

Ownership in Post-Conflict State Building Policy Memo

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Executive Summary

This paper will explore unintended consequences of international assistance in Sierra Leone and Tajikistan by focusing on the post-war framework of resource distribution and redistribution that has been, in a large part, designed, financed, and implemented by external actors. Specifically, it will argue that post-war exclusion and violence is the result of international transitional assistance that tends to sustain, or reinforce, wartime patterns of resource distribution, such as the clientelistic use of state assets through kinship and regional affiliations, or for personal allegiance to the ruler. Based on policy review and the case studies of Tajikistan and Sierra Leone, it will propose that the current approaches to post-conflict state building have failed to transform the existing, wartime patterns of resource distribution known to be “inherently authoritarian, violent, and disaster-producing” (Duffield 1994:55). Violence, according to literatures on civil war, is not necessarily the result of a breakdown or collapse of states but a competition over exclusionary and private uses of state assets and prerogatives (Bratton and Walle 1997, Reno 1999, Rubin 2002). Those benefiting from the distortion of state capacity will have few incentives to establish an effective and legitimate government (Ballentine May 2004, Berdal and Malone 2000, Duffield 2002).

It is hence imperative that the post-war provisions of resources, to be inclusive, be treated as public goods which require the mobilization and regularization of resources and relations of government accountability that arise from the interests of citizens as taxpayers. International donors, however, have often relied on the existing elite networks, including those based on alternative or extra-legal sources of authority (e.g., customary law) and capacity (e.g., arising from a war economy), in the administration of internal and external resources at the risk of perpetuating the hierarchy of power relations *ex ante*. Moreover, a minimalist government model preferred by donors tends to reduce the scope and capacity of states by privatizing or reducing expenditures for what states provide as public goods.¹ Thus, frequently, it is no longer states that provide the public goods but international donors through their implementing organizations.² These policies, I propose, have an unintended consequence of sustaining the wartime patterns of income generation and allocation which tend to be exclusive, clientelistic, and conflict-prone, as these elites are likely to extend resources only to the members of their own communities. Those who are not included in their definition of community or who belong to opposing or weaker groups will face exclusion from access to employment, land, and

¹ The Washington Consensus policies can also undermine a peace process. In Cambodia, the World Bank pushed for a downsizing of the public sector when political compromises established under the peace accord had included the expansion of civil service to absorb various political parties. Astri Suhrke, Arve Ofstad, and Are Knudsen, "A decade of peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan," (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002), 41.

² In Sierra Leone, international aid constitutes 81.3% of central government expenditure and “the Tajik state has almost completely outsourced the provision of material public goods to international donors.” Christoph Zürcher and Kristof Gosztanyi, "The Future of Intervention: Intervention, Legitimacy and the Reconstruction of Statehood" (paper presented at the Blankensee-Colloquium: Kultureller und Sozialer Wandel, Berlin & Blankensee, 16-18 July 2004 2004), 23.

other resources that provide livelihoods.³ The failure to transform the wartime distributive structures is likely to result in an emergence of the state with its legitimacy and capacity severely constrained by the increasingly authoritarian polity, rampant corruption, or the rise of organized crime and other economic-motivated violence.

Introduction/Policy Context

Although international actors have increasingly assumed executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities in the post-war reorganization of polity and economy⁴(Caplan 2002:110, Gurr and Marshall 2003), a gap remains between their stated goals of peace—namely, the establishment of security, democracy, and economic development and their foundations in effective and legitimate states⁵—and what they have been able to achieve collectively. The implementation of peace agreements has stalled even when UN involvement was deemed “successful,” such as in Cambodia (by the 1998 coup), Guatemala (by the 1999 referendum that rejected the proposed constitutional amendments), and Tajikistan (by the executive decrees consolidating presidential power).⁶ It has been argued that success should be based on whether “large-scale violence is brought to an end while the implementers are present and the war is terminated on a self-enforcing basis so that the implementers can go home without fear of the war rekindling” (Downs and Stedman 2002). This external security-centric—or minimalist—definition of peace implementation, however, can lead to a false assumption of institutional outcomes. Though the establishment of law and order is prerequisite for any state building, peace processes could collapse after security is restored, elections held, and an interim government put in place through a large-scaled international assistance (e.g., Haiti and Liberia in the 1990s).

