I am working on a book-length project primarily on the relation between metaphysics and philosophy of language to philosophy of science. The book (tentative title: The New Theory of Reference and A New Philosophy of Science) will concentrate on applying various notions both in the new theory of reference and in metaphysics to various topics in philosophy of science. Part I of the book will begin with a discussion of three metaphysical principles from which we may derive the necessity of the laws of physics for all material substances. I then examine the implications of this form of physical necessity for the claim that there is a more fundamental metaphysical notion of necessity. I also examine the plausibility of the view that there can be counter-legals ("possible scientific laws" contrary to actual laws). In part I, I also examine the role of haecceitism (a view that one can talk coherently of the same object in different possible circumstances) in light of possible states of sub-atomic particles.
In part II of the book, I discuss at length classification systems to evaluate the degree to which various metaphysical and semantic notions are presupposed in our scientific classificatory systems. I compare leading approaches to systematics in biology -- phenetics, evolutionary systematics, and cladistics -- and discuss the resultant debates over taxonomy (e.g., the cladistically motivated proposal to supplant Linnaean taxonomy with the rank-free PhyloCode). More broadly, I compare classification in biology with classification in chemistry and physics. I evaluate two central questions: are the classificatory systems at one level of science reduced to or eliminable in favor of a more fundamental level of classification in science; does classification in biology based upon the theory of evolution present a challenge to the semantics of natural kind terms as given by the new theory of reference?