples of such poems figured in sixteenth century printed collections. When thus Spaniards in
Peru listened to "old men" and "wise men" reciting Inca traditions, the
experience was not altogether alien.
But difficulties of translation, both verbal and cultural, were numerous. Although Cieza
himself appears to have learnt some Quechua, he collected much of his information with the help
of translators. However, even the most skilled of translations conveyed the original meanings
only selectively, as becomes apparent if we consider some items from among a handful of
Quechua terms and phrases that survive within the Spanish narratives that were written in the
sixteenth century.
According to Juan de Betanzos who lived in Cuzco and whose knowledge of Quechua was
excellent, the Inca Pachacuti, as we have seen, decreed that Inca girls were to be supervised by
women known as "Cozcoynacacuna, as we would say, ... Roman matrons." This
paraphrase brings to mind socially respected married women of the Roman republican period,
such as figured in medieval catalogues of distinguished women. But in effect, the Quechua term
contains meanings that have no real European equivalents. Ynaca is a cloth worn over the head
by women; at the same time, the term indicates that the cloth in question was a finely woven one,
with designs, while ynacca usta was a noble lady of Inca lineage. Different kinds of patterns and
qualities of cloth denoted an individual's regional origin, social status and age group. Certain
kinds of cloth were produced in the home, but the most precious varieties, such as the ynaca
mentioned here, which were woven by specialists who worked under state supervision and
patronage, could only be obtained as a gift from the Inca. The term Cozcoinacacuna thus provides
a glimpse into the functioning of Inca society that is hinted at by the Roman analogy. But this
analogy achieves little by way of alerting the reader to the complexities of Inca society and
cultural politics.
Many Spaniards were profoundly impressed by the pan-Andean character of the Inca empire,
by the fact that wherever they went, they encountered the same urban planning and the same
system of adminstering justice and of managing economic resources. It was this universality of
the various forms of public life throughout the Andes that reminded the Spanish of the Roman
empire, and gave meaning to Garcilaso's idea that Cuzco was indeed "another Rome."
This aspect of the Inca empire, however, which was readily intelligible to Europeans of the
sixteenth century, went hand in hand with other aspects, for which there existed no precedents
from classical antiquity or the Spanish middle ages.
Unlike European histories that circulated in manuscript or print, Inca historical traditions as
expressed in the cantares, villancicos and romances that Cieza heard were exclusive
communications. Repeatedly, Cieza refers to the controlled, edited quality of these recitations.
When an Inca ruler died,
the old men of the people discussed the quality of the life and customs of their dead king and in
what way he had benefited the republic and what battles he had won ... These matters being
settled among them, along with others which we do not fully understand, they decided whether
the dead king had been such that a glorious reputation should remain of him, so that by virtue of
his valour and good government he should remain among them for ever. The (old men) then
called upon the principal remembrancers ... who were able to give account of what had happened
in the kingdom, so that they might evaluate (the record of the reign) among each other.
Elsewhere, Cieza pointed out that an Inca's shameful or ignoble deeds and characteristics were
deleted from the official record, this being the reason, he thought, why some reigns were so
poorly documented. The version of Inca history that was recited at festivals in Cuzco, and that
Spanish enquirers studied, was thus a history that had been reviewed by the elite. Furthermore,
these versions of the Inca past were in some sense the property of the ruling Inca, in that, as Cieza
noted, "these cantares could not be published or recited except in the presence of the
ruler," in whose service the "principal remembrancers" mentioned by Cieza did
their work of remembering.
The Incas recognized remembering as a formal skill or calling, which is why remembrancers
were included as a distinct group in a list of specialized Andean occupations compiled by a
Spanish historian. The Quechua term describing them is quipucamayoc. A quipu is a bundle of
knotted cords of different colours that encoded narrative or numerical information, and camayoc
refers to a person possessing a specialized skill or task. Spaniards regularly described the quipus
as a form of writing, or as books, and were profoundly impressed by the accuracy and scope of
Inca administrative quipus. They also understood the importance of quipus as a vehicle of
preserving historical information, of the cantares, romances and villancicos that Cieza and others
heard. However, no Spaniards appear to have learned how to make or read a quipu, a fact which
is fundamental in evaluating the impact of European historical perceptions in the Andes.