In the immediate aftermath of civil wars, external actors are pressed to act as the government or its surrogates, establishing infrastructures for and carrying out immediate transitional tasks (e.g.,

³ As a World Bank-commissioned report recognizes, although “building on what exists may enhance the legitimacy of community councils and the returns of project investments... the inclusion and active participation of marginalized groups may prove difficult” Arne Strand et al., “Community Driven Development in Contexts of Conflict,” (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2003), 6.. Bermeo also argues that “kin-based or religious organizations are increasingly providing refuge from state inadequacies, but these groups tend to be pre-liberal or illiberal and to subscribe to undemocratic values...these groups themselves are inherently exclusionary and often chauvinistic” Nancy Bermeo, “What the Democratization Literature Says--or Doesn't Say--About Postwar Democratization,” *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003): 246..

⁴ This definition of state building is provided by David D. Laitin and James D. Fearon, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” *International Security* 28, no. 4 (2004). Alternatively, post-conflict state building may be understood as “extended international involvement (primarily, though not exclusively, through the United Nations) that goes beyond traditional peace-keeping and peace-building mandates, and is directed at building or re-building the institutions of the state.” *What is state building?* (International Peace Academy, [cited August 27 2004]); available from http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseState_Building.htm.

⁵ The goals of UN peacekeeping operations include, for instance, an establishment of a “transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.” *The Mission of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations* (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, [cited August 18 2004]); available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/info/page3.htm>.


⁶ Of the 18 countries that experienced UN peacekeeping missions with a political institution building component between 1988 and 2002, thirteen (72%) have been classified as some forms of authoritarian regime. Charles T. Call and Susan E. Cook, “On Democratization and Peacebuilding,” *Global Governance* 9, no. 2 (2003): 233-34.

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants), while also striking a balance between the need for timely delivery of humanitarian assistance and for local capacity building. For the sake of expediency and with few alternatives available, donors have increasingly focused on the role of community participation in public service delivery, many of which originate from humanitarian assistance in areas where hardly any government structures are present (2004f:11).⁷ Community-based development also seeks to resolve the lack of coherent policies and funding gaps in transition situations (2004d:23). International transitional assistance may be thus characterized by “liberalization,” “NGOization” (of subcontracting arrangements by aid agencies), “informalization” (that privileges informal or ‘customary’ forms of domination to ensure order)—which is closely related to liberalization in that ad hoc, privately managed arrangements take precedence over formalized regulation by public authorities—and “securitization” of the development agenda (Gould 2005). Frequently, therefore, it is no longer states that provide these public goods but international donors through their implementing organizations. In Sierra Leone, international aid constitute 81.3% of the central government expenditures and “the Tajik state has almost completely outsourced the provision of material public goods to international donors” (Zürcher and Gosztonyi 2004:23).

Against this background, questions with regard to the reform of the wartime distributive structures include:

- (a) The selection of local partners—its criteria and legitimacy—and possible alternatives (to what extent international actors are prepared to form a new group of elites or forced to rely on the existing ones; if the former is feasible, how to ensure the sustainability of those arrangements without reverting to authoritarianism);
- (b) How to balance donor regulations, including those on transparency and accountability, and the use of aid as a strategic instrument of concession (when economic-financial incentives may be offered to transform informal/war-time power structures);
- (c) How to ensure accountability at multiple levels to avoid corruption and patronage between donors and governments, governments and regional and sub-regional groups, and donors and their local-communal partners (e.g., if, and what kinds of, “taxation” might exist in exchange for the allocation of those resources and who collects and controls them)

⁷ Community-based development is expected to enhance sustainable, effective, and inclusive development and governance by reducing informational problems (direct elicitation of needs and priorities from target communities), expanding the public goods and the resources available to the poor (credit, social funds, capacity building and training), and strengthening the capacity of local institutions.



(a) Politics of post-war resource distribution: who is in control?