The preservation of accounts of the Inca past was in the hands of the Inca ruler and, after his
death, of his lineage, whose task it was to maintain the cult of his mummified body and to
administer his property. Meanwhile, a new historical record was created on behalf of the
suceeding ruler, which likewise would in due course be preserved by his lineage; the different Inca
lineages in turn were assisted in their task of maintaining the memory of their ancestor's deeds by
their quipucamayocs. The Spanish invasion destroyed the very raison d' tre of these historical
traditions, which articulated and justified Inca governance as exercized both by the Inca ruler
himself and by the lineages of past rulers. Secondly, the nature of the record that was preserved
by the quipucamayocs presented a problem of recognition. Given that the quipus, as Spaniards
understood them, constituted some equivalent to writing, the skill of reading them did not turn
out to be communicable to the new ruling class. Even the much admired administrative quipus of
the Incas were immediately translated into writing and into Spanish, and as a result their Andean
and Inca keepers were displaced by Spanish notaries and scribes. With regard to historical
quipus, this process of displacement was accelerated by the fact that the preservation of the Inca
past had been in the hands of the very people who were most severely affected by invasion and
conquest, that is, the Inca elite.
The Inca past contained many components that were not intelligible or recognizable in the light
of the European past, and in the light of Castilian concepts of history. This, and the rapid
disappearance of the quipucamayos as a group of experts who possessed a skill of daily political
and cultural importance led to the speedy transformation of Inca historical traditions into a
unitary, chronologically ordered narrative analogous to European precedents. Spaniards, such as
Juan de Betanzos, Pedro Cieza de Leon, and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, who conversed at
length with quipucamayocs and other individuals who had lived under and served the last Inca
rulers, all expected to find in the Andes a past that responded to European concepts of historical
order. That is, they looked for successions of rulers, such as the emperors of ancient Rome, or
dynasties, such as ruled the kingdoms of early modern Europe. A dynasty of Inca rulers, son
suceeding father, was therefore what they found in the Andes. Once this dynasty was in place, as
early as 1551, it was next to impossible to discover how the Incas had actually suceeded one
another, and how therefore they had actually projected their entitlement to rule to their many
subjects and allies.
Inca historical traditions were composed and preserved on behalf of the Inca elite, whereas
European works of history were composed for publication. A monarch might indeed wish to
control the content of history, but success was inevitably partial, because, as the poet Horace had
already understood very well, once a book had left the author's study, it could never be recalled.
Even in the Andes, the survival of oral traditions hostile to the Incas long after the Incas had gone
demonstrates that Inca control of historical narrative was only partially successful. Nonetheless,
once Spanish historians appropriated Inca history, this history changed both in content and in
purpose, precisely because it was composed according to criteria that aimed at inclusiveness and
objectivity, and not at a selection of data which expressed an imperial mission and the ideas and
ideals of a ruling class. In addition, Spanish historians who wrote, in the last resort, for
publication, addressed a public that was defined by its access to literacy and printed books, and
not so much by reference to its relationship to the Inca or any other ruling elite. In this way, an
exclusive, focused and purposeful communication by the Inca elite was transformed into a much
more inclusive and general communication that addressed a European reading public interested in
"the things of Peru." The resulting process of displacement, whereby Inca reality was
modified and transformed by the new governmental practices of the Spanish, by their learned
traditions, and by their methods of propagating these learned traditions as well as information in
general, can be further illustrated by examining early colonial concepts of Inca law.
The Roman imperial past equipped Spanish historians of the Incas with a set of concepts that
enabled them to locate the Inca empire on a map of diverse political structures that ranged from
village communities to city republics, monarchies and empires. Similarly, medieval historical
narratives from Castile rendered the recitations of "wise men" in Cuzco accessible to
Spaniards with an interest in the Inca past. At the same time, the very recognizability of some
aspects of the Inca past veiled from view those other aspects for which Europe offered no
parallels. This was also the case in matters relating to Inca law. At the same time, questions
regarding the nature of Inca law and the content of Inca legislation raised practical issues such as
affected the recording of Inca history only marginally. For history was a matter of describing the
past, whereas questions of Inca law and the resulting issue of relating Inca with Spanish law
conditioned governmental practice in Spanish Peru. This practical dimension in the study of law
gained an ever increasing importance as lawyers and other governmental officials endeavoured to
create a coherent and practicable administrative system in the Andes.
That the Incas had a legal system of some kind was apparent even to the first Spaniards in
Peru. As Miguel de Estete observed, "this nation (of the Incas) of Cuzco lived scattered
throughout all the provinces (of Peru and was engaged) in administering justice." Indeed,
before long, cases brought before the Audiencia in Lima forced Spanish lawyers to interest
themselves in the nature of the claims that were being made by Andean litigants. Nonetheless,
thanks to the breakdown of all order in the Andes that followed the Spanish invasion and wars of
conquest, the very existence of Inca law came to be questioned during the early colonial period.