In Tajikistan, kinship-based identities and ethno-regional patronage systems—often referred to as clan politics—have shaped the alignments of power and income allocation prior to, during, and after the civil war. The clan-based informal quotas—not the quotas for the United Tajik Oppositions (UTO) set out in the 1997 peace agreement—continue to form the basis of government appointments (Olimova 2004:94).⁸ It has been argued that the peace accord, facilitated by the UN and OSCE, formalized and bolstered “an openly clan-based regime” of President Emomali Rakhmonov (Asadullaev 2001, Collins 2004:225). Throughout the civil war period, Rakhmonov’s government maintained sufficient control over key state positions, infrastructures, and enterprises, the privatization of which was negotiated and planned by the state, in secrecy, without the participation of opposition parties (Martino 2004:35). The managements of electricity, cotton, or mine industries are handpicked by the President, a policy he has utilized to reward regime loyalist or co-opt the opposition leaders to becoming part of the administration.⁹ President Rakhmonov heavily recruits commanding officers and the chiefs of regional and district administrations from his hometown of Danghara in order to consolidate control over law enforcement, customs, taxation, and business enterprise development (Olimova 2004:90). Power in Tajikistan is thus executed through the parallel processes of (a) horizontal clan politics among regional leaders and (b) hierarchic and vertical bureaucracies that report directly to President (Olimova 2004:108).¹⁰ These two systems of patron-client connection compete with, and mutually reinforce, each

⁸ Occasionally, individuals outside the specific ethno-regional group may be selected to prestigious positions, because of advantageous marriages or other specific merits for the ruling region/

⁹ Hence, opposition parties are “still much more preoccupied in the reform or remaking of privatization, which was crucial to them fifteen years ago, than in problems such as the administrative relations between the central state and the regions.”

Stephane A. Dudoignon, “From Ambivalence to Ambiguity? Some Paradigms of Policy Making in Tajikistan,” in *Tajikistan at a Crossroad: The Politics of Decentralization*, ed. Luigi De Martino (Geneva: Cibera, 2004), 133-34.

¹⁰ This relates to the new economic-institutionalist arguments about relationships between formal and informal institutions (Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). North argues that failed or incomplete transition can be explained by informal institutions which as part of cultural or habitual behavior are difficult to change. According to Grzymala-Busse, the main functions of informal institutions include: (1) the redistribution of resources via family and personal networks, norms of mutual insurance, or discretionary access to state

other, as the ability to convert administrative potential into financial capital has created a competition among clans over the appointment for government positions and hence an access to the privatization pie (Olimova 2004:96). The increasingly centralizing and exclusive state apparatus has also strengthened regionalism, because:

the weakening of the state power, post-Soviet lack of confidence in the bureaucracy, and changing rules of the game (transition to the market) have stimulated the growth of the influence of tribal, regional and ethnic ties and traditional social institutions. They serve as an instrument of survival of the people; however, from the other side they promoted the isolation of the people within their regional, local, tribal groups (Olimov and Olimova 2004:12).

In Sierra Leone, the role of “conflict diamonds” —or more specifically, benefits from diamond extraction and the inability of the state to adequately tax the sector—was part of a wider set of problems that led to the civil war. While the introduction of neo-liberal policies in the 1970-80s reduced food subsidies and escalated grievances associated with the paramount chieftaincy (especially among the youth), ethno-regional tensions (e.g., Mende versus Temme), and factionalism within the military, privatization expanded the personal fortune of Siaka Stevens and his allies (e.g., a small group of the Lebanese merchants) through their monopolistic control of private enterprises and government import/export licensing. The process of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone presents a risk of reconstructing the political-economy structures that caused and escalated the conflict in the first place (Keen 2003). Neo-liberal economic policies, the native administration of paramount chieftaincy, and rural-urban gaps have been revived through international assistance, and the influx of aid without the state capacity to manage it exacerbates corruption. With the IMF-imposed limits on the public sector spending, the salary scale of civil servants is close to or below the poverty threshold (Hanlon 2004). As a result, many normal state functions have been carried out by large and well-funded international NGOs:

Rather than the government collecting maximum revenues, using them to pay for basic services, and then developing a plan to seek specific, targeted assistance where funds are insufficient, it is outside actors (donors, INGOs or UN) that set policy and perform other state functions...Such swapping of responsibilities means that the state does not build meaningful capacities. Its institutions are focused on finding new sources of donor revenue, rather than managing money at hand in a way that would develop autonomy and self-sufficiency” (2004c:5-6).

Furthermore, although the rule of paramount chieftaincy was one of the major causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone, some semblance of traditional authority has been reinstated, notably through the support

resources; (2) information sharing to reduce transaction costs; and (3) social control through informal monitoring and sanctions. Anna Grzymala-Busse, *Informal Institutions and the Post-Communist State* (The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, July 13, 2004 2004 [cited July 28 2004]); available from <http://www.nceeer.org/Working%20Papers/paperpdfs/grzymalabusse071304.pdf>. As such, informal constraints can be complementary or accommodative to formal institutions and provide solutions to problems of social coordination. This is more likely, however, when formal institutions are effective. When formal institutions are weak and ineffective, informal constraints can undermine the efficiency and performance of states by posing parallel and competing power outside formal-legal state control (Hans-Joachim Lauth, "Informal Institutions and Democracy," *Democratization* 7, no. Winter 2000 (2000).

of the UK's Department for International Development. Donors have heavily relied on the role of paramount chiefs in the distribution of humanitarian and development assistance: UNHCR's Community Empowerment Program (CEP) handed out financial resources to paramount chiefs with a view to facilitating the settlement and reintegration of repatriated refugees. CEP approach was favorably received within the UN country team and was included as one of the guiding principles in the 2004 UN Transitional Appeal for Relief and Recovery. CEP's aims to empower different groups within communities, however, failed because:

The problem resides in the fact that in most cases the sensitization and decision making process concerned the CEPs is geographically focused and relies on traditional leaders at chiefdom and village level, as well as on existing decision making bodies such as the Village Development Committees. In a post-conflict situation when community cohesion is fragile CEPs can become a source of dispute between different parties seeking to exert control (Sperl and Vriese 2005:44).

(b) Local resource management

Tajikistan faces the challenge not only of post-war reconstruction but also of the post-Soviet transition within the region where, compounded by slumped democratic-market reforms, donors have increasingly abstained from working with the government and concentrated on the local-level support to development (2004f:2). Community-based development programs, such as the World Bank's Community-Driven Development (CDD) and UNDP's Area-Based Development, are among the fastest growing mechanism for development assistance expected to enhance public service delivery in a sustainable, effective, and inclusive manner through direct elicitation of needs and priorities and resources available to the poor (2004f:11).¹¹

In the process of community-based development, donors organize local development groups which often overlap with the historical forms of social cohesion and self-help, such as *avlod* (patriarchic extended family), *mahalla* (a neighborhood-based form of voluntary associations) and *aksakal* (well-respected male member of the community), all of which build on kinship ties and the proximity of residence (Peabody, et al. 2004:17-18). These solidarity networks provided mutual support, information sharing, life-cycle rituals, and communal decision-making through the gatherings of the male elders in mosques and teahouses (*chaihara*).¹² Although these institutions were considerably

¹¹ The World Bank's lending for CDD projects has increased even for the conservative estimate from \$325 million in 1996 to \$2 billion in 2003 Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, "Evaluating Community-Based and Community-Driven Development: A Critical Review of the Evidence," ed. Development Research Group (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2003), 2.. Similarly, UNDP's area-based development approach represents one of the principal strategies to promote local ownership,¹¹ and its decentralization programs have evolved significantly over the past decade financially and substantively, expanding from administrative decentralization to the devolution of political, financial, and executive responsibilities. "The UNDP Role in Decentralization and Local Governance: A Joint UNDP-Government of Germany Evaluation," (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office, 2000), 6-7. According to UNDP's "Learning from Experience for Afghanistan" (2002), "decentralization is a useful tool in post-conflict situations because it broadens participation in peace building, helps groups overcome ethnic conflict, and drives growth and development at the grassroots level. A decentralized approach also allows for broader participation in decision making. Most conflicts arise from competition for scarce resources. Decentralization is a means of jumpstarting development at the local level while processes are underway at the center."

¹² For instance, a decision to become a labor migrant must be approved by the head or elders of *avlod* (patriarchal extended family) who then raises money to help with travel, makes arrangements to ensure that the migrant's family members are taken

eroded during the Soviet period, their status has been reinvigorated by international humanitarian and development aid agencies to enhance the legitimacy of projects and *ashar*, collective voluntary labor, which donors often require as the community contribution towards the project costs. As such, community-based development does not necessarily transform the composition of community elite structures, but tends to preserve it. Community groups were often “linked to clan and family structures, the pressures to firstly satisfy family, then community needs, remained” (Freizer 2005). Many community initiatives tend to start with a limited social assessment and generally do not focus on the structure and functions of institutions at the village level (2002a:10). Meanwhile, accountability mechanisms between donors and communities are not clearly defined. The World Bank’s own evaluation admits that strategies to ensure transparency and combat corruption have largely been overlooked in community-development projects in Central Asia (2002a:22). Relationships among donors, local governments and the community initiative groups also remain ambiguous. Local governments are in most cases the owners of the assets created or rehabilitated through a project, although they often do not have a proprietary role in operations and maintenance (2002a:21).