It was in these circumstances that in about 1550, the surviving kinsmen of Atahuallpa, wishing to
point out that in the past, Peru had been an ordered polity, informed Juan de Betanzos that their
ancestor the Inca Pachacuti had issued a set of twenty seven laws or "ordinances"
dealing with Cuzco and the provinces of the Inca empire. Following the historiographical
fortunes of these ordianances provides a further insight into the interaction between Andean and
Spanish perceptions of society and history.
Some of the Inca Pachacuti's laws as described to Betanzos dealt with matters arising in Cuzco,
while others concerned the governance of the provinces of the empire. Laws addressed to Cuzco
include regulations for the distribution of goods from Inca storehouses and punish theft from
these storehouses and elsewhere. There are also laws of marriage, laws covering false testimony
and laws regulating the use of fine cloth. Similar laws are repeated in more general terms
elsewhere, and a number of them rest on common sense. This is also true of most of the laws
affecting the provinces, which regulate the maintenance of roads, bridges and tambos, the conduct
of soldiers and of local administration. A handful of laws affecting Cuzco, however, have no
parallels of any kind, and would thus appear to record the authentic legal practice of the Inca
capital. One such law points to the high risk of fire in Cuzco, where all houses were roofed with
thatch, and decrees that if a house caught fire, the neighbours could in the absence of the owner
take his possessions, while also being obliged to help quench the fire. If subsequently it emerged
that the fire was not caused by owner's neglect, the neighbours were to restore his possessions
and help rebuild the house. Another law that gives a vivid insight into the life of the city regulated
the raising of children born out of wedlock and related matters:
(The Inca) ordered and commanded that lest young men while still unmarried go after married
women and mamaconas, there should be established a certain house where a number of women
from among those who were taken in the wars were to live, so that the young men could have
converse with them... If one of these women became pregnant, the child was to be raised
elsewhere and be called capci Churi, which is to say child of the community.
Here, Betanzos intervened to explain that the Incas believed that a child born after a woman had
had intercourse with two or three men in close succession was thought to be the child of all three
men, and continued:
So that babies thus born be raised, (the Inca) ordered that there be a house with women from the
provinces and villages whose children had died, who were to raise these babies. Likewise he
ordered that the lords designated to supervise the affairs of the people should command straw to
be laid beneath the bridges of the brook and river which passed through the city, at the edge of
the water, and that the babies to whom mamaconas or nobly born ladies had given birth secretly
and in hiding should not be killed but should, once they had been born by night, be placed beneath
these bridges [and that noone observing a baby being thus deposited should enquire after its
origin] and that these guardians should every morning look beneath the bridges to see whether
there was a baby and that they should take the babies thus found to be raised by the above
mentioned women.
Some fifty years after Betanzos collected his information in Cuzco, the missionary Martin de
Murua produced a list of the ordinances of Inca Pachacuti, and shortly thereafter, the Andean
historian Guaman Poma de Ayala wrote down a set of somewhat similar ordinances which he
attributed to Pachacuti's successor Tupa Yupanqui. By this time, a body of literature had come
into existence which praised the strict laws of the Incas as exemplary, and contrasted the harmony
and affluence of the Inca empire with the social chaos and and perennial shortages of colonial
Peru. The ordinances of Murua and Guaman Poma reflect these circumstances, in that they invite
the conclusion that the Inca empire was a strictly regulated, ordered and affluent society: the very
opposite of conditions at century's end.
Furthermore, the ordinances of Murua and Guaman Poma reflect the ideas and ideals of a
European and Christian legislator, so that these ordinances reproduce a variety of generalized
Andean regulation, a number of laws that could only be derived from Judeo-Christian precepts
and a tiny residue of legal practice that can be attributed to the Incas. As regards the European
layer in these texts, both Guaman Poma and Murua thought, for example, that the Incas
prohibited mensturating women from offering sacrifice, a rule which is more likely to have been
derived from Leviticus than from Inca or Andean practice. According to Murua, the Incas had
the custom of bestowing honourable burial on those of their enemies who had fallen in battle - but
according to the much more reliable evidence of Betanzos, the very opposite was the case. Both
Murua and Guaman Poma thought that women and the poor could not give evidence in Inca
litigation, the former because of their "levity," and the latter because they were likely
to succumb to bribes; but a law of this kind presupposes Spanish judicial procedure, and was
perhaps invented as a commentary on it. Laws in Murua and Guaman Poma that proclaim Cuzco
as the "court and capital" of "these kingdoms" evoke Spanish
formulations regarding Madrid as the seat of the royal court, and Guaman Poma's idea that Inca
law was to be "observed and obeyed" likewise depends on Spanish precedent.
Finally, where Betanzos had distinguished laws affecting Cuzco from those affecting the provinces
of the empire, Murua replaced this distinction by one separating law regulating civilian life from
the law of war, because in Europe, the latter constituted a distinct juridical category. Legal rules
distinguishing conduct in the capital city from conduct in the rest of a country, on the other hand,
were unknown in sixteenth century Europe. Murua thus introduced his Inca laws about warfare
with the remark: "for the conduct of war, the Inca made the following ordinances,"
and proceded to describe a legitimate casus belli as viewed by his Incas in terms reminiscent of the
declaration of war that according to Livy, Tullus Hostilius had issued against Alba Longa.
In such a context, the specifics of Inca legal practice that speak in Betanzos' rules about fires in
Cuzco and the care of illegitimate babies were inevitably lost to view, wiped away by exponents
of European legal thinking who approached problems with different juridical principles in mind.
Their preconceptions were reinforced by individuals born and raised in the Andes, such as
Guaman Poma, who were eager to prove to the invaders that the conquered world of the Incas
had possessed its own order and integrity; and indeed, a number of Spaniards were eager to prove
the same thing. But, in the last resort, the proof could only be conducted by appealing to the legal
concepts and the legal language of the now dominant culture.
This same dilemma is spelt out in the manner in which Spanish Peru was governed during the
sixteenth century. The lawyers who sat as judges and pleaded cases in the Audiencias of Lima
and Charcas had been educated in Spain, and their norms of professional conduct were likewise
Spanish. But before long, Andean cases were brought before these experts that defied the legal
system in which they had been trained. Most troublesome was litigation involving tribute
payments and thus land, because Inca and Andean ideas about rights of access to land did not
correspond to Spanish ones. In the face of conflicting claims, the Spanish tended to try imposing
one simple rule, namely that ownership of land should be adjudicated to the party who had
enjoyed it under the Incas, and that tribute payments should match whatever had been collected
by the Incas. While these principles raised a host of unforeseen difficulties, they also reinforced
some significant misconceptions about the Andean and Inca past.
Although the Spanish invaders had from the beginning perceived a certain unity and uniformity
in the Inca empire, this empire was no monolith, but a polity that encompassed a vast range of
linguistic, political, cultural and ecological variety. It was, however, one of the paradoxes of the
workings of colonial culture and politics in Peru that this variety was increasingly homogenized, at
least in a superficial sense. When the Spanish arrived, for example, the people of almost every
valley spoke their own language, with "the general language of the Inca, known as
Quechua" serving as a sort of lingua franca. By 1700, however, these regional languages
had almost completely disappeared, in part because Spanish officials and missionaries only
recognized Quechua. This priority assigned to Quechua went hand in hand with the Spanish
acceptance of the Inca claim that their's had been the first and indeed the only ordered polity in the
Andes, and that before their own advent, Andean people had lived in social chaos and without the
arts of civilisation such as agriculture, weaving and architecture. Such a claim appeared credible,
much evidence, such as the still functioning Chimu capital in Northern Peru to the contrary,
because the theory of political development enshirned in it had important European analogues.
Cieza's Manco Capac, for example, who called together people from the vicinity of Cuzco
"with love and kind words" resonated not only with the story of the Romans who had
governed in Spain "with love and friendship," but also with Cicero's orator, a
"great and wise man," who gathered people living scattered in fields and forest
retreats into ordered settlements and taught them civilisation. In subsequent historians of the
Incas, this Ciceronian image of Manco Capac became ever more elaborate, not merely because the
lure of classical antiquity was strong, but also because such a model of the progress of civilisation
was reinforced by the manner in which Spanish officials and lawyers formulated their questions
and thus organized information about the Andes.
In 1553, the Spanish crown issued one of many questionnaires about tribute payments, which
was in due course answered by Hernando de Santillan, lawyer and oidor of the Audiencia of Lima.