In Sierra Leone, paramount chiefs have been known to “distribute resources and jobs to family and business relations, thereby further reducing the numbers involved in decision-making and sustaining a patronage system that continues today” (2003c:17). Chieftom land is reserved for ‘natives’, whereas ‘non-natives’ are required to take out a lease to build on chieftom land, the definition of which is unwritten and enforced by the chiefs as achieving ‘native’ status means rights to land, residence, the law and political representation (Jackson 2005:53). Paramount chiefs are also the primary agents of tax collection and management at the local level, and chieftom tax collectors are usually accompanied by chieftom police and defaulters are brought to customary courts. Especially in diamond areas, revenues from the 0.75% tax for the Mining Community Development Fund are distributed among the chieftoms in the areas proportionately to the number of mining licenses held in each territory. Much of the money, however, has been “mismanaged or embezzled by chiefs who were displaced during the war and have little attachment to their people” (Malan and Meek 130).

According to the Conciliation Resources which supports local peace monitoring and reconciliation, one of the most concerning signs of conflict arising at the local level is tensions between paramount chiefs and the youth, particularly those related to CDF as they demobilize and return to their chieftoms. Many of the disarmed youth have been absorbed into informal groups, such as the Movement of Concerned Kono Youths (MOCKY formed in 1999, or the Bike Rental Associations (BRA). MOCKY demands that all foreigners, particularly the Lebanese, stay out of the district, and the BRA youth are increasingly involved in the incidents of shooting, theft, murder, and riots or confrontations with the police. After the departure of UNAMSIL, any “peaceful” demonstrations can quickly escalate into large-scaled disturbances.

(3) The Role of the State

care of, and facilitates support networks through which migrant workers find jobs, accommodation, resident permits, and cash in host countries. Babken Babajanian, "Poverty and Social Exclusion in Tajikistan," in *Prepared for the World Bank* (2004), 17.

When there is inequality within the local power structures, the benefits of international assistance to post-conflict state building may be captured by non-target groups (Mansuri and Rao 2003:13). As the World Bank report argues:

Many communities are characterized by serious power imbalances, which place severe constraints on community-based development. Where the poor are heavily dependent on vertical links with local elites, it is difficult to form the horizontal associations necessary for organizing collective action for the common good. Moreover, there is real danger of “local capture” of development programs, with local elites thwarting efforts at collective action or monopolizing their benefits. In such settings, higher levels of government may actually be better motivated to help the disadvantaged than local agencies influenced by local vested interests (Gupta, et al. 2003:2)

Yet, as the Bank’s report recognizes, many community-based development initiatives alienated local governments, perceiving “government agencies to be irrelevant or obstacles to CDD (Community-Driven Development) and have largely bypassed them in CDD activities, fearing that government involvement would result in elite capture and the exclusion of vulnerable groups” (Peabody, et al. 2004:14). Distancing the government from community-based development, however, presents several challenges. First, accountability between donors and the government remains problematic. Second, by establishing new structures for decision-making and resource allocation, donors may have overlooked an important political aspect. That is, these parallel arrangements can distract public activism from official governance processes in which the public puts claims on government bodies and their performance (2004f:11). Third, donors increasingly realize the role of state responsibilities for the sustainability of community development, because community motivation for infrastructure projects does not automatically translate into a comprehensive understanding of the need for long-term maintenance.

The limits of community-based development have also become clear. In many micro-credit and other community-project sites, villagers complain about the lack of electricity, large-scaled water supply for irrigation, transportation, and other public goods and services that are beyond the scope of village-level interventions. The Aga Khan Foundation’s report on its program in the Rasht Valley notes that although income in the region as a whole increased, it is the richest families who benefit from the agricultural, livestock, and non-agricultural income generation program (diversifying their income sources), not the poorest families whose income increase is mainly derived from remittance. Moreover, “there has been little change in the number of job opportunities and no real decrease in unemployment...there is an overall increase in a number of people leaving to Russia” (2004b). Furthermore, rural development based on kinship affiliation can often preclude development of cross-regional or wider social networks between different groups of people. While providing protection, kinship ties can also suppress individual choice and freedom (Babajanian 2004:18).

Unintended Consequences

The 2004 Report on Transition Issues jointly prepared by the UN Development Group and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Action Working Group notes that post-war transition should aim at scaling down humanitarian assistance (exit strategy) and scaling up reconstruction and recovery activities for longer-term development (2004d:15). Yet,

whereas the UN has a tendency to neatly compartmentalize humanitarian, transition and development contexts...UN does not have currently an established planning tool or funding mechanism that is flexible enough to address a complex situation like Tajikistan, which requires both humanitarian aid, post-conflict recovery assistance, and development cooperation at the same time (2004a).