The lawyer Juan Polo de Ondegardo also responded to this questionnaire, and very similar
questions were asked in regional inspections conducted on behalf of the Spanish crown to assess
tribute payments. All these questionnaires enquired about the quantity of tribute payments in
Spanish Peru, the manner in which they should be collected, and whether they were to consist of
cash or kind, while at the same time accepting Inca practice as the crucial point of departure. But
this was more easily said than done, as is revealed by the very form of the responses that lawyers
in Peru sent back to Madrid. At issue were not merely various practical problems, such as the
transition to a monetary economy, and the huge drop in the population of Peru that followed
invasion and conquest, but also the very concept of what constituted society and sovereignty.
Before entering on his task, accordingly, Santillan outlined the history of the Incas and their
system of government, pointing out that the first question he was to answer "deals with the
lords who governed the Indians of these provinces." But all the question had asked was,
"What tributes (they) payed in the time of their infidelity ...," the issue of who had
governed being incidental to this primary concern of the crown. However, Santillan, and similarly
Polo de Ondegardo, were seeking to establish a context in which they could explain the existence
and functioning of the threefold division of lands that the Incas had made, one part being for the
state religion, one for the Inca and the third for the people, pointing out that this had to be
understood before one could discuss tribute. In addition, the division of land in turn was relevant
to how one could think about sovereignty in Peru, which also bore on the question of tribute.
These complications were aggravated by a problem resulting from the presence of the Spanish
in Peru that was discussed at length by Polo de Ondegardo. The Incas being gone, Spaniards
considered themselves entitled to claim as their own lands that had formerly been assigned to the
Inca and the state religion, while at the same time collecting tribute from the remainder. But, as
Polo pointed out, this resulted in a double payment of tribute, because the Incas had never taken
anything from this last category of land. Rather, by way of serving the Inca ruler, people had
worked the lands assigned to him and to the state religion, reserving crops harvested from lands
that had been assigned to themselves for their own exclusive use. Other forms of serving the
Inca, such as weaving and construction, had likewise left this category of land untouched.
Spanish demands for what amounted to double tribute payments, Polo argued, were the direct
outcome of failing to understand how the Incas had governed. This difficulty, as viewed by Polo,
was compounded by a further one, which concerned the status of the individual within the Inca
state, or, more precisely, the absence of such status. According to Polo, the concept of personal
freedom was unknown to the Incas, because throughout, the Incas had dealt with communities,
not with individuals. The Inca ruler had assigned work to be performed in his service not to
individuals but to communities, and in each community, the curacas, whose authority and position
the Inca had ratified, supervised the distribution of this work. Hence, Polo observed, litigation
about land between Andean individuals was practically unheard of in early colonial Peru. Rather,
the cases that were heard in the Audiencias were almost invariably disputes between communities.
Polo thought that the Spanish ought to continue governing and taxing Andean people as
communities, not as individuals, thereby curtailing their freedom, but at the same time preserving
some semblance of the order established by the Incas, while simultaneously avoiding the expense
and effort of creating annual census records of tributarios. Practical considerations thus went
hand in hand with more theoretical ones. The ordering of political society by reference to groups
and to hierarchies of authority, Polo thought, was both universal and beneficial, and he quoted
Aristotle to prove his point:
The entire government of our republic consists of the ordained subjection which we maintain in
relation to one another, and the restraint imposed on anyone running wild. Examples are readily
to hand: children are subject to parents, wives to husbands, servants to their masters; friars to
their superiors and clerics to the bishop. In sum, there is noone without a superior whom he
fears, and if anyone strays, the force of the law bears on his punishment and judges attend to the
law's execution, thanks to which republics have perpetuated themselves and continue to do so
until this day.
However, Aristotle notwithstanding, Polo was not interested in imposing a European historical
and political vision in the Andes. For, while recognizing how much irreversible change the
Spaniards had effected in Peru, he believed that as much as possible of the government of the
Incas should be salvaged, and that no new measures should be introduced without understanding
"(Andean) customs and laws." Santillan was one among many to share this view.
"Before the Incas began to rule," he wrote,
there existed no government or public order. Rather, in each valley or province there was a
curaca, or principal lord, ... and each of these valleys was at war with its neighbour, and for this
reason, there existed no commerce or communication among them. And in each valley a language
was spoken different from the next ... In general, no-one achieved power or reduced the land to a
kingdom and empire until the Incas began to rule, and their sovereignty and government extended
further and was more civilized and ordered than any other that is remembered in that land. And
even outside it, ... (the Incas) ruled so well that they ought to be praised and even imitated.
Similarly, Polo wrote that before the Incas, people in the Andes lived like "animals"
without any discernible political authority, and that the admirable legal and social order that the
Spanish found had been created by the Incas. Polo recognized that the beginning of Inca imperial
expansion predated his own time only by some three hundred years, but, so he thought, no one in
the Andes remembered any other major state; hence, in effect, the Incas had ruled from time
immemorial.
The image that sixteenth century historians painted of the Incas was to some extent shaped by the
shadow of Rome, by the idea that in some sense, the Roman and the Inca empires resembled each
other, that Rome provided an explanatory context in which the Incas could be understood.
Lawyers thought about the Incas in more practical terms because they were occupied, day by day,
with the government of Peru. The specifics of Inca land holding and taxation and other related
issues thus occupied their attention much more than did the process of Inca imperial expansion
and the deeds of individual Incas. Polo de Ondegardo discovered the mummified body of Inca
Pachacuti along with the "quipus and accounts" of his deeds; but, Polo wrote, there
was no time on that occasion to enquire what exactly these quipus said, and with this, he
continued his discussion of practical matters. Lawyers did not need the Roman empire as an
explanatory context to understand the Incas, and altogether referred surprisingly little to
European models or antecedents for what they found in the Andes. But that did not mean that
they were not also agents of a Spanish historical vision in the Andes, and agents of profound
change.
The Incas had brought to the Andes an administrative uniformity that did not exist before, and
with it had gone a certain degree of cultural and religious uniformity. But it was in Spanish Peru
that Quechua supplanted the many regional languages of the Andes, while Christianity eliminated
the many forms of religious and cultural diversity that had been accomodated within the Inca state
religion. Yet, the lawyers who were instrumental in implementing this profound transformation
were, as we have seen, conservatives in many respects, even though their very conservatism
entailed its own mode of innovation. These three features which we have noted in their ideas and
activities, a tendency to foster uniformity along with a desire to preserve some part of the Inca
order, and a tendency in spite of this conservatism to help implement radical change, are reflected
in a document from Laraos of the year 1597. Laraos is situated in the Andes south east of Lima,
and originated as a resettlement community which was organized in 1569 by the local governor
Davila Brizeno. Twenty eight years later, in 1597, this community produced a document in
Quechua and Spanish describing the boundaries of its land, with an accompanying map.
According to the Quechua text, the boundaries between Laraos and its neighbours had been
established by the Inca Tupa Yupanqui, who had personally walked along the boundary line. On
August 8th, 1597, the curaca of Laraos with seven old men again walked this boundary line,
inspecting the landmarks and boundary stones that defined it by way of re-establishing the
community's claims to the land. The document was signed by the seven old men, the curaca and
the Andean notary who wrote it down. On the same page appears the Spanish text, which
mentions the same witnesses, along with representatives of neighbouring communities. The map
displays the boundary markers and land marks that are also mentioned in the text, but the way in
which this map is conceptualized has little to do with European maps. Rather, what it shows is
the river dividing Laraos into its upper and lower moieties, each of which is ringed by its
boundary on which the land marks form a continuous band.
This document is a testimony of the old and the new in the Andes at century's end, a testimony
of continuity along with headlong innovation such as also describes the impact of the Spanish
language and Spanish historical perceptions in the Andes. The people of Laraos looked back to
the Inca Tupa Yupanqui to explain the existence of their community, even though that community
had been created by the Spanish. At the same time, the Inca's claim to rule was expressed
anachronistically in Christian terms, for he appears in the document as "Tupa Inca Yupanqui
by the Mercy of God." Behind this anachronism and behind the claim that Laraos was the
creation of Tupa Inca Yupanqui lurks a profound paradox that characterized the culture of early
colonial Peru. On the one hand, the Spanish had supplanted the Incas; regional Andean language
were in the course of disappearing, and in the political sphere, Spanish had supplanted Quechua;
but on the other hand, the Incas were seen to constitute the essential pre-condition of Spanish
existence in Peru. Viewed from the Andean vantagepoint that speaks through our document from
Laraos, however, what the Spanish were doing had to remain quite simply unintelligible unless it
could be formulated by reference to the Incas. In its own day, Inca dominion had been much
contested and fought against. But in retrospect, the Incas legitimated and explained the political
existence of Andean people in the present. The Spanish language used by government and in
courts of law and presupposed Quechua antecedents, while Spanish government could not
function without recourse to a perception of history that included the Incas. However much this
was a hispanized vision that had been accomodated to the new political realities of the Viceroyalty
of Peru, it highlighted, as Garcilaso expressed it, "the foundations upon which the Indians
draw when recounting what was greatest and best in their empire."
|