Many trade-offs are being made in such a “transition” context. In Tajikistan, international organizations may have contributed to maintaining or strengthening the clan politics and status quo within, because of the “securitization” of peace-building approaches that privilege the end of open and armed hostilities over inclusive decision-making and development. This trend, if any, has been reinforced in the course of the post-9/11 war on terrorism: in Tajikistan and throughout Central Asia, any signs of political dissent have been suppressed in the name of preventing or fighting terrorism, and the oppression of popular participation in decision-making has resulted in the expansion of underground or extremist Islamic movements. Donors, meanwhile, continue to focus on technical assistance, rather than combating corruption or authoritarianism. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), usually formulated exclusively with the government beyond the reach of the public, tend to be “technical and compartmentalized” and rarely link “economic reforms with institutional capacity building”(2002b:Para 16, 2003d:10). National development strategies based on growth strategies may not necessarily promote equity and inclusion, and “poverty reduction policies appear as an add-on to a general growth strategy” (2003b:31).

In lieu of inclusive and equitable development, international assistance to local self-reliance has, counter-intuitively, stimulated the growth of the influence of tribal, regional and ethnic ties and traditional social institutions which serve as an instrument of survival, but also leads to the isolation of the people within their regional, local, tribal groups. These collective solidarity networks are in conflict with individualism associated with the market reforms (Olimov and Olimova 2004:12). The anatomization of communities also correlates to regime stability, preserving the archaic forms of power and preventing the democratization of the society and the state. A public opinion survey held in Dushanbe in 1999, 35.6% of the population prefer to live in the communist society (6% would like to live in the Islamic society), and 58% consider that it is necessary to strengthen the state control. Forty-three percent of respondents consider that solutions to poverty reduction and the development of the market economy lie in the restoration of order, even if it is connected with the restrictions in terms of human rights.¹³

¹³ Those respondents consider that the development of the market economy should be accompanied by the strengthening of the government control. They consider that the government should provide all aspects of human activities—from pension allowance to health care and education.

Therefore, community-based relief and development is not a substitute for robust institutional-political reforms, including the core budget support for civil services and revenue/tax generation for other recurrent costs that will enable the resumption and functioning of basic public services by the state (2004d:22). Yet, while UN agencies are gradually moving away from a focus on humanitarian emergency relief, food security is still the largest component of international assistance to Tajikistan. As the International Crisis Group report noted, “there is no denying the basic fact that food aid is effectively a donor subsidy to the cotton industry,” (2005:10). Although a small number of government elites and their international and local allies benefit from cotton production, “donors who are happy to give food aid will not provide budgetary support of the kind that would be required during a transition period”(2003d:3).

Therefore, policy recommendations will include:

- Economic reforms during the transition period have to be planned in tandem with political-institutional reforms, with a view to transforming the wartime distributive structures within or outside the formal state apparatus
- The reform of civil services and their budgetary support are not only a technical matter but are embedded in political power relations, given their influence over access to state assets and positions. Training for civil servants, a popular strategy to enhance ownership, needs to be undertaken in conjunction with larger managerial reforms, including public revenues dedicated to the priority sectors as an indicator of “political will” and “local ownership” (2003a:5)
- Power-sharing arrangements may need to be planned and implemented not only at the executive levels, but also for the ownership of state assets, enterprises, and other industrial-financial edifices, as those who control these—often quasi-state—institutions tend to be the constituencies of “spoilers” that manipulate the implementation of peace processes
- Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) tend to be elite-centric processes, mainly involving government officials but not the poor, the youth, women, and other marginalized groups that are expected to be the beneficiaries of such plans (2002b:Para 16). Moreover, there is a disconnect between the humanitarian and development actors broadly related to PRSPs/MDGs, on the one hand, and those with democratization, on the other: not much dialogue and synergy exist between organizations engaged in the two spectrums of post-conflict reconstruction agendas.
- Taxation can be reviewed as a form of accountability. In many post-conflict situations, a peculiar situation emerges in which donors and their implementing partners are essentially underwriting the basis of income tax. While donors, not the government, provide public goods and services through community-based development, the real tax basis—usually mineral and agro-business industries—are often owned or controlled by elites with formal or informal access to state positions and assets.

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